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This work aims to explore the main distortionary features arising from the economic 
double taxation of distributed profits in three member states of the European Union: 
Portugal, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
The problem of economic double taxation of distributed profits has been studied by 
public finance economists, but so far no comprehensive comparative analysis has been 
carried out at the juridical level. It is the purpose of this work to study the tax 
implications deriving from taxing distributed profits twice, but from the legal point of 
view. 
To achieve this aim both domestic laws and international tax treaties of the three 
member states selected are analysed in an interactive and pluridimensional way. Inward 
and outward investment is covered and dividend income tax burdens are ascertained by 
taking into account those taxes that directly influence the effective dividend income tax 
rate. The results are exposed and critically analysed in the light of the tax principles of 
neutrality and efficiency, the European Union principle of non-discrimination, and the 
objectives of fair distribution of revenue between member states, simplicity and 
prevention of tax evasion. 
The research findings indicate that well accepted tax principles, such as the principle of 
worldwide taxation and the principle of vertical equity, operate less efficiently in their 
roles within the overall tax system. Instead, the source principle is gaining momentum 
with simplicity or neutrality aims prevailing over distributional criteria. Accordingly, 
from a theoretical point of view, the principle of capital import neutrality is of growing 
importance as compared with the principle of capital export neutrality. 
It is also suggested that in the three states surveyed, unless an exemption system is in 
place, problems remain with the balance between debt financing and equity financing, 
complicated by the more favourably treatment given to capital gains. Neither classical 
or imputation systems provide a satisfactory answer to these problems. 
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NOTE TO READERS 
in this work, the usual U. K. style for presenting numbers has been used. Thus- 
12.310 Twelve units and three hundred and twelve thousandths of a unit (to 
three decimal places) 
12,312 Twelve thousand three hundred and twelve whole units. 
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INTRODUCTION 
WHAT IS INTEGRATION? 
1.1 Introduction 
This work aims to explore the main distortionary features arising from the 
current tax treatment given to dividend income and capital gains in three EU member 
states: the LJK, Portugal and the Netherlands. In general, distributed profits are subject 
to two levels of taxation: first at the company level and subsequently at the shareholder 
level, in direct opposition to the tax treatment granted to interest income. Indeed, 
restricted only by any anti-tax avoidance provisions applicable, interest income is freely 
deductible, and consequently subject to a single level of taxation. The discriminatory 
tax treatment given to equity finance when compared with that granted to debt finance 
raises doubts about the neutrality and efficiency of current corporate tax systems. 
These distortions increase considerably when corporate profits flow cross-border with 
high effective tax rates being charged on dividend income as a result of cumulative and 
successive tax charges. 
In this work I aim to analyse the problem of domestic and international 
economic double taxation of distributed profits in Portugal, UK and the Netherlands, 
and to assess its impact upon the overall tax systems. The definition followed by the 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, is that economic double 
taxation occurs when "two different persons are taxable in respect of the same income 
or capital. "' This is adopted in this thesis subject to a specific distinction being drawn 
between domestic and international economic double taxation. The so-called juridical 
double taxation which arises when "the same income or capital is taxable in the hands 
of the same person by more than one state"' will not be treated here. 
Several answers have been presented by tax systems to reduce or eliminate the 
problem of domestic or/and international economic double taxation of distributed 
profits. However, so far, no consensus has been reached 
in this field at the EU level. It 
is worth noting that the Ruding Report stressed the 
importance of a common playing 
field in this matter in order to achieve a true single and integrated market. ' 
OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Report of the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs, March 1994, commentary on articles 23A and 23B concerning the methods for 
elimination of double taxation, paragraphs 
1 and 2. 
See footnote above. 
See Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, March 1992, p. 15. 
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Member states have different ways of dealing with the problem of domestic 
or/and international economic double taxation of distributed profits. For theoretical 
and classification purposes, tax systems have been separated into five major categories- 
a) Classical Systems, 
b) Imputation Systems, 
C) Exemption Systems, 
d) Deduction Systems, and 
e) Cash-Flow Systems. 
Only the first three categories have been used worldwide. Nonetheless, a 
reference is also made to the cash-flow and deduction systems, and their main 
strengths and weaknesses are evaluated. In practice, neither deduction nor cash-flow 
systems have been adopted by any EU member state, and consequently only the three 
main systems will be object of extensive research at both domestic and international 
levels. 
Methodology 
Three member states have been selected. These are Portugal, UK and the 
Netherlands. They have been chosen on the basis of the above mentioned findings and 
also by taking into account their common history in the field of trade and commerce. A 
comparative analysis will be carried out mainly supported by internal and DTCs 
provisions. However, contrary to the methodology followed in the Ruding Report (e. g. 
King-Fullerton approach), ' the tax treatment of distributed profits in the three 
jurisdictions is treated in an interactive way by recourse to specific cases and examples. 
Within the European Union, imputation systems have been favoured over other 
tax systems. Consequently, emphasis will be placed upon the theoretical arguments 
employed to defend their use, especially the concept of integration. This concept Will 
be critically analysed in the light of recent statistical data in the field of income 
redistribution. Both corporate and individual tax structures of the three member states 
selected will be covered, with special emphasis placed upon the new challenges posed 
to the complex progressive individual tax rates structures currently in operation in the 
European mon. 
4 See Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, March 1992, chapter 4, p. 67. 
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1.2 The 'Integration' Concept 
In the European Union, the problem of economic double taxation of distributed 
profits has been treated within the theoretical framework of 'integration'. ' One may 
regard the integrationist position at treating the problem of taxation at the corporate 
level merely as a way of including all corporate- source income in the individual income 
tax base. The underlying assumption of this approach is that in the end, all taxes must 
be borne by people and that the concept of equitable taxation can be applied to people 
only. ' Where the aim is tax integration, and consequent reduction or elimination of 
economic double taxation of dividend income, without any attempt to solve the 
problem of economic double taxation of capital gains, two ways can be chosen: 
To treat (all or part of) the corporate income tax as a withholding tax to the 
extent that it applies to distributed income of the corporation (the imputation 
system) or, equivalently, to apply different rates of corporate tax to distributed 
and undistributed corporate income (the split-rate system), or 
(2) To allow the corporation a deduction for (all or part of) the dividends it pays 
similar to the deduction for interest paid on corporate debt (the deduction 
system). 
True integration can only be achieved by attributing to the shareholders the 
income earned at the corporate level, whether distributed or not, and by taxing that 
income at the rates applicable to the incomes of the various shareholders (the 
partnership approach). ' Advocates of this position point out that under this approach, 
the problem of taxing long-term capital gains would be solved and inequities and 
distortions of the tax system would be removed. ' In practice, this approach has never 
been followed as the basis of a national tax system, mainly due to the complexity and 
excessive administrative costs associated with the taxation of capital gains. ' On the 
other hand, partial integration systems have been in place in several EU member states 
(e. g. UK, Germany, France) alongside other systems built upon different tax 
5 Charles E. McLure, J. R-, Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice?, Studies of Govenunent 
Finance, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1979, Chapter One, pp. 2 and 3. 
6 Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, fifth 
edition, 1989, Chapter 21, p. 372. 
7 Harry G. Gourevitch, "Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience", Tax Lawyer. 31(l), 
84-85. 
8 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967, Vol. 4, Chapter 19. 
9 See footnote 2 above. 
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frameworks. Notwithstanding the attractiveness of the concept of tax integration, both 
inequities and high compliance tax costs at domestic and/or international levels are 
increasingly placing pressure upon traditional concepts that no longer satisfy the 
demands of taxpayers or tax revenues. " 
1.3 The Drawbacks of Integration 
Several countries currently applying classical systems (e. g. USA or the 
Netherlands) have been following closely the operation of partial integration systems. " 
Classical systems look at the company as a legal entity with an existence of its own. 
From this it is concluded that, being a separate entity, the company also has a separate 
taxable capacity which is subject to a separate tax. " Notwithstanding the awareness of 
the advantages associated with the introduction of partial integration systems, those 
countries have not considered replacing their classical systems. Indeed, not only 
domestically but also internationally, partial integration systems are complex, with high 
compliance costs. They differentiate between domestic and foreign investors and can 
lead to discriminatory treatments such as those currently under close scrutiny by the 
ECJ. 13 
On the other hand, the disadvantages associated with classical systems include 
high domestic and international effective tax rates on dividend income. " Both raise the 
need to find a more equitable and efficient tax system suitable for an increasing mobile 
society. Indeed, the "absolute" or classical view that looks at the corporation as a 
separate entity with a separate taxable capacity is hardly tenable. " It is worth noting 
that notwithstanding the distinct and independent legal nature of companies, there is 
only one productive activity, which should be taxed only once. " On the other hand, the 
answers provided by integrationist systems no longer fit well into the current economic 
See in Part II the criticism made to the UK partial imputation system. 
Treasury Department Report, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems, Taxing 
Business Income Once, Issued Jan. 6,1992, The Bureau of National Affairs, Washington. 
12 "It seems to me impossible to dispute that once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like 
any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself. " 
(Lord Halsbury, L. C. in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. (1897) AC 22). 
13 See Part IV, paragraph 2.2. 
14 See Part IV, paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2. 
15 Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, fifth 
edition, 1989, p. 373. 
16 Richard L. Doemberg, "International Aspects of Individual and Corporate Tax Integration", Tax 
Notes international, March 16,1992. 
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and financial patterns, and pressures from the ECJ strongly indicate that, from the 
revenue point of view, those systems cannot survive in the long term. For instance, if 
full enforcement is given to the principle of non-discrimination by the ECJ, member 
states currently applying imputation systems and extending tax credits beyond 
domestic borders may be forced to revise their DTC policy. Indeed, to avoid 
discriminatory tax treatment, those credits should be granted not only to certain DTC 
partners but also to all EU member states. 
In Search of a Modern Tax System 
Integrationist systems aim to eliminate economic double taxation of dividend 
income but they often fail to provide a satisfactory answer for the problem of economic 
double taxation of capital gains, " or to comply with the principle of progressivity of 
taxation. This principle aims to allocate the burden of tax fairly between different 
members of the community. " From this standpoint, companies are seen as a conduit 
for personal income and, consequently, corporate profits should be attributed to the 
shareholders and taxed at the respective personal income tax rates. Is this view the 
correct one? Once it is accepted that, from the tax point of view, companies and 
shareholders are a unified reality, notwithstanding legal and juridical independence, 
two alternatives can be visualised: 
(1) Integrationist systems, or 
(2) Exemption systems which charge company profits at the corporate level and 
exempt dividend income and capital gains in the hands of the shareholder. " 
Shareholders' income would become subject to corporation tax rules and as a 
result the personal income tax regime would be no longer applicable. " 
17 See Part II, paragraph 2.2, b), 2). 
18 Report of the Royal Commission on the Taxation ofProfits and Incomes, Crand 9474, H. M. S. O., 
1955. 
,9 This system is already in place in several EU member states at the corporate level (domestically 
and/or in accordance with the Parent- Subsidiary Directive). 
It is interesting to note that the US Treasury Report (1992) continues to apply the traditional 
concept of 'integration' when describing an exemption system. 
20 In practice, the most effective way for member states to tax corporate profits originating NNithin 
their boundaries is by a corporation income tax (vide Part IV, Table 9). An exemption system is 
also aligned with the principle of economic efficiency which suggests that all capital income 
should be taxed at the same rate (Treasury Department Report, Integration of the Individual and 
Corporate Tax Systems, Taxing Business Income Once, Issued Jan. 6,1992, The Bureau of 
National Affairs, Washington, p. 12). 
Moreover, and taking into account the weight of pension funds and other savings devices (e. g. 
PEPs, etc. ), it may be argued that a corporation income tax is the only mechanism to bring within 
the tax charge corporate profits. Indeed, integrationist systems (see UK partial imputation 
18 
Both the aim of elimination of economic double taxation of dividend income 
and capital gains and that of the reduction of tax compliance costs may be achieved at 
the expense of the principle of progressivity. It is already under attack in several EU 
tax systems. " Indeed, the three surveyed tax systems exempt almost completely inter- 
company dividend income not only domestically but also within the Union. 22 While 
taxed in the UK, ` capital gains are not taxed in the Netherlands and in Portugal (long- 
term gains). " 
2. TYPOLOGY OF TAX SYSTEMS 
2.1 Classical System 
As mentioned in the paragraph above, the classical systeM2' rejects the 
21 integrationist view and taxes separately corporations and shareholders. In the 
Netherlands, this system applies to individual shareholders . 
2' A classical system is also 
followed in Portugal at the individual shareholder level, either under provisions of 
DTCs or internal legislation, " when dividend income derives from foreign sources. 
system), lead to a reduction of the total tax collected on corporate income allocable to tax-exempt 
investors. 
This issue, however, cannot be dissociated from an effective taxation of corporate profits where a 
minimum corporation income effective tax rate is reached (principle of tax transparency and 
elimination of corporate tax incentives). 
21 See Part I paragraph 2.2, b), 1) and Part H, charts 2 and 3. See also Fiona Beveridge, 
International Dimensions of Taxation, Studies in Law, Hull University Law School, 199 1, p. 5: 
However horizontal and vertical equity, though offered as desirable objectives for a tax system, in reality 
fail even as a basis for comparison of the tax-treatment of two or more taxpayers. They are devoid of 
substance because they fail to address the position of the individual vis-A-vis the community as a whole, and 
thus vis-&-vis the state ... 
Equity, when used in this sense, becomes little more than a formal requirement, 
like natural justice or due process, and it is submitted that it is unnecessary and unhelpful to restrict it to 
such a role". 
22 See Part 1, paragraphs 2.2, a) and 2.3, a) Part II, paragraphs 2.2, a) and 2.3, a) and Part III, 
paragraphs 2.2, a) and 2.3, a). 
23 See Part II, paragraph 2.2, b), 2). 
24 See Part 1, paragraph 2.2, b), 2 and Part 111, paragraph 2.2, b), 2). 
25 Some authors (Radler, Winter course 1996, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary 
and Westfield College) argue that the so-called 'classical system' is not a system. Instead, its logic 
is built in the absence of a system. 
26 Richard L. Doemberg, "International Aspects of Individual and Corporate Tax Integration", Tax 
Notes International, March 16,1992. 
27 See Part 111, paragraphs 2.2, b), 1) and 2.3, b), 1). 
28 See Part I, paragraph 2.3, b), I). 
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Pros and Cons of Classical Systems 
The main advantages of classical systems have been their administrative 
simplicity and their ability to satisfy revenue demands of member states, both at 
domestic and international levels. " The revenue compromise embodied in the classical 
system has been reflected in the OECD Model Tax Convention, which only covers the 
problem of juridical double taxation. " Initially, this compromise worked in favour of 
residence states or capital export countries. With the subsequent cuts in corporation 
income tax rates, the effect of this compromise has been reversed, and source states or 
capital import countries appear now as the main tax revenue beneficiaries due to the 
unchanged rates of withholding tax. " This trend has been working to the detriment of 
major capital export countries whose prevalent attitude has been to exempt from 
withholding tax dividend income paid to foreign shareholders. It appears from current 
changes in domestic tax policies that classical systems no longer satisfy the revenue 
needs of capital export countries, unless those countries charge withholding taxes on 
foreign dividend income. This is because they are increasingly assuming features of 
capital import countries. Notwithstanding these fundamental changes in the results of 
29 Hugh J. Ault, "Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the International Tax 
Base: Principles and Practices", Tax Law Review, 47(3), New York University School of Law, 
565. 
30 See articles 23A and 23B of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, OECD, 1994. 
It is worth noting that the 1963 OECD Draft Model Convention (article 10) took the tentative 
position that, in principle, a member country could have higher withholding rates if there was a 
lower corporate rate on distributed profits as part of an integration system, thus recognising the 
connection between corporate and shareholder level taxation in an integrated system. However, 
this approach was rejected in the 1977 OECD Model Treaty. 
Recent research has emphasised the importance of taking also into account the problem of 
economic double taxation of dividend income in the international sphere, even if confined by the 
limits posed by the integrationist approach (see Richard L. Doemberg, "Amending the OECD 
Model Treaty and Commentary in Response to Corporate Tax Integration", Intertax, 1995/1, 
p. 14: 
"Using the current version of Article 10 as a starting point, a modified version of that provision could serve 
to ensure that the benefits of integration on cross-border dividends are extended to the shareholders and not 
to the other contracting state. " 
and Kees van Raad, "In a World where Classical and Integration Systems Co-exist, Article 10 
OECD Model should not disregard the underlying Corporation Income Tax", Intertax, 1995/1. 
The limitations of this research work has been critically exposed by David Williams in his article 
"An Optimum Form of Article 10 of the OECD Model, IFA, International Taxation of Dividends 
Reconsidered in Light of Corporate Tax Integration", Vol. 19a, Kluwer, 1994, p. 69: 
"A clear theoretical argument can be advanced besides those already discussed that there are two forms of 
integration. One is the 'integration to the shareholder' approach, and the other the '*integration to the 
company' approach. While in practice the former predominates, the latter cannot be excluded. However, it is 
believed that any system that adopted the 'integration to the company approach would probably have to 
adjust the total position by way of limiting the integration, so that there would be no strong practical 
difference from the 'integration to the shareholder' approach. I would welcome comment on this. " 
31 Vide Part IV, paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2. 
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tax policy and in trade patterns, unless an imputation system is in place, 32 the 'classical 
view' is still the rule in the international context, " supported by the principles of non- 
discrimination and reciprocity. 
With non-tax barriers to cross-border investment disappearing, the negative 
effects of economic double taxation of income and capital has received more attention 
and comment. " The disadvantages associated with the operation of a classical system 
have been under close scrutiny and some proposals have been presented in order to 
provide a developing framework for resolving these questions. " Indeed, the inequities 
and inefficiencies linked with classical systems, such as discriminatory treatment of 
equity finance with concomitant distortion of financial or investment decisions, have 
been noted in several research studies and have led to extensive critical discussions not 
only in the USA but also in the EU. " 
2.2 Imputation Systems 
Imputation systems follow the integrationist view although they have not 
attempted to implement fully its effects and rationale (partial integration"). " They aim 
to tax corporate profits in the shareholders' hands and as a result eliminate or mitigate 
economic double taxation of dividend income without abolishing the corporation 
income tax charge. Nonetheless, the broader problem of economic double taxation of 
distributed profits (namely the double taxation of capital gains) is not covered. This 
compromises the achievement of the above mentioned aims: progressivity in the tax 
system and elimination of economic double taxation of income and capital. 
32 See UK experience and the extension of domestic tax credits to foreign shareholders under the 
provisions of some DTCs (Part 11, paragraph 2.3 a), 4)). 
33 See Portuguese (Part I, paragraph 4) and Dutch experiences (Part III, paragraph 4). 
34 IFS, Setting Savings Free, Proposalsfor the Taxation of Savings and Profits, The Capital Taxes 
Group of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1994. 
35 See footnote above and Treasury Department Report, Integration of the Individual and Corporate 
Tax Systems, Taxing Business Income Once, Jan. 6,1992, The Bureau of National Affairs, 
Washington. 
36 Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, 1992, Chapter 5, pp. 93 to 109. 
37 if the integration of corporate and individual taxation deals with both retained and distributed 
corporate profits, the system can be said to involve full integration. If retained profits are subject 
to the corporate rate until distributed and the relief comes at the point of distribution, the 
integration is only partial (see Hugh J. Ault, "International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration", 
Law & Policy in International Business, Vol. 10,46 1). 
38 Vide paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 above. 
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Types of Imputation Systems 
Imputation systems may assume two forms: 
a) Full Imputation Systems, and 
b) Partial Imputation Systems. 
Imputation systems are used to refer exclusively to systems where there is a 
direct link between tax credit given to the shareholder in respect of income tax paid on 
dividends received and corporation tax paid by the distributing company. " Under the 
imputation system, all corporate profits in respect of which relief is granted will have 
been subject to corporate income tax levied at statutory rates; part or all of the 
corporate income tax paid on the distributed profits is set off against the shareholder's 
tax liability on the dividends received or refunded to him if the corporate income tax 
thus paid exceeds his own income tax liability. " Under a full imputation system, the 
corporation income tax paid is fully credited (or refunded if appropriate) in the hands 
of the shareholder against his/her individual income tax liability. Economic double 
taxation of dividend income is therefore avoided by subjecting dividend income only to 
the progressive personal income tax rate structure. 
Differently, under a partial imputation system, shareholders receiving dividends 
enjoy a credit (or r fi e und) reflecting only part of the tax underlying the dividend. 
Economic double taxation of dividend income still remains, at least for higher income 
tax rate shareholders . 
4' This main distinction provides the basic framework for the 
multiplicity and variety of imputation systems currently in operation in several 
countries. " Within the EU, a special reference should be made to the German 
imputation tax system, classified frequently in the literature as a 'split rate system 1.43 
The German imputation tax system is built upon a split rate structure combined with a 
full credit on distribution for corporation taxes paid (full imputation system). 
Accordingly, retained profits are taxed at a rate of 45%44 and distributed profits taxed 
39 Ken Messere, Tax Policy in OECD Countries, Choices & Conflicts, I1BFD, 1993. 
40 OECD, Taxing Profits in a Global Economy, Domestic and International Issues, Paris 1991, 
p. 170. 
41 See Part 11, paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2, b), 1) which illustrate the main distortionary features of the 
UK partial imputation system. 
42 An extensive comparative survey of imputation systems in place in OECD countries is given in 
Tax Policy in OECD Countries, Choices & Conflicts by Ken Messere (IBFD, 1993), p. 360. 
43 Ault, H. J. & Radler, A. J., (1980), The German Corporation Tax Law With 1980 Amendments, 
Kluwer. 
44 See paragraph 23 of the German Corporation Income Tax Act. 
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at 30%. " Moreover, by enabling resident shareholders to credit fully (or obtain a 
refund if applicable) the reduced corporation income tax charge' against their income 
tax liability, " the German (full) imputation tax system prevents (domestically) the 
distortionary aspects of economic double taxation of dividend income. 48 
Pros and Cons of Imputation Systems 
The attractiveness of applying imputation systems derives from their potential 
11" ability to reconcile the progressivity principle with the aim of eliminating economic 
double taxation of dividend income. Simultaneously, they satisfy revenue needs by 
guaranteeing that a minimum tax is collected notwithstanding the allocation of the 
definitive burden of taxation to the individual shareholder. 
However, from the tax compliance point of view, these systems are 
complicated, demanding a costly and efficient tax administration. With the increasing 
importance of pension funds and a generalisation of tax savings mechanisms, their 
attractiveness as revenue collectors is progressively reducing. Indeed, revenue 
authorities are fully aware of the costs associated with tax refunds which are due to 
exempt entities and lead to a reduction of the total tax collected on corporate income. " 
This trend also poses heavy constraints to the implementation of the principle of 
progressivity. Is progressivity a realistic aim to pursue in this field? Moreover, 
imputation systems do not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of 
discriminatory treatment of equity. Even if dividend income is not subject to a double 
tax charge, capital gains remain penalised unless they become tax exempt in the 
shareholders' hands at the disposal time. For tax purposes, taking into account that in 
general interest is freely deductible, debt continues to be preferred to equity. 
At the international level,, the reconciliation of the principle of reciprocity with 
the non-discrimination principle creates reasons for strong opposition to the extension 
beyond domestic borders of imputation systems. Indeed, the bilateral nature of the 
See paragraph 27 of the German Corporation Income Tax Act. 
This reduced rate is referred to as the 'distribution burden' (Ausschuttungsbelastung). 
Teixeira (ed. ), Business Taxation in the European Union, chapter 8, paragraph 8.39-8.42., Wiley. 
1995. 
48 Bearing in mind that the tax credit is available only to domestic shareholders, this problem is not 
deleted at the international level (see paragraph below 'Pros and Cons ofImputation Systems'). 
49 See for instance the UK experience and the cut of the ACT rate from 25% to 20% in order to 
reduce the revenue costs associated with tax refunds to pension funds. 
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principle of reciprocity" may conflict with the general EU principle of non- 
discrimination which reflects the view that countries' tax laws should not discriminate 
against foreign firms and shareholders, or against domestic firms and individuals 
investing abroad. " 
Imputation systems have developed without much overall attention to 
international issues. This is despite the fact that in some countfies5 international aspects 
were a reason for adopting the system. " From the domestic treasury perspective and 
leaving aside trade or financial considerations, the extension of imputation systems to 
non-resident shareholders results in a substantial loss of revenue. This may not be 
offset by the tax system operating in the shareholder's resident country (e. g. country 
applying a classical system). Under these circumstances, and leaving other tax 
considerations aside, in order to keep a proper revenue balance between source and 
residence countries, the principle of reciprocity advocates the use of a classical system. 
However, this principle may conflict with the non-discrimination principle not only 
domestically but also internationally. Indeed, by granting tax credits to domestic 
shareholders or by extending them to selected foreign shareholders under DTC 
regimes, " imputation systems are discriminatory, leading to distortions and inequities 
within the EU single market. " 
50 The principle of reciprocity usually refers to equality of the rates of withholding tax levied on 
interest, dividends, and royalties by contracting States, although in a wider sense of reciprocity, 
miffor-image rates of withholding tax may be abandoned for some other concession, or lack 
thereof. This is known as effective reciprocity; that is, the equality of effective tax burdens on 
foreign-owned investment between countries (see Report of the Committee of Independents 
Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the European Communities, March 1992, p. 38). 
51 See Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, March 1992, p. 198 and articles 6,48,52,58,59 and 73b of the Treaty of 
Rome. 
52 See UK Green Paper, Corporation Tax, H. M. S. O., 1972. 
53 Part H, paragraph 2.3, a), 4). 
54 See Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company T ation, Com ssion of e ax mi th 
European Communities, March 1992, p. 378: 
"A good example is the full or partial extension of the imputation tax credit to taxpayers of only certain 
treaty countries, which sometimes may even be more favourable to taxpayers in third countries. Such treaty 
preferences should already today be in violation of Community principles". 
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2.3 Other Systems" 
a) Exemption SystemS56 
Under an exemption system, distributed profits are taxed at the corporate level 
and exempted in the shareholders' hands. The system complies with the principles of 
neutrality and efficiency. Indeed, distributed profits are only subject to one level, i. e. 
corporate level, and both dividend income and capital gains are exempt in the hands of 
the shareholder. At the international level, the system is simple to implement and in 
accordance with the principle of capital import neutrality which prevails when domestic 
and foreign suppliers of capital to any given national market obtain the same after-tax 
rate of return on their investment in that market. 
57 
Notwithstanding these qualities and the administrative simplicity associated 
with its implementation, politically this system is not widely used. This is mainly due to 
its inability to accommodate the principles of progressivity or vertical equity. Indeed, 
even in case of choosing an exemption with progression system, those principles 
cannot be satisfied. Under an exemption with progression system, dividend income 
would be considered only for the purposes of determination of the tax applicable to 
other (non-exempt) income. In other words, dividend income is included when 
determining the tax rate but excluded when that rate is applied to non-exempt income. 
In an increasing global economy, " it remains to be seen whether the principle of 
progressivity and associated aims will always prevail over the principle of neutrality of 
55 In practice, some countries (e. g. Portugal) may apply hybrid systems involving exemptions and 
credits at the shareholder level. Due to the complexity and multitude of combinations, they will 
not be covered in this work. Only the hybrid Portuguese tax system is critically analysed, arguing 
the author in favour of a coherent and unified tax system. 
56 Fred W. Peel, "A Proposal for Eliminating Double Taxation of Corporate Dividends", Tax 
Lawyer, 39,1985-86,1-36. The author presents in this article a detailed proposal for eliminating 
double taxation of corporate dividends by excluding dividends from gross income at the 
individual shareholder level if the dividends are paid from income previously taxed at the 
corporate level. In brief, the proposal is to adopt a single corporate income tax rate equal to the 
maximum individual tax rate and permit shareholders to exclude from income dividends paid out 
of corporate earnings that have been taxed at the single corporate rate. It is argued that the 
proposal would advance tax simplification, while taxing corporate profits on a more rational 
basis. 
Peel points out that this approach has not received the consideration it deserves. He argues that 
the approach is practical and has a sound theoretical basis, and consequently dividend exclusion 
should be considered a feasible alternative in the choice among methods of ending double 
taxation of dividends. 
57 OECD, Taxing Profits in a Global Econom Domestic and International Issues, Paris, 1991, 
p. 3 9. 
58 World Trade Organisation, High Rates of World Trade Growth Continue to Outstrip Out t 
Growth, Press Release/29,2 November 1995. 
pu 
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taxation. " Indeed, economists increasingly pointed out that the redistribution was an 
illusion: 
Our objective now is to be neutrality, with taxes that do not penalise 0 
one person rather than another. They give equality of opportunity, rather 
than equality of result. The ideal tax is one that takes from us in proportion 
to what we have, or what we use, in such a way that the tax affects our 
behavioural patterns to the minimum". 60 
b) Deduction System 
Under this system a full or partial deduction from the corporate tax base is 
allowed for distributed profits. " Accordingly, distributed profits are partially or totally 
taxed in the shareholders' hands. This tax treatment does not discriminate against 
equity finance taking into account that both interest income and distributed profits can 
be deducted from the corporate tax base. For practical reasons however, mainly to 
guarantee that a minimum tax revenue is collected, this system is not accepted as a 
suitable and appropriate way of taxing company profits. " Indeed, notwithstanding its 
ability to treat equally debt and equity finance and unless a high withholding tax is 
charged at the company level, a deduction system does not provide a satisfactory 
answer to the problems of tax avoidance or evasion. From the revenue point of view, 
this system is rejected at the outset. Moreover, and taking into account current trends 
of abolishing withholding taxes on dividend income and reduction of tax exemptions 
granted to tax exempt entities, a deduction system does not constitute a feasible 
alternative to the EU tax systems currently in place. " 
59 IFS, Setting Savings Free, Proposalsfor the Taxation of Savings and Profits, The Capital Taxes 
Group of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, Chaired by Malcolm Gammie, February 1994. Supported 
by the principles of neutrality, fairness and transparency, the reports argues that income and 
gains earned on savings accumulated from taxed sources should be exempt from income and 
capital gains tax. 
See also 'Dividend Exclusion PrototyW' advocated in the Treasury Department Report, 
integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems, Taxing Business Once, issued Jan. 6, 
1992, BNA, pp. 17-25. 
60 David W. Williams, Trends in International Taxation, International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation, 1991, p. 23. 
61 Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, March 1992, p. 18. 
62 BNA, Treasury Department Report, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems, 
Taxing Business Once, issued Jan. 6,1992, p. 107. 
63 See Council Directive Of 23 July 1990 (90/435/EEC), OJ No. L 225/6,20.8.90 which abolishes 
the withholding tax charged upon the profits distributed 
by a subsidiary to its parent company. it 
must be stressed that the Directive expressly rejected the 
deduction system in its article 4. Indeed, 
the only systems which are allowed to be used according to the 
Directive are the exemption and 
fcredit' systems. 
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The ACE Proposal 
The discriminatory tax treatment of equity finance and the non-neutralities 
derived from a more favourable tax treatment granted to interest income led the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies to present a proposal whose main aim was to achieve 
neutrality within the tax system. A tax system should be neutral towards different 
sources of finance, location and type of investment: 
of 
- The essence of the proposal is that the system should give an equity 
allowance (ACE or allowance for corporate equity) for the costs of equity 
finance in the same way that relief is given for the costs of debt finance. 
This means that the system will tax all profits in excess of a given 
"normal" rate of return, while the costs of raising finance will not be taxed 
at the company level". 64 
Accordingly, when calculating its profits, a company would be entitled to 
deduct an allowance for the capital invested in by its shareholders. This allowance for 
corporate equity is based on the equity invested in the company including the retained 
profit and past equity allowances, less tax and dividends paid and less net investment in 
other companies. " To work out its ACE allowance, each company creates a record of 
the money provided to it by its shareholders ("Shareholders' Funds Account" or 
"SFA"). For most companies, shareholders' funds comprise two main elements: 
the amounts subscribed for new share capital, and 
retained post-tax profits. 
Adjustments to the SFA are in nearly all cases by reference to actual payments 
or receipts of money or value by the company. Amounts subscribed for new share 
capital are, for example, added to the SFA when subscribed. Dividends are deducted 
when paid. The balance is adjusted for retained post-tax profits when tax is paid or 
repaid. At the end of each accounting period, the company multiplies the daily balance 
of its SFA for the period by a published rate of interest. This rate, to be published 
monthly by the government, is based on market interest rates for medium-term 
government securities and varies in line with such market interest rates. The figure that 
64 IFS, Equityfor Companies, A Corporation TaxfOr the 1990s, Report of the Capital Taxes Group, 
Commentary No. 26,199 1, p. 19. 
65 The ACE system operates in precisely the opposite direction to the Comprehensive Business 
income Tax (CBIT) proposal of the US Treasury Report (1992), pp. 39-60. Whilst CBIT equallses 
the treatment of debt and equity by disallowing the deduction of debt and subsequently exempting 
dividends or interest received by shareholders and debtholders, ACE equalises the treatment of 
debt and equity by providing a deduction in respect of equity equivalent to interest in computing 
the company's profits. 
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results from this calculation is the company's ACE allowance which is deducted from 
the taxable profits of the company for the period. 
The advantages offered by this proposal in the field of tax neutrality are sound 
and attractive. Indeed, not only debt and equity are treated equally from a tax point of 
view but also the problem of economic double taxation of distributed profits at the 
corporate level is solved. However, the drawbacks associated with the implementation 
and enforcement of a deduction system (e. g. imposition of domestic and international 
withholding taxes) coupled with the limitations attached to the ACE system' prevent 
its use within the EU. 
c) Cash-Flow System 
This system, proposed by the Meade Committee, " implies a combination of 
personal expenditure tax with a corporate cash-flow tax. 
A model of a personal expenditure tax has been presented by William 
Andrews. " Under Andrews' approach, individuals would be taxed on the basis of their 
consumption, rather than the sum of consumption and accumulation. To accomplish 
that result, the personal income tax would be levied on a simple cash flow basis- 
business and investment expenditures (including capital outlays) would be deductible 
when made, while business and investment receipts (including returns of capital) would 
be immediately and fully includable in taxable income. Andrews argues that such a tax 
would not only be superior to the current income tax, but that it would even be 
preferable to a truly comprehensive accretion-type income tax. Considerations of 
administrative simplicity, economic efficiency, and fairness all lead him to that 
conclusion. 
66 US Treasury Report (1992), p. 108: 
"The AFCE proposal is designed to Operate in a classical corporate tax system to reduce the tax bias 
against equity finance. The IFS proposal is not a true integration proposal. Corporate equity income in 
excess of the AFCE allowance would remain subject to a second 
level of tax when such income is 
distributed or when shareholders are taxed on capital gains attributable to such income. As a consequence, 
the IFS proposal would not eliminate the bias against the corporateform and the incentive to retain rather 
than distribute corporate equity income in excess of the AFCE allowance". 
67 IFS, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, Report of Committee chaired by Prof. JE 
Meade, Allen and Unwin, 1978. 
68 See Andrews, "A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax", Harvard Lau, Review, 
87,1113 (1974). 
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Many commentators, and particularly the Meade Committee, have advocated 
the adoption of a flow of funds base or cash-flow base. In general, the flow of funds 
base taxes all inflows of funds to the company and gives relief for all outflows, whether 
these correspond to current or capital expenditure. " The Meade Committee described 
three different forms of cash-flow: an R base, equal to sales revenue minus all 
expenditures on factor inputs; an R+F base, equal to the difference between all cash 
inflows and all cash outflows, including financial transactions, except dealings in shares 
and issues of new equity and dividends; and an S base, equal to (net) dividends paid 
minus the proceeds of new shares issued. 
The first of these bases would raise severe transitional problems for highly 
geared companies and could not be applied to financial companies. " The Report" 
therefore focuses on the S base, and points out in a footnote that the R+F base is the 
tax-inclusive equivalent of S. The main disadvantages of a cash-flow system are that 
the proposed tax base is radically divorced from what is commonly regarded as 
"profit", and also, it would be radically different from the systems applying to overseas 
competitors. " Moreover, the Green Paper's greatest concern relates to "the formidable 
economic and commercial distortions"" that would arise if a cash-flow tax for 
companies were combined with a personal income tax instead of the personal 
expenditure tax proposed by the Meade Committee. Under those circumstances, "a 
man could build up his savings free of tax in a company; sell that company (notably to 
a foreigner or an exempt fund); and use the sale proceeds to finance consumption free 
of tax as an individual". 74 
However, the point has repeatedly been made" that a cash-flow tax would be 
much simpler to operate than any other system, whereas the "proper" measure of 
69 IFS, Equityfor Companies, A Corporation Taxfor the 1990s, Report of the Capital Taxes Group, 
Commentary No. 26,199 1. 
70 EFS, Equityfor Companies, A Corporation Taxfor the 1990s, Report of the Capital Taxes Group, 
Commentary No. 26,1991, p. 45, paragraph 3.2.3. 
71 H. M. S. O. (1982), Corporation Tax, (Green Paper), Cmnd 8456, London: H. M. S. O. 
72 EFS, Equityfor Companies, A Corporation Taxfor the 1990s, Report of the Capital Taxes Group, 
Commentary No. 26,1991, p. 63. 
73 H. M. S. O. (1982), Corporation Tax, (Green Paper), Cmnd 8456, London: H. M. S. O., paragraph 
7.39. 
74 H. M. S. O. (1982), Corporation Tax, (Green Paper), Cmnd 8456, London: H. M. S. O., paragraph 
7.41. 
75 See Edwards, J. S. S. (1982a), "On the case for a flow offunds corporation tax", EFS Working 
Paper no. 35. 
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profits is highly subjective and uncertain. One of the main advantages of this system, 
for example, is that it takes account of inflation without the problems of indexation. " 
Indeed, this system requires no indexation for inflation taking into account that there 
are no allowances to index. This is because the tax is based on the sources and uses of 
funds statement and not the profit and loss account. Moreover, unlike the imputation 
or classical systems, it would be broadly neutral as between retentions and distributions 
provided that net raising of equity attracts tax relief or credit and all distributions 
attract tax. However, neutrality will not be achieved if profits are not reinvested. With 
a cash flow tax, interest payments are not deductible for corporate income tax 
purposes (or, equivalently, borrowing is a taxable receipt). Consequently, debt finance 
would be less attractive than at present and there would be fiscal neutrality between 
debt finance and new equity issues. Retained earnings would be the most attractive 
source of finance for taxable investors,, and financial policy would be a matter of 
complete indifference for tax-exempt investors such as pension funds. This cash flow 
tax would be co-ordinated with an expenditure tax reflecting the complete neutrality of 
the tax system. " 
3. IN SEARCH OF A EU TAX SYSTEM 
From early stages of its development, the EU has been pursuing the ambitious 
aim of having a common corporation tax system. Indeed, in order to achieve a genuine 
European Union single market, movements of persons, capital, goods and services 
should flow free without trade, monetary or tax barriers. " Whereas in both trade and 
monetary fields important achievements have been made, progress in tax matters has 
been slow and impaired by the unanimity principle embodied in the Treaty of Rome. " 
Notwithstanding the adoption of a common VAT in the EU, harmonisation is still 
required in the field of indirect taxation such as approximation of tax rates, 
exemptions, etc. In the area of direct taxation, despite several efforts towards trying to 
ýnd a reasonable and sensible solution, 80 no common attitude has yet been assumed. " 
76 Mervyn A. King, The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax, Economic and Social Research Council 
Programme, Number 95/May 1986. 
17 it is worth noting that in 1984, the Department of the US 
Treasury rejected substitution of a 
consumption-based tax for the income tax, and 
in the 1986 Act, Congress moved decisively in the 
direction of strengthening the individual income tax. 
71 See Sijbren Cnossen, (ed. ), Tax Co-ordination in the European Community. Series in 
International Taxation, No. 7, Kluwer, 1987, pp-3-5. 
79 Farmer, P. & Lyal, R., EC Tax Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. 
'0 Vide Part IV, paragraph 1.1. 
81 See Ruding's recommendation in the field of DTCs: 
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Nowadays, the gradual economic and financial convergence occurring within the EU, a 
direct result of the progressive implementation of the criteria stipulated in the 
Maastricht Treaty, " brings increased pressure upon member states to align their tax 
systems in order to retain their competitiveness not only within, but also outside, the 
single market. 
Further convergence in the field of indirect and excise duties taxation is 
underway, and this trend cannot be dissociated from the direct taxation frameworks 
currently operating in member states. From both economic and financial perspective, 
the tax system must be viewed as a whole if one wants to assess its true impact upon 
inward and outward movements of capital, persons or services. On this assumption, 
the exercise of identifying the distortions occurring within the EU in the direct tax field 
cannot be dismissed. 
In this work, both domestic and international effects derived from the operation 
of the Portuguese, UK and Dutch corporation tax systems are comprehensively 
covered. The findings clearly show that those systems, designed several decades ago, 
no longer fit within the new EU order which will be in place by the end of the century. 
Current domestic and DTCs structures are already under strain. This is due to changes 
in trade patterns, increased tax competition within and outside the Union and their 
compatibility with the full enforcement of the Union's principles established in the 
Treaty of Rome and Treaty of Maastricht. As demonstrated in this work, it is 
commonplace to find discriminatory treatments against other EU investors either to 
safeguard domestic revenues or to satisfy economic or financial aims. Both source and 
residence principles of taxation" come into operation, depending (if ascertained) upon 
'ýFhe Committee recommends action by the Commission in concert with Member States aimed at defining a 
common attitude with regard to policy on double taxation agreements with respect to each other and also 
with respect to third countries. " 
(Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, March 1992, p. 206). It remains to be seen how realistic is the 
achievement of this common attitude on the 
light of the very limited scope of article 220 of the 
Treaty of Rome. Moreover, DTCs only answer some of the questions that arise in trying to 
remove differences between national tax systems. 
Nonetheless, and taking into account the 
common background already built under the 
OECD auspices in this area (see OECD Model 
Taxation Convention which provides the general framework for EU DTCs), it is undeniable that 
DTCs provide a common vocabulan, and sets of principles and, as a result, they are of significant 
value to the EU. 
82 See Part IV, Table 7. 
83 The source principle involves taxing income 
in the jurisdiction in which it arose, i. e. at the 
location of the economic activity concerned (e. g. 
Argentina and Hong Kong). Differently, the 
residence principle involves taxing income regardless of where 
it arose, in the jurisdiction where 
the fiscal person to whom that income is attributed resides 
(i. e. worldwide taxation of residents). 
the applicable import/export ratio, supported mainly by the principle of reciprocity 
embodied in DTCs. 
84 
The magnitude and complexity of the problems covered in this work will 
increase with the new challenges posed by the introduction of a single currency. With a 
single currency, capital will flow much more easily and tax differentials will come 
under close scrutiny by EU taxpayers. The tax factor will appear then as the main 
determinant in the location and type of investment. Simultaneously, the risk of tax 
evasion in certain EU member states will increase considerably (see for instance the 
important role played by the Portuguese banking sector within the tax collection 
field). " The main losers will undoubtedly be domestic treasuries. Their capacity to 
control movements of capital for tax revenue purposes will come under severe attack. 
Indeed, with the introduction of a single currency, taxpayers will become increasingly 
aware of the advantages of no withholding tax charges on dividend or interest income, 
an equitable treatment of dividend income and the benefits of a single charge on 
retained profits or, equivalently, exemption of capital gains tax. 
It is for these reasons that this thesis seeks to explore how member states such 
as Portugal, UK and the Netherlands deal with the complexities posed by their 
corporation tax systems. Indeed, they face not only the problem of economic double 
taxation of dividend income and capital gains but also the financial distortions caused 
by a more favourable tax treatment granted to interest income. Within this framework, 
both discriminatory treatments given under domestic or DTCs provisions are 
emphasised in the light of recent cases of the European Court of Justice. 
it is worth pointing out that the three selected member states have much in 
common in their history, but many differences in their tax systems. All three are states 
with long histories of world trade, and with economies that for long periods benefited 
from flows of economic activity through the state. However, the legal framework of 
the states and their approaches to economic issues gave them different approaches this 
century to the issues of taxing business, especially 
international business. The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom have radically different approaches to taxing 
See Fiona Beveridge, International Dimensions of Taxation, Studies in Law, Hull University Law 
School, 1991, pp-7-8. 
84 See Part IV, paragraph 6. 
85 In the Portuguese tax system, interest income received by 
individuals is subject to a final 
withholding tax of 20% (article 74 para. 
3 of the IRS Code). Taxpayers receive their interest net 
of withholding tax without any further tax 
liability. Banks work as collectors of the tax on behalf 
of tax authorities. 
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international business - one relying on the basis that it can tax worldwide income 
subject to foreign tax credit in appropriate cases, and the other prepared to exempt 
overseas income from its tax system. Portugal has no clear underlying approach and 
uses aspects of both these approaches. Both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
are among the states that most use double tax conventions (DTCs) to solve double tax 
problems that arise, although as demonstrated in this work they seek different optimum 
forms of DTC from their treaty partners. Portugal has a much more limited network of 
DTCs. The effect of this more limited number of bilateral agreements is also explored 
in this work, 
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PART I 
PORTUGUESE CORPORATION TAX SYSTEM 
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE PAST? 
1.1 Historic Background 
Notwithstanding the important role played by Portuguese monarchy, 86 taxes 
were traditionally imposed by Parliament in consonance with the principle "nullum 
tributum sine lege". " It was only later in Portuguese history that, under the influence 
of the post-revolution French constitutional tradition, this fundamental principle of 
taxation was expressly included in the Constitution of 1822.88 
Despite the primary role played by constitutional provisions in tax matters, the 
foundations of the Portuguese direct tax system can be found well before their 
constitutional normalisation. Indeed, in the 17th century, the first comprehensive 
income tax was introduced in order to finance the war with Spain ('decima militar'). 
The tax applied to the total income of the taxpayer at moderate rates (e. g. 4.5% or 
10%). " Subsequently and again following the French experience, comprehensive 
taxation was abandoned in favour of specific direct taxes with different tax rates and 
regimes. Surprisingly, it took three centuries to see that form of taxation reintroduced 
again in the Portuguese tax system in the 1989 direct tax reform. 'o This was one of 
many reforms in the Portuguese system. 
The Introduction of the Pýinciple of Progressivity 
Tax reform undertaken in 1913 led to the introduction of the principle of 
progressivity in the Portuguese tax system. Initially, progressivity only covered income 
from real property, " but subsequently this principle was extended to other direct taxes 
in order to guarantee the coherence of the system and to eliminate tax distortions. A 
86 Vd. Ord. Afonsinas, L. 2, T. NMII, 26. 
87 This principle had however been violated by some monarchs which imposed 'taxes' without 
Parliamentary consent. 
88 E. g. Art, 103 no. IX, Art. 124 no. 11 and Art. 224. 
Vd. Regimento of 1654. 
90 The lack of sound and clear tax principles in the Portuguese history of taxation is worth notice. 
Still, under the current tax system only very general principles can be pointed out (see Portuguese 
Constitution, articles 106 and 107). 
For instance, compare with UK experience (see part 11, paragraph 1.1). 
See Cödigo da ContribuiQäo Predial of 1913, Art. 25. 
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few years later in 1922 another reform of the income tax took place. This time, serious 
attempts were made to reintroduce a comprehensive income tax in line with the UK 
'income tax'. 
Unfortunately, that aim was not achieved and as a consequence a dual structure 
was introduced in the tax system. " Specific income taxes persisted and an attempt was 
made to enhance the fairness of the system by putting into operation a'personal income 
tax' (imposto pessoal the rendimento). " This tax structure survived, with some minor 
changes, until the recent tax reform of 1989. 
The Ptinciple of Taxation of Deemed Income 
Due to deficiencies of administrative machinery and accountancy methods, 
taxes falling upon business income were based on deemed assessments set up by the 
tax services. This distortive rule came under scrutiny in 1957 when a tax commission 
was appointed to undertake a new reform of the Portuguese tax system. 
Notwithstanding the deletion of that principle in practice, it continued in operation 
until its complete removal in the latest tax reform (1989). 
1.2 From a Classical System Towards an Exemption System? 
Since the replacement of the comprehensive income tax ('d6cima militar'), 
business profits had been charged under a specific tax called 'contribuigdo industrial'. " 
For tax assessment purposes, taxpayers were divided into three categories (A, B, and 
Q. Category A applied to larger businesses and categories B and C to medium and 
small businesses. 
The purpose of this division was mainly to subject profits of medium and small 
businesses to the principle of taxation of deemed income and consequently prevent loss 
of revenue. Problems of tax evasion" and lack of accountancy expertise strongly 
advised the use of such method of taxing business profits. 
92 See Report of the Tax Refonn Conunission of 18 June 1927. 
93 Vd. Law no. 1368 of 21 September of 1922. 
94 See Law of 14 May of 1872. 
Despite the Christian influence which advised strict tax compliance, there has been public 
resistance to taxes that go against the public welfare. 
36 
A Progressive Tax Rate Structure 
In line with current UK, Belgian or Luxembourg corporation tax rate 
structures, 96 that tax was charged in accordance with a progressive tax rate structure 
departing from a 30% tax rate to a maximum tax rate of 40%. Small and medium 
businesses were subject to a more favourable tax regime. The policy was regarded as 
defensible in the economic circumstances of Portugal. This tax regime no longer 
applies and instead a flat rate of 36% is charged on all types of companies. 
In addition, companies were subject to another tax which was also charged 
upon individuals, called 'imposto complementar'. " This tax was divided into two 
categories: section A which applied to individuals and section B to companies. A 
progressive tax rate structure was in operation in both sections but it was not extended 
to dividend income derived from non-registered bearer shares and interest income 
derived from bonds which were subject to proportional tax rates. 
The use of several tax rates and cumulative taxes and regimes gave rise to 
strong criticisms such as unnecessary compliance tax costs and inequities that led to 
economic and financial distortions. 
How Distributed Profits Were Taxed: Classical System 
Economic double taxation did not receive much attention from the Portuguese 
legislature. From early stages, legislative measures were taken pragmatically, satisfying 
primarily short-term public finance demands or electoral aims. A coherent and overall 
analysis of the Portuguese tax system never took place and consequently no clear tax 
policy has emerged. " 
Distribution of profits was discouraged by successive tax reforms, and as a 
result dividend income has always been subject to high effective tax rates. 99 A classical 
system was in operation. Distributed profits were charged at the company level (e. g. 
contribuigdo industrial, other specific taxes and if applicable, 'imposto complementar') 
96 See part II, paragraph 2.1. 
97 This tax was structured on the same basis of the 'personal income tax' referred above. Generally, 
different types of income were subject to different taxes and again, by aggregating total income of 
the taxpayer after operation of deductions and crediting of those taxes (against 'personal income 
tax'), subject to 'personal income tax'. 
98 See for instance, the inability of current tax system to deal with inheritance and gift taxation or 
the absence of a clear tax policy in company taxation (e. g. the difficult task of defining current 
Portuguese corporation tax system or the strictness of group taxation). 
99 See Rogdrio Fernandes Ferreira, Panorama actual da Fiscalidade Portuguesa, Lisbon, 1974. 
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and again in the hands of the shareholder (e. g. capital tax, inheritance and gift tax and 
'imposto complementar'). 
In general, the tax system was not equipped to tackle the problem of domestic 
economic double taxation, let alone to deal with the complexities attached to 
international taxation. Nfinor reliefs in the form of reduced tax rates applying to capital 
taxes charged upon dividend income, or exemptions granted at the corporate level if 
dividends were paid to corporate shareholders (e. g. 'imposto complementar, was not 
payable in these circumstances) had neither solved the problem nor provided any clear 
policy guidance about the structure of the corporation tax system. Distributed profits 
continued to be charged at the company level (contribui9do industrial still applied) and 
again at the corporate or individual shareholder level (capital tax and other taxes), 
imposing high tax burdens on companies financing their investments through equity. " 
As a result, retention of profits was encouraged by the operation of a 'genuine' classical 
system which looked at companies and shareholders as completely separate and 
unrelated entities. 
A derogation from the classical system could be seen in the regime applicable 
to holding companies (sociedades de gestdo de titulos). These companies could be 
exempted from 'contribui9do industrial' but as shareholders, they were subject to 
capital tax and other specific taxes (e. g. municipal tax (derrama)). By granting this 
general exemption, economic double taxation was mitigated and in certain cases 
completely prevented. Shareholders of those holding companies were also exempted 
from capital tax and consequently, the distortions arising from economic double 
taxation were overridden. The importance of this type of company cannot be 
underestimated in current financial and economic circumstances. It encourages 
investment in companies by domestic shareholders and it could lead to a more active 
participation of small investors in the equities market. 
Living with a Close Tax System 
Tax reforms undertaken in the past confined themselves to domestic issues 
leaving aside important international topics such as the use of unilateral or bilateral 
measures to eliminate juridical or economic international double taxation. It was only 
100 The penalising effects of this way of taxing corporate shareholders are quite relevant, especially if 
taking into account other EU experiences. For instance in the M despite the adoption of a 
classical system at the individual shareholder level, companies were not liable to corporation tax 
on the dividend received (it represented 'franked investment income') if income tax has been 
previously accounted for at the paying company level. At the corporate level an exemption system 
was already in place. 
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in 1968 that the first double taxation convention (UK/Portugal DTQ` came into 
force in the Portuguese tax system, and since then the DTC network has been 
expanding only slowly. "' In the period between 1968 and 1974 a record number of 
DTCs had been concluded, mainly with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
countries. This tendency reflected the political and economic openness that occurred 
following the death of Salazar in 1968 and the EFTA membership which had been in 
place ftom 1960 until 1986.1" 
During that period, a double taxation convention was also concluded between 
Portugal and former Affican colonies. This came into force by Decree-Law no. 579/70 
of 24 November 1970. The aim of this convention was to prevent double taxation of 
income and capital when tax jurisdiction was asserted in both territories. However, 
after the April revolution of 1974 and subsequent independence of Affican colonies 
this convention was overridden. Only recently, DTC negotiations have started again 
with some of those states. "' 
Pragmatic measures were adopted at various times to mitigate international 
economic double taxation, but they were subsequently overridden (e. g. unilateral relief 
was granted to resident companies with foreign operations by taking into account only 
one third of foreign profits for'contribui9do industrial' purposes). 10' 
The system has been structured upon general international tax principles such 
as the worldwide principle of taxation based upon the residence criteria and source 
principle of taxation applicable to foreign income derived within the country which in 
early stages did not cover royalties income. The latter principle had, however, been 
partially implemented through the use of the withholding tax mechanism. For instance, 
dividends or interest paid to non-residents had been subject to withholding tax under 
'01 See Official Journal (I) of 24 July 1968. 
102 See Table I at the end of this part. 
103 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 to eliminate trade tariffs 
on industrial products. It comprised the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria 
and Portugal. Finland became an associate member in 1961 and Iceland joined in 1970. The UK 
(1972), Denmark (1972), Portugal (1986), Sweden (1994), Austria (1994) and Finland (1994) left 
EFTA to join the European Community. 
104 See DTC concluded with Mozambique, signed on 21 March 199 1. 
105 See Paulo de Pitta e Cunha, 0 Tratamento Tributdrio dos Rendimentos da Propriedade Industrial 
e intelectual, Lisbon, 1970. 
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domestic provisions" and subsequently, if applicable, under the reduced rates of 
withholding tax established in DTCs. 
These historic developments show that from early stages, lack of a clear and 
sound policy in international tax matters has been a problem in the Portuguese tax 
system. Notwithstanding the political and economic openness that occurred between 
1968 and 1974 period, subsequent developments stopped this trend. The 1974 
Revolution brought political instability and an inward-looking economic policy 
reflected by the absence of new DTCs. Negotiations for new ones recommenced again 
only during the eighties and still in a limited way. In 1980, only two DTCs were signed 
(Italy and Germany) and during the decade that followed (1981 to 1990), no further 
conventions were signed. 
Subsequent EU membership (1986) put on the Portuguese policy agenda 
important topics such as internationalisation of the economy, elimination of obstacles 
to the free movement of capital (e. g. elimination of all kind of restrictions to 
import/export capital transactions) and alignment of domestic tax structure with other 
EU partners. In line with the Ruding Committee Recommendations, ` Portuguese tax 
administration has started negotiations with several countries and the trend to be 
expected in the nineties is towards further expansion and update of current DTC 
network. DTCs have been signed with Ireland, Mozambique and USA and at the 
moment negotiations have been held with not only v*h EU member states but also 
34ýtft Affican and Asian countries. Renegotiation of old DTCs has also been taking 
place with several EU member states (e. g. France, Spain and Denmark). 
Towards an Exemption System? 
On I January 1989, a major tax reform took place in Portugal in the field of direct 
taxation. The objective of the legislative changes was mainly to enlarge the tax base, to 
mitigate the tax burden and to secure the necessary tax revenue to cover the public 
deficit. Major administrative and budgetary problems have prevented the full 
achievement of those aims to date. 
106 See Capital Tax Code, articles. 2,36 paragraph 1,40 and 42. 
See Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company T ation, Co ssion of e ax mmi th 
European Communities, March 1992, p. 206. The Committee urges Member States not OnlY to 
conclude DTCs where none exist between them, but also to complete those where their coverage 
is limited (Phase I). Portugal has not yet concluded DTCs with the Netherlands, Greece, 
Luxembourg and Sweden. 
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Under the new tax system, savings and capital income are taxed more favourably 
than other types of income. Among other factors, this policy seeks to activate the 
Portuguese stock market and to provide liquidity to the corporate sector. " As a 
consequence, several taxes were abolished (though mention is still made of them in 
most Portuguese double tax conventions) and a new system of taxation was 
introduced. This was supported by two main taxes- 
the individual income tax (Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas 
Singulares), "' and 
the corporation income tax (Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas 
Colectivas). "O 
Each is regulated by its own code. The tax codes are based primarily in the Portuguese 
Constitution which establishes that the tax system will be structured to satisfy two 
basic premises: public expenditure needs and equitable distribution of the income and 
wealth. "' The Constitution also stipulates that all taxes must be imposed by Act of 
Parliament, and in accordance with the principle of progressivity at the individual 
taxation level, and the principle of taxation of the actual profits at the corporate 
level. "' As explained below, these principles have been only partially reflected in the 
individual and corporation income tax codes. 
The Portuguese corporation tax system is supported by those codes and also by 
the Tax Benefits Statute. This grants special exemptions to certain categories of 
income, namely dividend income. As a result, different tax regimes are in operation 
both at the corporate and individual levels, leading to a complex and distortive tax 
system which has not yet found its own identity. As explained below, two systems are 
currently in operation: an exemption system which operates at the corporate level and 
a credit system, sometimes combined with an exemption system (e. g. tax exemption 
granted to dividend income from shares traded in the stock exchange), applicable to 
corporate and individual shareholders. 
108 See Tables 10 to 12 where the advantages arising from investing in the stock exchange can be 
seen. 
109 See Decree-Law no. 442-A/88 of 30 November 1988 (IRS) which came into force on I January 
1989. 
See Decree-Law no. 442-B/88 of 30 November 1988 (IRC) which came also into force on I 
January 1989. 
See Art. 106 of the Portuguese Constitution. 
112 See Art. 107 of the Portuguese Constitution. 
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Again, pragmatic measures and the absence of a fully coherent tax policy can 
lead to heavy tax burdens and give rise to uncertainties about the legislators' intentions. 
Despite the drawbacks of the system built upon a classical system structure, recently 
introduced tax measures indicate that the trend is to eliminate as far as possible 
economic double taxation of dividend income by exempting that income in the hands of 
the shareholder (e. g. increase of tax credit rate, group taxation and gradual increase of 
the exemption granted to shares traded or quoted in the stock exchange under the Tax 
Benefits Statute). "' 
Taking into account Portugal's position in international trade' 14 and also its 
specific policies in taxation matters (e. g. primarily dictated by investment incentives 
and prevention of tax evasion), the purpose of the following paragraphs is to analyse 
the Portuguese corporation tax system with a view to indicate what might be the most 
appropriate and feasible corporation tax system under current trade, "' administrative 
and fiscal circumstances. "' 
1.3 Inheritance and Gift Taxation 
Inheritance and gift taxes were first used in the 19th century and aimed to solve 
public finance difficulties. "' From early stages, contradictory policy aims (as with the 
conciliation of principle of equity with social aim of family stability) have been posing 
serious questions about the validity of this type of taxation. ' 18 
The main argument against this type of tax has been its inability to reduce 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth and to produce enough tax revenue"' which 
113 This trend reflects current public policies of activation of Portuguese stock market and increase of 
corporate sector competitiveness in the worldwide economy. See also Portuguese position in the 
EC Commission VAiite Paper, Part C (Growth, Competitiveness, Employment, The Challenges 
and ways Forward into the 21st Century), 1993. 
114 See ECJ Opinion of 15 November of 1994 (Case 1/94) acknowledging the trend for basic 
industries to be transferred to developing countries whilst the developed economies have tended 
to become, in the main, exporters of services and of goods with a high value-added content. 
This trend has been reflected by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Convention and its 
annexes which were the subject of a single process of negotiation covering both goods and 
semces. 
115 See Table 2 at the end of this part. 
116 See Table 3 at the end of this part. 
I" See Law of 21 February of 1838. 
`8 See for instance Tax Reform Commission Report of 18 June 1927. 
119 See Table 4 at the end of this part. 
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could justify the heavy administrative costs necessary to put in operation its complex 
structure. "' Indeed, its multiple bracket structure coupled with a dual tax rate 
structure"' leads to inequities and unnecessary high administrative tax costs. 
Special attention should be given to the distortions created by the operation of 
a flat 5% tax rate applicable to dividend income paid by share companies (SA). 122 We 
must also note the discriminatory treatment given to other types of companies. Quota 
companies constitute the most used commercial form in Portugal. 12' The system 
discriminates against them by subjecting their shareholders to the general inheritance 
and gift tax structure (currently with tax rates which may reach 50%) in a way that 
contradicts principles of neutrality and efficiency and important constitutional 
principles (such as the principles of progressivity and equitable distribution of wealth). 
Overall, the current tax regime heavily taxes small and medium businesses and almost 
exempts from inheritance and gift tax shareholders of large companies. 
Finally, bearing in mind that the 5% flat rate tax is charged at the time when the 
dividend is paid, the effective tax rate charged upon the dividend increases significantly 
and as a result, distribution of profits by SA companies is discouraged. "' This problem 
is amplified at the international level when high withholding tax rates are charged upon 
dividend income paid by Portuguese companies to EU shareholders. "' 
120 So far, no studies have been undertaken on these important topics, such as how income is 
distributed across Portuguese population (see research undertaken by the rFS, part II, Chart 2 and 
respective notes) and also the absence of comprehensive quantitative analysis made in the 
important issue of administrative and compliance tax costs is worth notice. 
121 See articles 40 (which establishes a progressive tax rate structure) and 184 (which establishes a 
proportional tax rate of 5% applicable for instance, to dividend income) of the Inheritance and 
Gift Tax Code. 
122 This special tax rate was introduced by recent tax reform (see Law no. 8/89 of 22 April of 1989) 
in order to grant a more favourable inheritance and gift tax treatment to shareholders of this type 
of company. 
The general inheritance and gift tax structure is highly progressive and it may give rise (tax 
liability occurs with the death of the shareholder) to a very high tax burden (see for instance the 
discriminatory treatment granted to quota companies). 
123 See Table 5 at the end of this part. 
124 See Tables 6 to 12 at the end of this part. 
See comparatively low dividend income effective tax rates applying to dividend income paid by 
LJK or Dutch companies (see part 11, examples 1,2,4,6 and 8). 
The weight of inheritance and gift tax cannot be underestimated under current trends of 
elimination of dividend income withholding taxes (see Parent-Subsidiary Directive) and 
progressive elimination of economic double taxation. 
See also Part 111, paragraph 1.1. The particular operation of this tax has led to the suspension of 
double tax convention negotiations between Portugal and the Netherlands. 
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On this basis, it is argued that"' Portuguese inheritance and gift tax 
regime should be revised with a view to eliminating current distortions to achieve not 
only equity, neutrality and efficiency goals but also to guarantee that a satisfactory 
amount of revenue is collected. 
2. PORTUGUESE CORPORATION INCOME TAX SYSTEM 
2.1 Introduction 
Portuguese corporation income tax (IRC) is charged upon all profits of resident 
companies at a flat rate of 36%. Small and medium businesses are not entitled to a 
reduced tax rate as happens in the UK system. "' The 36% flat rate ranks amongst the 
higher corporation income tax rates charged within the EU. "' Only Belgium, Germany 
and Ireland apply higher corporation income tax rates, but it must be noted that those 
systems have 'safeguards' that enable them to compete successfully in the international 
arena. For instance, Belgium adopted an exemption system to mitigate or eliminate 
international economic double taxation. 129 
Local and municipal taxes increase considerably the effective corporation tax 
charged upon company profits. "' The former is creditable against corporation income 
tax"' but the latter"' can only be deducted as a business expense under art. 23, 
Recent trend of reduction in the number of rate brackets and lowering of tax rates has also been 
extended to inheritance and gift taxes (see Ken Messere, Tax Policy in OECD Countries, Choices 
& Conflicts, IBFD, 1993, p. 305 ss. ) 
This rationale has been fully implemented in New Zealand where a single rate of tax is in 
operation. 
121 See article 69 paragraph I of IRC Code. See however future developments announced in the 1995 
Budget and mentioned in paragraph 2.2. a). 
128 See Part II, Table 7. 
129 In Belgium, full exemption applies to companies (Art. 76 of the Royal Decree Tax Code) and an 
exemption with progression is followed in case of individual taxpayers (Art. 155 of the Tax Code). 
See further in Teixeira, Business Taxation in the European Union, Wiley Chancery, 1995. 
See Politica de Verdade, Politica de Sacrificio, Politica Nacional, Discursos, vol. 1,3rd edition, 
p. 27: 
"Se temos wn imposto e meia dfizia de adicionais ao mesmo imposto ou de adicionamento sobre a mat6fia 
colectAvel, temos a mentira da Mbutagdo. " 
It is worth mentioning that the tax credit is also taxable. See Art. 71 paragraph 2, c) of IRC Code 
and Order No. 10/90. 
132 See Decree-Law no. 37/93 of 13 February 1993 and Order no. 5/92. In order to finance local 
projects, local authorities may exercise tax powers in their geographical area by imposing a 
municipal tax. This tax cannot exceed 10% of the assessed corporation income tax and it is based 
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paragraph 1, f) of IRC Code. "' As a result and in 1995, the effective corporation tax 
may reach a 38.8% tax rate. Indeed, and within the EU, it is one of the highest 
corporation tax rates-"' 
Portuguese personal income tax system is based upon a four income bracket 
structure subject to the following rates- 15%, 25%, 35% and 40%. The multiple 
bracket structure increases administrative and compliance costs and runs against 
current trends of simplification of tax systems. 
In accordance with article I of the IRS Code, income is attributed to different 
schedules with specific deduction rules. Taxable income for the personal income tax is 
the sum of the income attributable to each schedule, after the operation of specific 
deductions relating to each schedule and also taking into account any general 
deductions applicable to the aggregate income. 
Unless a specific provision comes into operation, different kinds of income are 
subject to different withholding tax rates. The mechanism of withholding tax, used 
widely in the Portuguese tax system, is applied to dividend income, where a 25% tax 
rate is charged. Withholding tax is creditable (and refundable) against both corporate 
and personal income tax. 
Dividend income is charged at the personal income tax rates. However, the 
progressivity principle is overridden if dividend income derives from shares quoted or 
traded on the stock exchange. In this case, a 50% exemption is granted' 35 and the 
remaining income subject to the progressive income tax rates. Also, by preventing 
refunds of tax credits to exempt or lower rate shareholders the system moves away 
from a progressivity system towards a proportional system of taxation. "' 
upon the profits generated in the respective area. In 1994 only 40% of the assessed corporation 
income tax was taken into account. In 1995, a larger proportion, equal to 80% of the assessed 
corporation income tax applies. 
133 See however different position defended by the Portuguese tax authorities (DGCI - Order 14/95 of 
21 April 1995). 
134 See Teixeira, Business Taxation in the European Union, Wiley Chancery, 1995, Chapter 1, Table 
11. 
135 See Art. 31 of the Tax Benefits Statute. 
136 See Tables 10 to 12 illustrating the flat rates charged upon lower rate shareholders (e. g. 44% 
effective tax rate for 150/o/25% shareholders of SA companies and lower rates of 39% and 41.8% 
for 150/o/25% shareholders of quota companies). 
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Economic double taxation of dividend income is mitigated not only by the 
operation of the 50% tax exemption mentioned in the paragraph above but also by the 
use of a tax credit equivalent to 60% of the corporation income tax (MC) charged 
upon distributed profits. 137 
Those reliefs significantly reduce, but not elinýiinate, economic double taxation 
of dividend income. Distributed profits are subject to a 36% corporation income tax 
rate and additional taxes (e. g. local, municipal and if applicable, 5% inheritance and gift 
tax) and also a provisional 25% withholding tax rate. Economic and juridical double 
taxation is reduced or eliminated by crediting the provisional dividend withholding tax 
against personal income tax and also by the operation of the 50% tax exemption or/and 
the 60% tax credit mentioned in the paragraph above. 
The pragmatic approach regulating the current Portuguese corporation tax 
system mixes together exemptions and credits, producing a complicated system. "' The 
main weakness of the recently introduced tax system is the lack of a general and clear 
framework which would prevent inequities (e. g. different tax regimes leading to 
different effective tax burdens) and excessive administrative and private compliance 
costs. Those factors can lead to economic and financial distortions and increase the 
risk of tax evasion. 
In subsequent paragraphs, both domestic and international dimensions of the 
Portuguese tax system are reviewed and the main distortions arising from the 
economic double taxation of dividend income noted. The analysis will focus on the tax 
treatment given to dividend income derived from Dutch and UK sources and also to 
dividend income paid by Portuguese companies to resident shareholders of those EU 
member states. 
137 See Art. 80 paragraph 3 of the IRS Code. 
138 See Miguel Cadilhe, Politica de Dividendos e Dupla Tributaqdo, EESF, E(fiq6es ASA, 1991. 
46 
2.2 Domestic Dimension 
a) Taxation of Corporate Shareholders 
1) A Hybrid System 
OA) 
Corporate shareholders are subject to different tax treatments depending 0 their 
commercial structures, share capital pattern and economic dimension. Moreover, 
different systems to eliminate economic double taxation of dividend income at the 
corporate level are used, leading to high tax burdens in certain circumstances"' or to 
almost complete exemption of tax in the hands of the shareholders. "0 
Generally, two systems are used: the exemption and credit systems. The 
operation of these systems reflect the past classical tax structure which took 
shareholders and companies as complete separate and distinct entities. In general, those 
tax reliefs are only granted at the shareholder level"' and they are not computed on the 
basis of either corporate"' or income tax liability (compared for instance, with UK, 
French, Italian or German imputation systems). 
2) Withholding Tax 
In consonance with the principle of taxation at source, particularly relevant in a 
country such as Portugal where tax evasion is widespread, distributed profits paid by 
resident companies to resident corporate shareholders are subject to a withholding tax 
at the rate of 25%. "' This tax is creditable against the corporation income tax"' 
liability of the receiving company. 
Certain types of resident companies are exempted from applying the 
withholding tax when distributing profits to other resident companies. "' In order to 
encourage investment and economic growth, the following companies qualify: 
a) venture capital companies; 
139 See for instance Tables 7 and 8 at the end of this part. 
140 See Tables 6-A and B. 
An exception was introduced in the 1995 Finance Budget allowing small companies to deduct 
95% of their profits from the taxable base. 
142 An exception applies under article 72 paragraph 2 IRC. As explained in paragraph 2.2, the 60% 
tax credit is computed on the basis of the corporation income tax liability. See also paragraph 2.2 
a), 3). 
143 See IRC article 75, paragraph 4 and IRS article 74, paragraph 2, a). 
144 See IRC article 75, paragraph 3. 
145 See IRC article 76, paragraph c). 
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b) regional development companies; 
C) investment promotion companies-, 
d) holding companies (SGPS); 
e) brokerage companies; and 
f) investment companies. 
3) Extending the Affiliation Privilege 
As a result of the implementation of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive, "' not only 
dividend income paid by resident companies to resident corporate shareholders is taken 
into account under this more favourable regime but also dividend income remitted by 
companies resident in the EU. As a result, tax neutrality is achieved within the EU and 
dividend income deriving from other EU sources is not subject to discrimination. 
According to this regime, "' a resident company can deduct from its taxable profits 
95% of the dividend income received under the following circumstances: 
a) the distributing company is resident in Portugal or in another EU statel- 
b) the distributing company is subject to corporation income tax; and 
C) the parent company shall have held during the two preceding years, at least 
25% of the share capital of the subsidiary. However, if otherwise provided in a 
double tax convention, the 25% minimum participation in the share capital of 
the subsidiary may be replaced by a 25% voting rights test. 
In the case of newly created affiliates, the two years period applies from the 
date of their constitution. The same criteria apply irrespective of the holding capital 
percentage or holding period, to dividend income derived from shareholdings held as 
part of the technical reserves of insurance companies and also to dividends received by 
the following companies: 
a) venture capital companies; 
b) regional development companies; 
C) investment promotion companies; 
d) holding companies (S. G. P. S. ); 
e) brokerage companies; and, 
f) investment companies. 
146 Council Directive 90/435/EEC, OJ 1990 L225/6. 
147 See IRC, article 45 paragraph I and 5. 
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The more liberal tax regime granted to the above fisted companies is merely a 
consequence of current econon-k and financial policy priorities. 
A Chance to Finish the Job 
If the above mentioned conditions are complied with, economic double taxation 
within the corporate sphere is almost completely eliminated. "' The remaining dividend 
income is subject to the standard corporation income tax rate of 36%. If the above 
mentioned requisites are not met, the Tax Benefits Code grants a 50% tax exemption 
to dividend income derived from shares quoted or traded on the stock exchange. For 
these corporate shareholders, the tax burden of economic double taxation is further 
mitigated as a result of the combination of the 50% exemption with the 60% tax credit 
analysed in paragraph 2.1 above. "9 
A theoretical analysis of those regimes can be used to argue in favour of a full 
exemption system in line with the UK tax system"' or, within the EU context, with the 
Dutch participation exemption. The same reasoning leads to criticism of the credit 
system which comes into operation when the affiliation privilege conditions cannot be 
met. 
Corporate shareholders not qualifying for the 95% exemption are entitled to 
deduct from the assessed corporation tax 60% of the corporation income tax paid on 
those dividends subject to the following conditions: 
1) the distributing company shall be resident in Portugal and, 
2) it shall be subject to corporation income tax (a non-exempt entity). "' 
Again, economic double taxation of dividend income is not eliminated but C7 
merely attenuated, discouraging investment through equity and leading to commercial 
and financial distortions. However, taking into account past and current legislative 
148 See Tables 6-A and B at the end of this part. 
149 See Tables 7 to 9 at the end of this part. Corporate shareholders of quota and SA companies not 
trading in the stock exchange are subject to effective tax rates of respectively 52.4% and 55.3% 
compared with a lower effective rate of 45% applicable to corporate shareholders of SA 
companies with shares traded in the stock exchange. 
See part 2, paragraph 2.2 a). 
"' See IRC, article 72 paragraph 2. 
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measures, "' the trend is towards an increase of the tax credit granted, which may result 
in the eventual conversion of the credit system into a fuH exemption system. 
4) Group Taxation"' 
This regime guarantees full tax neutrality and eliminates completely the 
economic double taxation of dividend income. If all the requirements are met, dividend 
income paid by subsidiaries to their parent companies is fully exempted. Nonetheless, it 
only applies under strict conditions (e. g. a 90% share holding is required) and limits 
operate to offset losses in order to prevent tax avoidance devices which could erode 
the group's taxable income base. 
Accordingly, in a group of companies, the parent company may request from 
the Minister of Finance authorisation to assess the taxable profits on a consolidated 
basis by consolidation of the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of the 
companies of the group. The authorisation is valid for 5 years, but after this period the 
parent company may renew its application. This authorisation is only granted if all the 
following requirements are met. 
1) all companies of the group must be resident in the country; 
2) the parent company shall exercise total control over all other companies of 
the group (in accordance with order no. 4/90 and article 490 of the 
Companies Act, total control criteria applies to parent companies (defined 
in article 486 of the Companies Act) holding directly or indirectly at least 
90% of the share capital of the dependent companies); 
3) all the profits of the companies of the group shall be submitted to the 
general tax regime established in the corporation income tax code; 
4) all companies must use the same criteria in their accounts regarding stocks 
valuation, depreciation of assets, provisions and accounting periods. 
As mentioned above, one main advantage of the tax consolidation is the 
elinfination of the double taxation of dividends distributed by the subsidiaries to the 
parent company. Other advantages may be added such as the transference of losses 
between the companies of the group and the elimination of taxation of the profits 
derived from inter-company transactions. However, to counteract tax avoidance 
devices, a limit is imposed to the deductibility of the group tax losses. In accordance 
152 It is worth noting that the tax credit started at a modest 20% tax rate and it has been progressively 
increased in subsequent tax budgets. The 1995 tax budget increased it from 50% to 60%. 
153 See Order no. 15/94. 
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with article 59 A of the Corporation Income Tax Code, the consolidated income 
cannot be less than 65% of the aggregated companies' incomes. Those unrelieved tax 
losses can nonetheless be carried forward in accordance with article 60 paragraph b) of 
IRC. 
In Defence of Small Companies 
To increase domestic and international competitiveness of newly created small 
companies, the 1995 Budget authorises the government to grant a more favourable tax 
regime to those companies by means of special tax benefits. "' Accordingly, companies 
incorporated during the current year (1995) with an average number of employees 
higher than three and less than 20 and with a turnover not exceeding 500,000 PTE will 
be entitled to deduct 95% of their taxable profits (not including capital or real property 
income) during 1995,1996 and 1997. This partial tax exemption is subject to further 
qualifications, namely it will only be granted if the company's activities are carried on in 
separate premises and at least 75% of its share capital has been held by individuals. 
This recent change in tax policy may indicate the willingness of the Portuguese 
goverment to undertake a major reform in the field of small companies taxation. "' 
Accepting the fact that small companies constitute a major source of wealth and 
employment in the EU, "' a comprehensive reform may, with advantage, be undertaken 
with a view to the possibility of the reduction of inheritance and gift taxation, "' a 
reduced company tax rate, carrying back tax losses and decreasing compliance tax 
costs. 
154 See Law no. 39-B/94 of 27 December 1994, article 37. 
155 See also legislative authorisation granted to the government to implement a tax neutral regime, 
by using the tax deferral mechanism, in cases of conversion of commercial structures owned by 
individuals into corporate structures. 
156 See COM (94) 352 final, Brussels, 07.09.1994, Communication from the Commission, The 
European Observatory for SMEs, comments by the Commission on the Second Annual Report 
(1994), p. 3. 
157 See COM (94) 55 final, Brussels, 14.03.1994, The Community Internal Market - 1993 Report - 
p. 99. In this report the Commission of the European Communities points out that few small and 
medium-sized enterprises are handed down to a second generation of entrepreneurs and only a 
tiny minority of those survive to the third generation. The Commission is currently examining 
whether a recommendation on this and other questions concerning SNI[Es (e. g. international 
double taxation of business transfers) should be addressed to the Member States. 
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b) Taxation of Individual Shareholders 
1) in Search of a Coherent Tax System 
In the Portuguese tax system no coherent approach is yet in place and despite 
efforts to eliminate economic double taxation of dividend income, "' so far little 
theoretical analysis has been undertaken on this important topic. "' A complex and 
distortionary system still remains in operation with different tax rates and a mixing of 
tax credits and tax exemptions, dependent upon the type of shareholder or share 
classification. 
. Ex-emption or Progressivity? 
The Portuguese personal income tax system is based upon a four income 
bracket structure subject to the following tax rates- 15%, 25%, 35% and 40%. "' There 
is no special tax rate charged upon dividend income which is taxable in accordance 
with Schedule E of the Personal Income Tax Code (IRS). 161 
Distributed profits are generally subject to a withholding tax, creditable against 
either corporation or personal income tax, and they are charged in the hands of the 
individual shareholder at the progressive tax rates above mentioned. 
"at is the Impact of These Progressive Tax Rates Upon the Overall Corporation 
Tax System? 
Subsequent increases of the tax credit, currently reaching 60%, led to a more 
neutral and efficient tax system and to further reduction of economic double taxation at 
the individual shareholder level. "' The system is progressively moving away from a 
credit system into an exemption system. Notwithstanding the gradual removal of non- 
neutralities and inefficiencies, the system is still accommodating the new changes and 
158 See recent increase of tax credit (from 50% to 60%) in the 1995 tax Budget. 
Compare for instance with the UK experience where from the early sixties a comprehensively 
theoretical analyses had been undertaken, backed by a strong policy and sense of direction (see 
part 11, paragraph 1.2). 
160 The income tax rates applying in 1994/95 are: 
161 See IRS, article 6, paragraph 1, h). 
162 Tables 10 to 12 at the end of this part illustrate the effective tax rates operating under the 
Portuguese 'progressive tax rate structure. 
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trying to reconcile an exemption system with a progressive system of taxation. But can 
both be achieved? By preventing refunds of tax creditS163 the system only guarantees a 
certain degree of progressivity. For instance, dividend income effective tax rates 
remain proportional at respectively 39% and 41.8% for lower rate shareholders of 
quota companies and 44% for lower rate shareholders of SA companies. 164 
The higher effective dividend income tax rates charged upon shareholders of 
SA companies result from the unrelieved 5% inheritance and gift tax charged at the 
time of the distribution. The distortionary aspects of this tax are reflected in the high 
effective dividend income tax rate mentioned above. The extend of this distortion is so 
noticeable that notwithstanding the 50% exemption relief granted to shareholders of 
SA companies trading in the stock exchange which is not granted to shareholders of 
quota companies, the latter end up better off than the former. 165 
These types of discriminatory tax treatments (e. g. inheritance and gift tax and 
'stock exchange' tax exemption) give raise to unnecessary compliance tax costs and 
lead to inequities and inefficiencies. 
Towards a True Exemption System 
The overall structure of the Portuguese corporation tax system clearly supports 
a full exemption system of taxation in which distributed profits would be taxed at the 
corporate rate and fully exempted in the shareholders' hands. The loss of tax revenue 
resulting from a harmonised and coherent tax system could be compensated by a 
decrease in both public and private compliance tax costs and by generating a better 
trade environment which is already in place in several states of the EU. 
The high Portuguese corporation income tax and the unrelieved municipal, 
inheritance and gift taxes substantially increase the effective tax rates on personal 
dividend income. This leads to undesirable and distortionary levels of taxation, 
especially when compared with equivalent tax burdens on dividend income currently 
operating in the EU. "' 
163 See IRS, article 80 paragraph 5. 
164 See Tables 10 to 12 at the end of this part. 
165 Compare Table 10 with Table 12 at the end of this part. 
166 See, for instance, UK personal dividend income effective tax rates which are kept at much lower 
rates of respectively 16.25% (exempt shareholders), 33% (lower and basic rate shareholders) and 
49.75% (higher rate shareholders) in cases where the standard 33% corporation income tax rate 
is in operation. 
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VL 
Should We Have Quota Companies? 
The disparity of tax regimes applying to quota companies and SA companies 
also results from weaknesses in the current Commercial Code. This can lead to 
excessive rigidity, as with restrictions posed to the payment of interim dividends, and 
heavy administrative and compliance burdens, such as the requirement of notarial 
intervention for most company documents. The legal structure of Quota Companies 
(see for instance definition of quota as a rigid and static share capital participation) is 
regulated by the Commercial Code within this theoretical framework. "' Indeed, it may 
be argued that the complexity and limitations attached to the commercial concept of 
the quota, such as limits posed to the transfer of quotas prevented the inclusion of 
quota companies in the Tax Benefits Statute provision that grants a 50% exemption to 
dividend income paid by SA companies trading in the stock exchange. 
Finally, it is worth noting that notwithstanding the options provided by the 
Commercial Code which enables investors to choose from four major categories of 
companies in practice, only two have predominantly been used: the SA company and 
the Quota Company. This is an issue which should deserve particular attention from 
commercial law experts. 
168 
Is it Appropriate to Encourage Investment Through the Use of 'Pragmatic' Tax 
Benefits? 
It is worth restating the need for an active trading nation to have a coherent 
and clear tax system that minimises specific tax benefits which distort the tax system, 
or which give rise to high public and private compliance tax costs and lead to 
uncertainty about the taxpayer's position in the overall system. By doing so, the scope 
for, and motivation behind, tax evasion is reduced and efficient tax-effective planning 
can be pursued by both private and public entities. 
2) Taxation of Capital Gains 
Distributed profits are subject to corporation tax and subsequently taxed in the 
hands of the shareholder as income or capital gains. In the Portuguese tax system) 
capital gains constitute merely a different category of income subject to the IRS 
Code. "' Capital gains are taxed under Schedule G"' and, unless the taxpayer chooses 
167 Compare, for instance, with the UK commercial structure which is simply built on the distinction 
between companies limited by shares and unlimited liability companies. 
168 See Table 5 at the end of this part. 
169 See IRS, article 1, paragraph 1. 
" See IRS, article 10. 
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the progressive system of taxation, subject to a lower tax rate of only 10%. "' This 
more favourable income tax rate decreases the scope for economic double taxation of 
share income. This occurs when the shareholder disposes of his or her shares within a 
period of less than 12 months from the acquisition date. 
172 If the shares are held for a 
period exceeding 12 months, capital gains are fully exempted. 
Taxation of capital gains in the Portuguese system is guided mainly by 
economic and financial aims such as improvement of stock exchange performance and 
increase of corporate liquidity. The scope for inequities is quite narrow given the low 
income tax rate charged and the trend is towards full tax exemption of capital gains. 
Furthermore, by exempting capital gains of non-resident corporate investors without a 
permanent establishment in the country, "' the system achieves full neutrality within the 
international sphere. 
2.3 International Dimension 
a) Taxation of Companies 
Recent enacted legislation aims to encourage foreign investment in the country 
and to avoid discriminatory measures towards EU investors. The regime operating in 
the offshore zone of Madeira and the partial implementation of the Parent- Subsidiary 
Directive play an important role in the process of openness and reduction of 
international tax burdens. These regimes are noted below, with special emphasis placed 
upon the remaining obstacles to complete elimination of international economic double 
taxation of dividend income. 
A Temporary 'Tax Haven' in the EU 
An attractive tax system operates in the offshore zone of Madeira which now 
only covers non-residents entities. Initially, Portuguese residents were able to use it to 
avoid high tax burdens charged in continental Portugal. However, this no longer is 
possible. 
The scheme also is subject to a time limit. Profits derived from licensed or 
qualified activities, "' including shipping operations, "' carried out in the above 
171 See IRS, article 75. 
172 See IRS article 10, paragraph 2, c). 
173 See Tax Benefits Statute, article 33. 
174 See Tax Benefits Statute, article 4 1. 
175 See Decree-Law no. 393/93 of 23/11/93. 
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mentioned areas by non-residents are exempted from corporation income tax until 31 
December 2011. This exemption does not apply to transactions with Portuguese 
residents (excluding however, entities incorporated offshore). Clearly, the system 
discriminates against residents and aims to attract foreign investment into the country. 
Dividend income attributed to the shareholders of offshore companies are also 
exempted from both corporation and individual income taxes until 31 December 2011. 
Until recently, the tax regime described above had not been challenged by 
'limitation of benefits' clauses, frequently included in DTCs with countries granting 
special benefits or exemptions. Indeed, offshore companies could benefit (and still 
benefit) from the operation of reduced withholding tax rates or even tax sparing reliefs 
granted under the terms of a DTC. Recent developments, such as the unusual 
occurrence of the denouncement by Denmark of its DTC with Portugal and the terms 
of the USA/Portugal DTC, concluded in 1994, including a 'limitation of benefits' 
clause, indicate that this may be changed in the near future. New DTCs may be limited 
by that clause, with present conventions updated during the renegotiation process, 
currently taking place with several EU member states. "' 
2) The Impact of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive 
The Parent- Subsidiary Directive has been implemented in Portugal by stages. 
Portugal does not have to apply it in full until the year 2000, with the prospect of a 
further extension by negotiation. This derogation was allowed mainly to safeguard 
public revenue interests and to enable the Portuguese tax system to adapt to the 
changes introduced by this Directive. At present, withholding taxes constitute the most 
efficient method of revenue collection in Portugal. However, in the near future, major 
reforms are likely in the tax administration structure in order to implement efficiently 
the principle of worldwide taxation. 
According to the Directive, dividends distributed by a Portuguese subsidiary to 
a parent located in an EU member state shall be subject to maximum withholding tax 
rates of 15% until 1997 and 10% until the year 2000. Article 3 paragraph I of the 
Directive defines parent company as any company of a member state which fulfils the 
conditions set out in article 2 and has a minimum holding of 25% in the capital of a 
company of another member state falfilling the same conditions. Member states shall 
have the option of replacing, by means of bilateral convention, the criterion of a 
holding in the capital by that of a holding of voting rights (article 3 paragraph 2). The 
176 See Gloria Teixeira, Prof David Williams, "The Portuguese Tax System and Double Tax Treaty 
Network", Intertax, 1994/4, p. 180. 
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only double tax convention where a reference is made to this criteria (voting rights) is 
the U. K. /Portugal DTC. "' In the others, two tests are used: 
the beneficial ownership test (see for example, article 10 paragraph 2 
Italy/Portugal DTC) which was only introduced in the Portuguese double 
tax convention network with the 1977 OECD model and consequently, it 
applies only to double tax conventions concluded with Germany, Italy, 
Mozambique, Ireland, USA and recently renegotiated Spain/Portugal DTC 
and, 
the minimum holding share capital (see for example, article 2 paragraph 2, 
a) Denmark/Portugal DTC). 
Within the European Union context, Portuguese double tax conventions are in 
line with the maximum limits pointed out by the Parent - Subsidiary Directive. "' In 
fact, in several double tax conventions a more favourable tax treatment is given to 
dividend income such as, for example, the 10% withholding tax rate applying under the 
UX. /Portugal DTC or under the Denmark/Portugal DTC, subject to a minimum 25% 
holding in the share capital. Also, both Spain/Portugal DTC and Finland/Portugal DTC 
establish a 10% withholding tax rate if the recipient is a company holding directly at 
least 25% of the capital of the company paying the dividends (see article 10 paragraph 
2,, a)). In the remaining EU double tax conventions and in cases not covered by the 
10% reduced rate of withholding tax, a 15% withholding tax rate applies (see DTCs 
with Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Austria and Ireland). "' 
However, as mentioned above, a further tax may fall upon dividend income - 
inheritance and gift tax - at a tax rate of 5% (withholding tax). It is not surprising to 
hear complaints regarding the violation of the maximum limits imposed by double tax 
conventions as those DTCs do not cover inheritance or gift taxes. Consistently with 
this, the Commission has indicated that, in its view, the additional 5% withholding tax 
does not conflict with the Parent- Subsidiary Directive. "O 
17' See part 11 paragraph 2.3 a), 3. 
"8 See Table 13 at the end of this part. 
In some double tax conventions, this percentage applies without further restrictions such as 
minimwn holding capital or beneficial ownership (e. g. France/Portugal DTC or Belgium/Portugal 
DTQ. 
180 See however recent decision of the Oporto tax court of first instance of 4 April 1995 which 
decided that the 5% inheritance and gift tax violates the Directive and therefore cannot be 
imposed by the Portuguese tax authorities. 
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The major benefit of this Directive falls to EU countries that have not yet 
concluded double tax conventions with Portugal (Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg 
and Sweden). For them, the tax benefit arising from the entry into force of this 
Directive (I st January 1992) meant a decrease of the 25% withholding tax rate (plus, if 
applicable, 5% inheritance and gift) falling on dividend income to 15% until 1997 and 
10% until the year 2000. Moreover, from 1997, the 15% withholding tax rate currently 
applying in the Portuguese double tax convention network will be replaced by a 10% 
withholding tax rate if the conditions of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive are met (status 
of parent company and minimum holding of 25% of the share capital), in accordance 
with article 5 paragraph 4 of that Directive. DTCs will require revision to 
accommodate the Directive's limits. 
On 26 July 1993,1" the EC Commission presented a proposal to the Council 
recommending the extension of the Directive to all enterprises subject to corporation 
tax, irrespective of their legal form. Portugal already conforms with this 
recommendation. Indeed, only Portugal and the LJK have included all forms of 
companies in the list annexed to the Directive. Moreover, it recommends member 
states to grant 'indirect tax credits' to sub-subsidiaries of the resident parent company 
in order to eliminate econon-fic double taxation of dividend income. As explained 
below, Portugal does not grant this type of credit. 
3) Tackling International Double Taxation 
a) The Residence Criteria 
In accordance with IRC Code, article 4 paragraph 1, income of companies 
resident in Portugal is taxed on a worldwide basis. Residence is determined by the 
operation of two alternative tests: the incorporation test and place of effective 
management test. Source taxation only comes into operation in case those two tests do 
not apply-"' 
The Portuguese tax system taxes resident companies on their worldwide 
income and provides relief for international double taxation of capital or income by 
using three methods. 
The first method is the expanding list of double taxation conventions mentioned 
in Table 1. However, the impact of the current DTC network is quite limited. 
181 See COM (93) 293 final. 
182 See IRC, article 4 paragraph 2. 
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Most Portuguese DTCs were negotiated some time ago and are unchanged. 
They follow the strict wording of article 23 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention which merely deals with the problem of juridical double taxation. 
Accordingly, only withholding taxes charged upon dividend income in the 
source state are creditable against Portuguese corporation income tax. "' This 
issue, critically analysed in the subsequent paragraph, is of considerable 
relevance taking into account the high corporation income tax rate adopted in 
Portugal. Recent agreed DTCs grant underlying tax reliefs when certain 
conditions are met. For instance, the recently renegotiated Spain/Portugal DTC 
gives a 95% tax exemption to dividend income when the Portuguese parent 
company holds directly at least 25% of the share capital of the Spanish 
subsidiary. Indirect holdings do not qualify for the exemption. "' The inclusion 
of this exemption in DTCs concluded with EU member states is useless. As a 
result of the implementation of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive in the 
Portuguese tax system, the 95% exemption is already granted under domestic 
law to all EU subsidiaries satisfying the above mentioned requirements. 185 
Notwithstanding the insertion of this relief in DTCs, the Portuguese DTC 
network continues to follow the classical view of taxation at the international 
level, denying relief for economic double taxation of capital or income. Within 
the EU, the 95% exemption guarantees that income deriving from EU sources 
is not taxed more heavily than domestic income. However, third countries 
investing in Portugal are heavily taxed as a result of that policy. 
(2) The second method is the unilateral tax credit regulated in the IRC Code, 
article 73. "' This relief only applies to companies and in the absence of a DTC. 
Moreover, and notwithstanding the general wording of article 73 and the 
reference made in article 58 paragraph 1, b) to foreign income taxes charged 
upon foreign income, article 71 merely states that a tax credit may be granted 
in case international double taxation occurs. In accordance with prevalent 
international tax policy only juridical double taxation is considered and 
consequently, article 73, which shall be read in conjunction with article 71 
paragraph 2, b), only covers withholding taxes paid in the foreign country. 
Once again and for non-convention countries, a classical system is in operation 
183 See for instance article 22 paragraph 3 of the UK/Portugal DTC. 
184 See Spain/Portugal DTC, article 23 paragraph 2, b). 
I" See IRC Code, article 45 paragraph 1. 
186 For a comparative approach in this field see Gloria Teixeira, Prof David Williams, "The Impact 
of the Unilateral Credit in the US, UK and other Tax Systems", Intertax, 1995/11. 
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without any relief for international economic double taxation. Unilateral tax 
credit is particularly relevant to EU companies not qualifying under the 95% 
domestic exemption (and respective provisions of the Parent- Subsidiary 
Directive) and without a DTC with Portugal (e. g. Portuguese company holding 
less than 25% of the share capital of a Dutch company). "' 
(3) The third method consists in deducting foreign taxes when computing company 
profits. "' 
These methods are noted below when describing the tax regimes applying to 
cross-border dividend income flows derived from the UK and the Netherlands. 
Towards More Integrated EU Corporation Tax Systems? '" 
b) How UK and Portuguese Corporation Tax Systems Interact 
Foreign dividends are taxed on the basis of their gross amount, i. e. including 
any withholding tax paid in the source state. But underlying tax credits are not granted 
by the Portuguese tax system (including domestic law and DTC network)" and the 
UK tax system does not apply any withholding tax on dividend income remitted to 
Portuguese companies. As a result, dividend income is taxed on the basis of its net 
amount. 
The example below shows the effective dividend income tax rates charged 
upon dividend income remitted by a UK company under the different tax regimes 
granted by Portuguese tax law to Portuguese corporate investors With special emphasis 
placed upon the discriminatory features of the system. 
187 The same reasoning applies to Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden. 
188 See IRC Code, article 58 paragraph 1, b). 
189 The concept of integration used in this part and parts H to IV differs from the technical concept of 
tax integration used in the introduction. Here, integration is equivalent to 'unification' or 
economic confluence of the autonomous legal concepts of company and shareholder. 
190 See footnote above and article 22 (3) UK/Portugal DTC. 
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Example I (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) * 
Notes: 
See Table 14 at the end of this part. 
Article 31 of the Tax Benefits Statute does not prevent resident companies who are 
investing inforeign companiesfrom taking advantage of the 50% tax exemption. As 
a result, investment in foreign markets is not discouraged. 
In accordance with article 72 paragraph I of the IRC, dividend income paid by 
non-resident companies does not qualify under the 60% tax credit relief. Within the 
EU context and taking into account recent decisions of the ECJ in the field of direct 
taxation, 191 it may be questioned if this tax treatment does not constitute a 
discriminatory measure which goes against the free movement of capital. 
However, with the recent inclusion in the Treaty on European Union of articles 73b 
and 73d, it may be argued that Member States can treat taxpayers differently 
depending on their residence and capital investment if that treatment does not 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free 
movement of capital. 
Two Systems in Operation 
Notwithstanding the classical approach followed in the Portuguese DTC 
network without any credits for underlying taxes, domestic provisions, namely the 
95% participation exemption or the 50% tax exemption granted to dividend income 
derived from shares traded in the stock exchange largely attenuate the penalising 
effects of economic double taxation of dividend income. However, if not covered by 
those exemptions, the effective tax burden of dividend income increases, discouraging 
investment through Portuguese companies. 
c) How Dutch and Portuguese Corporation Tax Systems Interact 
No DTC has been agreed yet between Netherlands and Portugal. Unless the 
Parent- Subsidiary Directive regime and respective implementing provisions are 
followed, dividend income paid by a Dutch company to a Portuguese company is 
"' See Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v Roland Schumack-er or Case-1/93, Halliburton 
Services B. Vv Staatssecretaris van Financien. 
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therefore subject to a dividend withholding tax at the rate of 25%. If the Directive's 
requirements are met, no withholding tax is charged upon dividend income. 192 
International economic double taxation of dividend income remitted by Dutch 
companies to Portuguese resident companies is relieved by the operation of the 95% 
domestic participation exemption or, in case the participation exemption requirements 
are not met, by the use of the unilateral tax credit regulated in IRC, article 73. In this 
context, it is worth mentioning recently introduced CFC legislation which applies, for 
instance, when Dutch investment organisations pay dividend income to Portuguese 
companies. " The example below illustrates the effective tax rates applying to dividend 
income paid by Dutch companies to Portuguese companies under the different 
situations described above. 
Example 2 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Notes: 
See Table 15 at the end of this part. 
It is assumed that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies and consequently no 
withholding tax is charged upon dividend income in Netherlands. 
Dividend income paid by Dutch companies to companies incorporated in the 
offshore ofMadeira is subject to a 25% withholding tax rate. 
It is assumed that withholding tax is levied at the normal rate (25%). 
They are subject to Portuguese CFC rules in case the Portuguese resident 
shareholder holds at least, directly or indirectly, 25% of the share capital. 
However, if more than 50% of the share capital of the foreign company is held by 
resident shareholders, only a 10% holding is required to put in operation the CFC 
legislation regime. Moreover, in accordance with IRC, article 45 paragraphs I and 
5, investment organisations do not qualify under the participation exemption 
regi me. 
Investment organisations are subject to a 25% withholding tax in the Netherlands. 
192 Supported by the anti-tax avoidance provisions of the Directive, Dutch tax authorities are 
charging withholding tax on dividend income paid by Dutch subsidiaries to parent companies 
incorporated in the offshore of Madeira on the basis of article 2 paragraph c) which may prevent 
tax exempt entities from benefiting from the Directive's regime. See also part 11, paragraph 2.3 5). 
193 See IRC, article 57-B. 
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A Better Deal Under the UK Tax System? 
d) The Portuguese Corporate Investor Perspective 
Unless dividend income derives from Dutch investment organisations, effective 
tax rates on dividend income are lower if dividends derive from UK sources. The 
absence of a dividend withholding tax in the UK tax system is the major factor leading 
to lower tax burdens to the Portuguese corporate investor. Also, the 33% lower 
corporation income tax operating in the UK contributes to reduce the effective tax 
burden of dividend income. Indeed, both the absence of a DTC between Portugal and 
Netherlands and the proportionally high dividend withholding tax charged in the 
Netherlands lead to high tax burdens in the residence state (Portugal). 
Despite the favourable treatment granted under the participation exemption 
which complies almost fully with the principle of capital import neutrality (see effective 
tax rates operating in the case of dividends from the UK and Netherlands of 
respectively, 34.2% and 36%), the combination of a high Portuguese corporation 
income tax rate with the absence of underlying tax reliefs or carry back or forward 
facilities give rise to unrelieved economic double taxation of dividend income. 
However, despite the drawbacks of the system followed at the international level, the 
penalising effects of the domestic tax regime discriminates against domestic investors 
which face a higher corporation income tax rate (e. g. 36% compared with the LTK 33% 
or Dutch 35%) and further additional taxes (e. g. 10% municipal tax and if applicable 
5% inheritance and gift tax) ultimately leading to higher effective dividend income tax 
rates. 194 
e) The EU Investor Perspective 
Dutch and UK Positions 
This paragraph compares the tax burdens of cross-border dividends flowing 
within the three above mentioned jurisdictions. For this purpose, two examples are set 
out illustrating payment of dividend income by a UK or Dutch subsidiary, through an 
intermediate Portuguese subsidiary, to its ultimate UK or Dutch parent company. 
194 Compare with higher dividend income effective tax rates charged domestically and illustrated in 
Tables 6 to 9 at the end of this part. 
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Example 3 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
UK =: > Portugal => Netherlands 
Notes: 
It is assumed that municipal tax is levied at its maximum rate (I Oyo) and that the 5% 
inheritance and gift tax is charged 
This latter issue is nonetheless open to interpretation divergences. '9' In this 
analysis and supported both by domestic provisions which were designed to tax 
exclusively resident individual shareholders (specifically, shareholders of &4 
companies) and byfundamental principles of international tax law (e. g. states shall 
exercise their tax powers in conformity with the principles of source or residence 
(nationality) taxation), the author follows the view that no IHT should be charged 
upon dividend income derived from foreign sources and paid to non-resident 
shareholders. Also, it is assumed that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies and 
consequently, by means of a derogation, Portugal may impose a withholding tax of 
15% until 1997. 
In accordance with Order no. 4194 of 712194, no municipal tax is charged in 
Madeira or Azores. Furthermore, no inheritance tax is charged upon dividend 
income paid by companies incorporated in the offshore to non-resident 
shareholders. 196 
See Tables 6-A and 9. A 25% withholding tax is charged taking into account that no 
DTC has yet been agreed between Portugal and Netherlands. 
195 See for instance that no tax convention in the field of inheritance and gift taxes have been N-et 
included in the Portuguese DTC network. 
196 See Decree-Law no. 165/86 of 26 of June of 1986. 
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Example 4 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
The Netherlands =; > Portugal =; > UK 
... 
.... .................. . ................ 
................... .................. 10IMPARY: A .... ..... I ........... . ........... Portu **-*, :0***t &efVe Tax Rates 
....................... ........................ ............. ............ .......... ....... ..... ........ ........................ ........................ .... ........................... .............................. ... ....... ... ...... ........... 
50* 
............................. 
....................... ...... ........... ............... I .. 
.............. 
....... . ... 
.... 
.... 
.... ........ .. 
Net Dividend: 65 48.8 (C IT: 2.2) [48.8 50%) + 16.2 36%] 
Municipal Tax: 0.1 /00.5 46.4% 51.2% 60.5% 67% 
IHT: 3.2 / 2.4 
WHT**** (10%) (0%) (15%) (15%) 
Net Dividend Received 
by UK Parent Company: 53.6 48.8 39.5 32.9 
Notes: 
It is assumed that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies and dividend income is 
paid to taxable companies. 
Dividends paid to companies not qualifying under the terms of the Parent- 
Subsidiary Directive are also subject to a 25% withholding tax in the Netherlands. 
In this case, only half of the dividend income paid is subject to CIT Dutch 
withholding tax is creditable against corporation income tax. 
See DTC UKIPortugal, article 10 paragraph 2. It is assumed that a 15% 
withholding tax is charged except when the participation exemption or the offshore 
company requirements are met. In these cases, a 10% or 0% withholding tax apply. 
Conclusions 
At domestic level, the system is progressively moving towards an exemption 
system (see for instance, the 95% participation exemption, the exemption granted to 
dividend income from shares traded in the stock exchange or the tax credit 
progressively increased during past financial years). Meanwhile, exemption and tax 
credit systems are still living together and, as a consequence, economic double taxation 
is not fully eliminated at the corporate shareholder level. "' In this context, the 
advantages of group taxation are important. Notwithstanding the restrictiveness of its 
operation, it prevents economic double taxation of dividend income and guarantees tax 
neutrality within the domestic corporate sphere. 
Compare for instance with UK experience where economic double taxation of dividend income is 
fully eliminated at the corporate level. 
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At the international level, the Portuguese system is in a transitional period, 
evidenced both by the partial implementation of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive and by 
the increasing number of DTCs concluded or in course of negotiation. Meanwhile, high 
withholding taxes are being charged leading to high dividend income effective tax 
rates. "' Other factors may be added, such as the comparatively high corporation 
income tax rate currently in place, the distortive inheritance and gift tax and the use of 
the classical system to eliminate economic international double taxation without tax 
credits for underlying taxes paid at the distributing company level. " As a result, a 
classical system is still in place, mitigated by the extension of the participation 
exemption to EU corporate investors meeting the Parent- Subsidiary Directive 
requirements and by the use of a tax exemption granted to investors trading in the 
Portuguese stock exchange. "' 
The transitional tax regime granted to companies operating in the Madeira 
offshore zone avoids the distortionary aspects mentioned in the paragraph above by 
exempting company profits both from CIT and withholding tax. At the same time, and 
unless the anti-tax avoidance provisions of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive, DTCs or 
foreign unilateral provisions come into operation, those companies can benefit from a 
more favourable regime granted both under EU Directives and DTC network. Indeed, 
the increase use by tax administrations of anti-avoidance measures may compromise 
the success of Madeira offshore zone which presently ranks amongst the best holding 
centres in the EU. "' 
198 Compare for instance dividend income effective tax rates illustrated in examples 3 and 4. 
Notwithstanding the reduced UK CIT rate (33%), this effect is offset by the operation of high 
withholding taxes (15% in case the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies otherwise, a penalising 
25% tax is charged) charged upon dividend income distributed by a Portuguese resident 
intermediary subsidiary to its Dutch parent company (see example 3). On the other hand, the 35% 
higher Dutch CIT is mitigated by the reduced MMTs included in the Portuguese[UK DTC, 
respectively 10% and 15% (see example 4). The distortionary aspects of high dividend income 
withholding taxes are clearly demonstrated in those numeric examples. 
199 This system is followed in the Portuguese DTC network and also applies when the unilateral 
relief is granted. 
200 See examples I and 2. 
201 Threatened by the hostility of tax adm inistrations, offshore centres worldwide are replacing their 
0% rate policy by a reduced CIT rate which in practice merely substitutes the removed annual fee 
paid by companies incorporated in the offshore zone. 
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b) Taxation of Individual Shareholders 
1) The Advantages of a More EU Integrated Tax System 
Foreign dividend income paid to Portuguese resident individual shareholders is 
subject to the same regime applying to domestic dividend income. "' However, the 
60% tax credit relief is only granted to individual shareholders of Portuguese resident 
companies subject to corporation income tax (IRC). Again, and now at the individual 
shareholder level, it may be questioned if the denial of the tax credit does not 
constitute a discriminatory measure against other EU investors. "' 
Unless the 50% tax exemption comes into operation, no underlying tax credits 
are granted to individual resident shareholders for foreign taxes paid in the source 
state. DTCs are based upon the classical view embodied in the OECD model without 
attempting to solve the problem of international economic double taxation of income 
or capital. Accordingly, only withholding taxes paid in the source state are creditable 
against the personal income tax liability of the shareholder. In the absence of a DTC, 
even withholding taxes are disregarded by Portuguese tax authorities when assessing 
the final tax liability of the resident shareholder. The important unilateral tax relief is 
only granted to corporate shareholders and, as a consequence, a genuine classical 
system comes into operation preventing the flows of capital from those countries not 
covered by the Portuguese DTC network. 
Dutch and UK Positions 
In this paragraph, I aim to illustrate the effective tax rates charged upon 
individual dividend income when derived from either Dutch or UK sources. By placing 
side by side the UK and the Netherlands' tax jurisdictions, it is possible to select the 
most favourable location for investment when undertaken by a Portuguese resident 
individual shareholder. Also, it is possible to evidence the main distortionary features 
of the Portuguese tax system when taxing individual income derived from other EU 
sources. 
202 See for instance the 50% tax exemption granted to dividend income derived from (domestic or 
foreign) shares traded in the Portuguese stock exchange. 
See paragraph 2.3, a), 3, b). 
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Example 5 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
The Netherlands --=; > Portugal: Dividend Income Effective Tax rate 
Notes: 
(1) It is assumed that a 35% corporation income tax rate is charged in Netherlands. 
Also, and taking into account that no DTC is still in place between Portugal and the 
Netherlands, the standard domestic 25% withholding tax applies. 
(2) If the 50% tax exemption is granted, 15%, 25%, 35% and 40% shareholders are 
subject respectively to 54.8%, 5 7%, 59.7% and 61 % effective tax rates. 
Example 6 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
UK =; > Portugal: Dividend Income Effective Tax rate 
......... 
..................................... ....... . .......... 




.............. .. .............. . .................. . ................... ........... ............. ....... .......... .... 9T . .................. 
. .............. . ... 
........... ...... .... ....... ................... .......... .................. ......... 
--... - ....................................................................................................................................................... . ...... .... ........................................ ......... ........ ......................................... ....................................................... 
............................... ................................. ...... .. ........................... ............................. ............................... ....... "1 -9. - er. , ..... ...... .................... 
Gross Distributed Profit (100) 15% 25% 35% 40% 
Effective Tax Rate: 33%(') 43.0% 49.7% 56.4% 59.8% 
Notes: 
(1) In this case, UK does not levy withholding tax upon dividend income. in this 
numeric example, it is assumed that the standard corporation income tax rate is 
charged and no ACT surplus occurs. Also, no tax credit is granted by the source 
state (UK) to Portuguese individual shareholders. A classical system isfollowed in 
Portugal without relieffor underlying taxes charged upon dividend income. 
(2) In case the 50% tax exemption is granted, the following effective tax rates are 
charged: 38%, 41%, 44.7% and 46%. 
2) Main Findings 
The Distortionary Aspects of Source and Residence State Taxation 
Both the source states (UK and the Netherlands) and residence states 
(Portugal) have distortionary features which contribute to increase substantially the 
effective dividend income tax rates. "' The analysis above shows that those rates are 
Compared for instance with the relatively low effective tax rates charged in the UK upon 
dividends remitted by Dutch or Portuguese sources. 
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substantially higher than those applying to domestic dividend income under the 
domestic partial exemption or credit systems. 205 
Both the denial of partial imputation credits in the UK and the operation of a 
standard 25% withholding tax rate operating in the Netherlands lead to high effective 
tax rates in the source states. Moreover, by refusing to grant bilateral or unilateral tax 
reliefs in Portugall effective rates on dividend income reach high levels for Portuguese 
individual shareholders, deterring them from investing in these jurisdictions. 
With the increasing internationalisation of economies and high mobility of 
capital, this issue might with advantage be considered in the near future by the 
Portuguese government with a view to possible extension of the (withholding tax) 
unilateral tax relief to individual shareholders and by granting relief for any underlying 
taxes charged in the source state. 
The Portuguese Investor Choice 
Notwithstanding its distortionary features, the 50% tax exemption relief which 
extends to dividend income paid by non-resident companies reduces substantially the 
effective tax burden attached to dividends derived from non-domestic sources. Clearly, 
this incentive, granted with the aim of attracting foreign investment in the Portuguese 
stock exchange, leads to a substantial decrease of effective tax rates on dividend 
income and encourages both resident and non-resident investors to trade their 
investments through the stock exchange. "' 
On this basis, taking only into account tax considerations, Portuguese 
individual shareholders would invest in the UK company due to the lower corporation 
income tax rate charged in the UK (33%) and the absence of any withholding tax 
charged on dividend income. Both the 35% CIT rate operating in Netherlands and the 
25% WHT levied in the absence of a DTC deter Portuguese investors from choosing 
the Netherlands as a suitable business place. 
205 See Tables 10 to 12 at the end of this part. 
206 It is beyond the scope of this work to analyse and compare the tax burden arising from the 
imposition of other taxes such as stamp duty, transfer tax, etc. imposed in other tax jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that high stamp duty taxes (or other taxes or commission 
expenses) discourage potential investors from choosing the Portuguese stock exchange. 
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3. TIHE TAX TREATMENT OF EQUITY AND DEBT 
In the Portuguese tax system, debt finance is encouraged by allowing 
201 companies to deduct interest payments. Use of equity finance is penalised by 
subjecting distributed profits to two levels of taxation . 
2' This discriminatory treatment 
encourages debt finance, exposing companies to increasing financial risks and distorts 
companies' behaviour. The main distinction to be made in Portuguese tax law is 
between interest from public debt and 'commercial' interest. Within the international 
context, the former is subject to a more favourable tax treatment than the latter. 
Accordingly, to attract foreign investors into Portuguese markets and to improve 
Portuguese macroeconomic condition, the withholding tax, which generally is charged 
when interest is paid (either under the domestic regime 211 or under the reduced rates of 
withholding tax agreed in DTCS210) has been abolished for interest derived from 
qualifying public bonds traded on the stock exchange when paid to non-resident 
investors without a permanent establishment in Portugal . 
21 ' At present, this more 
favourable tax treatment has been granted only to interest derived from public debt 
without extending to commercial interest paid to lenders in states which have 
211 concluded a DTC with Portugal. Portuguese DTCs do not provide an exemption of 
withholding tax for interest income and impose comparatively high withholding taxeS211 
at 10%, 12% and 15% rates depending of the applicable DTC. 214 
207 See IRC, article 23,1, c). Deduction of interest may be subject in the near future to restrictions. 
The 1994 Finance Bill (article 28) expressly authorises the government to enact thin 
capitalisation rules within the international context (e. g. interest paid to a foreign subsidiary). it 
must be emphasised that, within the EU, those rules shall also apply in the domestic context to 
avoid conflicts with the principle of non-discrimination, currently under scrutiny by the ECJ. 
118 Retained profits are only charged at the company level. Excluding the case of short-term gains, 
capital gains are exempted in the hands of the shareholder. 
209 See IRS, article 74,3, a) and b). In accordance with this article, interest income is subject to a 
20% withholding tax rate. 
210 See Table 13 at the end of this part. 
211 See Decree-Law no. 88/94 of 2 April 1994 and Order no. 377-B/94 of 15 June 1994. Some DTCs 
exempt public debt interest from withholding tax (e. g. Germany, Italy, Mozambique, Ireland and 
Brazil). 
212 Compare for instance with the UK experience where no withholding tax is charged upon interest 
income paid to countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and US. 
213 See LTK or Dutch experiences. 
214 See Table 13 at the end of this part. 
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4. LIVING UNDER STRONG TAX CONMETITION 
Currently, member states' tax systems compete with each other in order to 
attract new investment, to provide a fair and stable tax environment for mature 
businesses and to encourage expansion of domestic enterprises in the international 
markets. Portugal as a capital import country"' is facing increasing competition not 
only from economies in transition and new Asian emerging economies or some 
countries of Latin America, but also from developed economies where capital import 
and capital export ratios have been converging in recent years. 
Tax incentives have been granted both by developed and developing countries 
with the aim to strengthen domestic and international trade and finance. Several tax 
tools have been used by developed countries such as the introduction of a special type 
of company (e. g. the International Headquarter Company in the UK) with a more 
favourable regime granted to foreign investors, the progressive lowering in some states 
of corporation income tax rates, a growing waiver of withholding taxes on interest, 
royalties and dividend income and the operation of special rates of depreciation or 
other equivalent tax reliefs affecting the corporation tax base and leading to reduced 
effective corporation income tax burdens. At the expense of public finance budgets, 
developed countries have been pursuing their trade and finance policies in order to 
sustain their competitive position in the worldwide economy (see for instance UK or 
Dutch experiences). 
Portugal still relies heavily upon withholding taxes, imposed at source and 
aiming to counteract tax evasion. Notwithstanding the temporary tax regime operating 
in the Madeira offshore zone, the high corporation income tax rate (36%) may work as 
a deterrent to trade and financial foreign investments in Portugal. This factor combined 
with high withholding tax rates (domestic and under DTCS116) places the country in a 
less favourable competitive position not only within the EU but also in the worldwide 
economy. 
In a consistent mood, recent finance bills have been taking into account the above 
mentioned trends, and the inefficiencies or non-neutralities of the 1988 tax reform have 
been progressively eliminated (e. g. the gradual increase of the corporate and personal 
dividend income tax credit or the increase of the tax exemption granted to dividend 
income from shares traded or quoted in the stock exchange). Moreover, the increasing 
215 See Table 2.1 at the end of this part. 
216 See Table 13 at the end of this part. 
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awareness that a coherent international tax policy is not only desirable but necessary 
have been leading to the expansion of the Portuguese DTC network. "' But the system 
is still in transition. At the domestic level, the aim appears to be to put in place an 
exemption system where dividend income is taxed only once, at the company level. 
Meanwhile, a complex and costly tax system is still in operation, combining credits and 
exemptions, and supported by a high corporation income tax and complex four bracket 
income tax rate structure. "' Economic double taxation persists, deterring free flow of 
income within the corporate sphere. "' 
At the intemational level, the impact of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive is 
important. Notwithstanding the fact that transitional withholding taxes continue to be 
levied, the main impact of the Directive was the extension of the 95% domestic 
dividend tax exemption to dividend income paid by companies resident in the EU and 
fulfilling the Directive's requirements. Otherwise, the system is still built upon a 
classical view structure, denying credits for underlying taxes paid in the source state 
both under domestic or DTCs provisions or even refusing to credit withholding taxes 
against individual shareholder's liability in the absence of a DTC. 
Without compromising public expenditure needs, ways will be needed to allow the 
tax system to become more competitive, and neutral towards different forms of finance 
and to reduce both public and private compliance costs. 
217 See Table I at the end of this part. 
218 Worldwide and for the sake of simplicity and reduction of both public and private compliance 
costs, the trend is towards elimination of multiple tax brackets (e. g. UK with its three (or two, as 
far as dividend income is concerned) income tax brackets and recent developments in New 
Zealand towards a flat income tax rate). 
2'9 See Tables 7 and 8 at the end of this part. 
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Table I 
Current Double Tax Conventions 
UK 27 March 1968 17 Jan. 1969 
Belgium 16 July 1969 19 Feb. 1971 
Finland 27 April 1970 14 July 1971 
Norway 24 June 1970 1 Oct. 1971 
Austria 29 Dec. 1970 27 Feb. 1972 
France 14 Jan. 1971 18 Nov. 1972 
Brazil 22 April 1971 10 Sept. 1971 
Denmark 3 March 1972 22 Dec. 1973 
Switzerland 26 Sept. 1974 17 Dec. 1975 
Italy 14 May 1980 15 Jan. 1983 
Germany 15 July 1980 8 Oct. 1982 
Mozambique 21 March 1991 5 Dec. 1993 
Ireland I June 1993 14 July 1994 
Spain 26 Oct. 1993 ---- 
USA 6 Sept. 1994 ---- 
Source: Gloria Teixeira, Prof. David Williams, The Portuguese Tax System and 
Double Tax Convention Net-work, Intertax, 1994/4. 
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Table 2 
Inward & Outward Direct Investment - Portugal 
Outivard Direct Investment (US$ Billion) 
1980 1: 985 1989 
0.02 0.02 0.08 
Inivard Direct Investment (US$ Billion) 
. .... ..... ....... ...................... ......................... ................. ........ .................. ....... ........... .............. ................... ................... ..................... 




0.16 0.25 1.62 
Source: OECD, Taxing Profits in a Global Economy, Domestic and International 
Issues, Paris, 1991. 
Table 2.1 











1980 1985 1989 
(million US$) 
13 Outward Direct Investment 
E Inward Direct Investment 
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Table 3 
Portuguese Public Expenditure 





T&-v Revenue Gap 
1977 1585741 91,296 42.5% 
1978 214,802 110,654 48.5% 
1979 280,659 139,895 50.2% 
1980 374)780 192,868 48.5% 
1981 506IP842 257,170 49.3% 
1982 624ý 158 323)628 48.1% 
1983 801)870 4341,491 45.8% 
1984 1,019,106 511,125 49.8% 
1985 11333)918 629)365 52.8% 
1986 1,596ý796 760,617 52.4% 
1987 1,835,1166 11008,139 45.1% 
1988 2,324iP989 1,313,692 43.5% 
1989 2,7285752 1,621,140 40.6% 
1990 3,437,901 1,8911)001 45.0% 
1991 45596ý341 23295)917 50.0% 
1992 4,606fi55 2,8455346 38.2% 
1993 41P998,046 25786,209 44.3% 
Source: Conta Geral do Estado, Nfinistdrio das Finanqas. 
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Table 4 
Receipts m Inhoitance and Gift Tax Since 19 74 





















Source: Conta Geral do Estado, Nfinistdrio das Finanqas. 
Notes: 
The amount of revenue which has been collectedfrom the imposition of inheritance and gift 
is negligible, especially if compared with the substantial higher revenue raised by specific 
indirect taxes such as stamp duty or car sales tax. For instance, in 1982 those taxes raised 
respectively, 31,721.1 (million Esc) and 19,400.2 (million Esc) compared with a mere 
1,617.9 (million Esc) collectedfrom inheritance and gift tax. 
A decade later, this trend has not been changed. For instance, in 1992 stamp duty raised 
213,8 78 (million Esc) and car sales tax raised 100,309.5 (million Esc) compared with a very 
modest 10,523.3 (million Esc) collectedfrom inheritance and gift tax charge. 
Clearly, an urgent review of inheritance and gift taxation is needed and a comprehensive 
analysis of the serious distortions (well documented in this work when looking at Portuguese 
effective domestic and international dividend income tax rates) originated by this tax should 
be undertaken in the nearfuture. 
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Table 5 
Portuguese Corporate Structure (1995) 
Share Companies (SA) 10)065 
Quota Companies (Lda) 1 263,083 
'Sociedades em Comandita' 14 
'Sociedades em Nome Colectivo' 1 690 




- Corporate Dividend Income Effective Tax Burden 
Gross Dividend 1 100 
IRC (36%) -36 
Inheritance and Gift Tax (5%) -5 
Municipal Tax (10%)* -3 
Net Dividend 1 56 
In 1995, only 80% of the assessed corporation income tax applies for 
municipal tax purposes. 
..................... .............................. .................................. ...................... ......... ........ ............... .............. ..... ................ -- ... .............................................. .................................... ........ - ...... ..... --- ................ .......................... .............. ................................... 
......................... ........ ..................... ............... .................................... .......... ....... 
..................... ...... .............. ........... ................ ................ ..................... MZi 00'. tn- O-M ................... ............ ............. ........ ....... .... ................. 
..... 
............ 11 ........ ..... ............ ................................................. .... ........ 
Tax Exemption* (56 x 50%) 28 
Tax Exemption" [(100 -5 -28) x 95%] 64 
Taxable Income (100 -5 -28 -64) 3 
IRC (36%) 1 
Final Dividend 55 
See Table 10. 
See Table 10. 
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Tax Exemption (100 x 95%) 95 
Taxable Income (100 -95) 5 
IRC (36%) 2 
Final Dividend 1 59 
Note: No withholding tax is charged upon dividend income in case the 95% exemption 




- Corporate Dividend Income Effective Tax Burden 
Gross Dividend 1 100 
IRC (36%) -36 
Inheritance and Gift Tax (5%) -5 
Municipal Tax (10%) * -3 
Net Dividend 1 56 
In 1995, only 80% of the assessed corporation income tax applies for 
municipal tax purposes. 
Tax Exemption* [(100 -5) x 95%] 90 
Taxable Income (100 -5 -90) 5 
IRC (36%) 2 
Final Dividend 1 54 




- Corporate Dividend Income Effective Tax Burden 
Distributed Profit 100 
IRC (36%) -36 
Municipal Tax (10%)* -3 
Dividend Before WHT 1 61 
WHT (61 x 25%) 1 -15 
In 1995, only 80% of the assessed corporation income tax appliesfor municipal tax 
purposes. 
Tax Credit (36 x 60%) 22 
VMT Refund 15 
Taxable Dividend (61 + 22 + 15) 98 
IRC (36%) 35 
Final Liability (IRC - Tax Credit) 13 
Final Dividend 1 48 
Notes: It is worth noting that the distortionary aspects of the credit sYstem increase considerably in 
cases where dividend income (already burdened at the first receiving company level with 
unrelieved economic double taxation) is redistributed to another company. 
They constitute an obstacle to thefreeflow of dividend income within the domestic corporate 
sphere (see Medina Carreira, "Concentraqdo de Empresas e Grupos de Sociedades, Aspectos 
Fhst6ncos Econ6rmcos e Juridicos", EdiC5es Asa, 1992). 
Unless an exemption is provided, dividends are also subject to a provisional 25% 
withholding tax which is refundable at the receiving shareholder level (see IRS, article 80, 




- Corporate Dividend Income Effective Tax Burden 
Distributed Profit 100 
IRC (36%) -36 
Inheritance and Gift Tax (5%) -5 
Municipal Tax (10%)* -3 
Dividend Before WHT 1 56 
WHT (56 x 25%) 1 -14 
In 1995, only 80% of the assessed corporation income tax appliesfor municipal tax 
purposes. 
Tax Credit (36 x 60%) 22 
WHT Refund 14 
Taxable Dividend (56 + 22 + 14) 92 
IRC (36%) 33 
Final Liability (IRC - Tax Credit) II 
Final Dividend 1 45 
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Table 9 
Partial Exemption System or Credit System? 
- Corporate Dividend Income Effective Tax Burden 
Distributed Profit 100 
IRC (36%) -36 
Inheritance and Gift Tax (5%) -5 
Municipal Tax (10%)* -3 
Dividend Before WHT 1 56 
WHT (56 x 25%) 1 -14 
In 1995, only 80% of the assessed corporation income tax appliesfor municipal tax 
purposes. 
Tax Exemption (56 x 50%) 28 
Tax Credit (36 x 60%) 22 
"T Refund 14 
Taxable Dividend (28 + 22 + 14) 64 
IRC (36%) 23 
Final Liability (IRC - Tax Credit) 1 
Final Dividend 1 55 
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Table 10 
Partial Exemption System or Credit System? 
- Personal Dividend Income Effective Tax Burden 
Distributed Profit 1 100 
IRC (36%) -36 
Inhefitance and Gift Tax (5%) -5 
MuniCiDal Tax (10%)* -3 
Dividend Before WHT 1 56 
WHT (56 x 25%) 1 -14 
In 1995, only 80% of the assessed corporation income tax appliesfor municipal tax 
purposes. 
............. ................. ............ ............ .... 
......... ........... ... esi(je t nd vid ........ Vharcholder J? nIi ual 
. ............... ........... ............... .............. .............. . ............. -: 
bMdMd: I edwe ... ...... ... .............. I.......... ..... ................. ..... ... 
251,0, o- 5 40% 
Tax Exemption (56 x 50%)* 28 28 28 28 
Tax Credit (36 x 60%)** 22 22 22 22 
VMT Refund 14 14 14 14 
Provisional Tax (28 + 22 + 14) 10 16 22 26 
Tax Credit Used*** 0 0 22 22 
Final Dividend 56 56 56 52 
Notes: 
See Tax Benefits Statute, article 31 which states that dividends paid by companies with shares 
traded in the stock exchange are only taxed on 50% of their amountfor IRS or IRC purposes. 
Compare for instance with the wording of the provision granting the 95% tax exemption to 
corporate shareholders. Here, the exemption applies to the gross dividend taking into account 
that in article 45 paragraph I of the IRC the concept distributed profits is used instead of 
dividends (see tables 6-A and 6-B). 
The issue however is controversial. A different result may be achieved in case a different 
interpretation of article 31 of the Tax Benefits Statute is followed (see Order no. 19190 of 6 
April 1990). 
See IRS, article 90, paragraph 3. The tax credit only covers dividend income taxable in the 
hands of the shareholder. 
Tax credits are only relevant in case the provisional tax liability exceeds the 25% refundable 
provisional withholding tax. In accordance with tax law, their use is limited, taking into 
account that excessive tax credits are not refundable (IRS, article 80 paragraph 5). 
No withholding tax is charged upon dividend income paid to exempt entities (see Infor7nation 




- Personal Dividend Income Effective Tax Burden 
Distributed Profit 100 
IRC (36%) -36 
Inheritance and Gift Tax (5%) -5 
Municipal Tax (10%)* -3 
Dividend Before WHT 56 
WHT (56 x 25%) -14 
In 1995, only 80% of the assessed corporation income tax appliesfor municipal tax 
purposes. 
..... ..... ............... ........ .......... I ......... ........... ......... . .......... ............................. ... . ...... ...... .......... . ............... .... ..... I ..... ...... ....... .... e .................. ........ .......... ........................ 
41 V ar, ho ............ - ........ .... ............ ............ ....... ............. ........ I ............... .................. ... ........... . ......... ........... k dl .... n ncome ....... .......................... ....... 
15% 
..... .... 
..... ..... ..... 25%* ...... ..... 




Tax Credit (36 x 60%) 22 22 22 22 
VMT Refund 14 14 14 14 
Provisional Tax (56 + 22 + 14) 14 23 32 37 
Tax Credit Used 0 0 22 22 




- Personal Dividend Income Effective Tax Burden 
............... ................ ...... 
....... ... Revident Indii4dual Shitrehol 
... .... ..... 
*v d Income ... ... ........ e., id 
25% 35% 40% 
Tax Credit (36 x 60%) 22 22 22 22 
"T Refund 15 15 15 15 
Provisional Tax (61 + 22 + 15) 15 24 34 39 
Tax Credit Used 0 22 22 22 
Final Dividend 61 59 49 44 
Distributed Profit 100 
IRC (36%) -36 
Municipal Tax (10%)* -3 
Dividend Before WHT 61 
WHT (61 x 25%) -15 




Double Taxation Conventions 
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..... ........ ...... ....... 
Royalfies 
Austria 15 10 5/10 
Belgium 15 15 5 
Brazil 15 15 10/15 
Denmark 10/15 15 10 
Finland 10/15 15 10 
France 15 10/ 12 5 
Germany 15 10/15 10 
Ireland 15 15 10 
Italy 15 15 12 
Mozambique 15 10 10 
Norway 10/15 15 10 
Spain 10/15 15 5 
Switzerland 10/15 10 5 
UK 10/15 10 5 
USA 5/10/15 10 10 
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Table 14 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates: 
UK Company =; > Portuguese Company 
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. 
articipation 
........ --- ..... ...... ........... ............ ........... 
50% Other 
....................... ........................................ ................................................................. ................................................................ - ............................. - ............ - ....... ....... ................................................................ ................ ......... .......... .................... -.. ................................................... ........... ................................................................ ........ - ......... ..................... ......... ............. ............................................................ ...................... ............................................. - ... ................................................................ ................................................................. ................................................ ............... ........................................ : . 
Exe ption ption EX 
... ............... ....................................... . 1. ............ ................................... ... .............. ................................... ................. ........... ............................. 
............................ ........... .............................. 
................................ ................ ............................. - .......................... ......................... ... ........ 
.... 
Rate's Ame Unts. Rates Azwunts 
UK 
Profit Before Taxes 100 100 100 
Corporation Income Tax 33% 33 33% 33 33% 33 
Profit After Taxes 67 67 67 
Gross Dividend 67 67 67 
Withholding Tax 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Net Dividend Paid to LJK 67 67 67 
Portugal 
Net Dividend 67 67 67 
Exemption 95% -63.7 50% -33.5 0% 0 
Taxable Dividend 3.4 33.5 67 
IRC 36% 1.21 36% 12.06 36% 24.12 
Dividend After Tax 65.8 54.9 42.9 
Total Tax Burden 34.2% 45.1% 57.1% 
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Table 15 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates: 
Dutch Company =; ý Portuguese Company 
Netherlands 
Profit Before Taxes 100 100 100 100 
Corporation Income Tax 35% 35 35% 35 35% 35 35% 35 
Profit After Taxes 65 65 65 65 
Gross Dividend 65 65 65 65 
Withholding Tax 0% 0 25% 16.25 25% 16.25 250/6 16.25 
Net Dividend Paid to UK 65 48.75 48.75 48.75 
Portugal 
Net Dividend 65 48.75 48.75 48.75 
Exemption 95% -61.8 50% -24.4 0% 0 00/6 0 
WHT Credit 0 16.3 0 16.3 
Taxable Dividend 3.3 40.7 48.75 65.05 
IRC 36% 1.17 36% 14.64 0% 0 36% 23.42 
V, FHT Credit 0 16.3 0 16.3 
Dividend After Tax 63.8 48.75 48.75 41.6 
Total Tax Burden 36.2% 51.3% 51.3% 58.4%] 
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PART 11 
UK CORPORATION TAX SYSTEM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Historic Background 
In matters of taxation, the United Kingdom Parliament takes precedence and 
constitutes the only acceptable and binding (domestic) source of law. "' Article 4 of the 
Bill of Rights of 1689 provides that "levying moneyfor or to the use of the Crown by 
pretence of prerogative without the consent of Parliament or for longer time or in 
other manner than the same is or shall be granted illegal". "... Aey are, after all, 
about all we can find in this country by way of constitutional provisions on taxation, 
at least before this century". "' Full use of this provision had been made in 1798 when 
Pitt introduced the first comprehensive income tax in order to finance the war with 
France (Act enacted on 9 January 1799). "' The tax applied over the total income of 
the taxpayer (individual or company ... ) at the rate of ten per cent. This system of 
taxation received severe criticism due to its failure to differentiate between earned and 
unearned income... and also due to its compulsory and intrusive nature. As a result, a 
significant change was introduced swiftly, when an amending Act... prescribed that the 
taxpayer who carried on a trade should declare how much of that income arose from 
trade and how much from other sources. In 1802, the unpopular tax was repealed. 
... As a member of the EU, the UK shall conform with the EU legislation, namely, in the tax field 
(see European Communities Act 1972). 
221 David W. Williams, "Three Hundred Years On: Are Our Tax Bills Right Yet? ", BTR, no. 11, 
Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1989. 
222 39 Geo 3, c13. 
223 For a historic account of the companies legislation, see Palmer's Company Law, twenty-fifth 
edition, C. M. Schmitthoff, Stevens & Sons-W. Green & Son, 1992, p. 6 et seq. 
224 This distinction, analysed by Adam Smith under the concepts of fixed and circulating capital (see 
The Wealth of Nations, Book II, Chap. 1), provided the background for the present dichotomy 
established under the present UK tax law between capital and income. Several attempts have been 
made to define clearly what is income and capital (see for example, John Smith and Son v. Moore 
[1921] 2 AC 13) but the parliament chose not to intervene in this area (see Royal Commission on 
the Taxation ofProfits and Income, Final Report, Cmnd. 9474,1955, p. 7). 
See also s. 833 (4) ICTA 1988 ('earned income'). 
225 39 & 40 Geo 3, c 49, s. 3. 
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Income tax was, however, repealed only to be replaced by a new Income Tax 
Act"' whose structure, modified to a certain extent, still survives in the present law. 
This is the 1988 ICTA, a consolidation measure and not a codification. The most 
fundamental changes imposed by the 1802 Act were the introduction of the mechanism 
of taxation at source, 227 and a well defined scheduler system of assessment (e. g. tax 
was deductible at the source from all dividends paid by companies). 22' Both lie at the 
heart of the current scheduler income tax system. 
The 1802 form of tax operated without much change through most of the 
nineteenth century, and has been in use continuously since 1842. Major changes only 
occurred in this century. The Finance Act of 1914 made significant changes in the 
system by introducing generally, 229 progressivity in the tax system (e. g. graduated scale 
of tax) and by extending the tax jurisdiction to income derived from stocks, shares and 
rents situated abroad, whether or not remitted to the UK. 2" Before the 1914 Act, those 
types of income were only taxed on a remittance basis which, in limited form, still 
continues. Its removal was because it was a criterion which caused substantial loss of 
revenue. Companies were not subject to a progressive system of taxation. Instead, 
various special taxes have been levied on them on a sporadic basis since excess profits 
taX231 was introduced in 1915. 
In 1920, following the conclusion of warfare, an enquiry into all aspects of the 
income tax system was started by a commission presided by Lord Colwyn. The Report 
of this Royal Commission... reiterated the importance of the principle of taxation at 
source. Further, it recommended that any relief for international double taxation should 
be confined to countries within the British Empire. When applying the relief, the UK 
rate of tax should be reduced by the Dominion rate subject to a maximum relief of not 
more than half of the British rate of tax. 233 At that time, the rates of direct tax in the 
Dominions were, with few exceptions, lower rates. 
226 43 Geo, 3, c. 122. 
227 See s. 208 of the Act of 1803. 
228 (1803) 43 Geo, c 122, s. 127. Until 1965, companies had always been liable to standard rate 
income tax on their profits and had been required to deduct and retain income tax on paying 
dividends. 
229 With the introduction of a surtax in 1909, the first step had been taken towards the general 
acceptance of the principle of progressivity into the income tax system. 
230 FA 1914 s. 5. 
231 F (No 2) A 1915 ss. 15-17. 
232 Cmiid 615. 
233 FA 1920 s. 27. 
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Further legislation was enacted during the inter-war years, but it was mainly 
confined to implementing the Royal Commission's recommendations and counteracting 
tax avoidance schemes. It is worth mentioning however the introduction of a company 
profits tax in the Finance Act of 1937. It remained until the introduction of a specific 
income tax on companies, called the corporation tax, in 1965. The 1937 tax was 
charged on the profits of all trades and businesses carried on by both corporate and 
unincorporated "societies or bodies so long as the businesses were carried on in the 
UK or were carried on elsewhere, by persons ordinarily resident in the UK. " 2" In order 
to prevent double taxation of dividend income at the receiving company level, a special 
concept was created named 'franked investment income'. The term 'franked investment 
income' (F. I. I. ) applied to income received by way of dividend or distribution of 
profits from a corporate body carrying on a business which was within the charge to 
profits tax. 
A ift 
Aner the Second World War, the first British comprehensive double taxation 
agreement was signed with the United States of America, on 16 April 1945.235 
Subsequently, other agreements were concluded with the main trade partners. 236 To 
prevent double taxation of income, in the absence of a double taxation agreement, a 
unilateral tax credit relief was introduced in 195 0237 overriding238 the more restrictive 
Dominion income tax relief 
The same rationale, improvement of the UK economy, and also increase the 
competitiveness of British industries, led the Royal Commission on the Taxation of 
Profits and Income... to issue a comprehensive report which was presented to the 
Parliament in 1955. The aim of this study is set out on the first page of the final report: 
11... to inquire into the present system of taxation of profits and income, 
including its incidence and effects, with particular reference to the taxation 
of business profits and the taxation of salaries and wages: to consider 
whether for the purposes of the national economy the present system is the 
best way of raising the required revenue from the taxation of profits and 
income, due regard being paid to the points of view of the taxpayer and of 
the Exchequer... " 
234 fits Tax, nineteenth edition by H. A. R. J. Wilson, See Spicer and Pegler's, INCOME TAX and Pro 
H. F. L. Ltd., London, 1950, p. 593 et seq. 
235 SR &0 1946/1327. 
236 See Talbot on Corporation Tax, Sweet & Maxwell, 1968, London, p. 279. 
237 FA 1950 s. 36. 
238 Except in relation to the Republic of Ireland. 
239 Cmnd 9474. 
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A clear account of the taxation of companies in 1955 is given on page 14 of 
that report- 
"A company is liable - 
(a) to income tax 
(but without the benefit of any personal reliefs and allowances), and 
(b) if its profits exceed L2,000, to profits tax also. 
When a company uses part of its profits to pay a dividend to shareholders, 
the dividend is derived from a fund that has borne income tax in the 
company's hands; it is not charged over again with income tax in the 
shareholder's hands. The fact that part of the fund of profits has been, or is 
to be, used to pay the dividend does not lessen the amount of the tax that 
the company pays on its profits; but when it pays the dividend it is 
authorised to deduct a sum equivalent to tax at the standard rate and to 
retain the sum deducted as part of its own funds. The shareholder's income 
is treated as consisting of the gross sum without allowing for the sum 
which the company has deducted, and the relevant tax is attributed to him 
in his account with the Revenue ... 
It results that from the company's standpoint the ultimate burden of income 
tax is felt as a charge at the standard rate upon profits placed to reserve or 
otherwise withheld from distribution to the shareholders. " 
From 1947 (and until 1958) distributed profits attracted tax at a rate 
significantly higher than the rate applicable to undistributed profits. The differential tax 
rates were criticised by the Commission which stated: 
of 
*** once 
large retentions become a permanent feature and the income tax 
becomes progressive, there is no theoretical justice in taxing undistributed 
ot240 
profits at the standard rate ... 
it proceeded by saying: 
"If the income tax that falls upon undistributed profits can no longer be 
explained as a rough and ready way of taxing individuals upon their 
respective shares in those profits, some other approach is needed for an 
answer to the question how a company's profits should be taxed. "241 
Notwithstanding the common concept of income tax (applicable both to 
individuals and companies), the idea of a full integrated tax SySteM242 was put aside by 
the Commission. Nonetheless, it acknowledged that it would be wrong to tax 
240 In 1958 differential rates were abolished. 
241 See page 15 et seq. of the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final 
Report, Onnd 9474,1955. 
In accordance with this system, company profits should only be taxed in the hands of the 
shareholders. 
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undistributed corporate profits without recognising that they represent income 
belonging ultimately to individuals. 
Another important contribution given by the Royal Commission related to the 
taxation of overseas profits. It recommended special treatment for a specific category 
of company, the overseas trade corporation. "' To compensate for the disadvantages 
derived from the operation of a world-wide system of taxation, overseas trading profits 
should be exempt from UK tax so long as they remain at the service of the business in 
which they are made. 
Some of the recommendations of this Commission, mainly measures to prevent 
international double taxation, were put in place in the subsequent Finance Acts. "' 
However, its main achievements were to call attention to the discriminatory treatment 
given to income derived from foreign sources and to propose a new type of company, 
the overseas trade corporation, with a special tax regime. These important proposals 
were revisited again in the nineties, leading to the recent enacted foreign income 
dividend (FID) regime and to the introduction of a new type of company, the 
international headquarters company. 
1.2 Changing the System 
a) Classical System 
The FA 1965, which introduced the corporation tax, adopted a classical system 
of taxation. Accordingly, it taxed companies and shareholders separately. Profits of 
resident companies were subject to the new corporation tax on their profits, and 
distributed profits were taxed also in the hands of the shareholders, thus making them 
subject both to corporation and income tax. "' No credit was given at the paying 
company level for the double taxation of distributed profits. Nonetheless, income tax 
deducted at company level could be used as an advance payment of the individual 
shareholder's tax liability. Furthermore, an individual resident shareholder who was 
exempt or entitled to relief from income tax could claim a repayment for the income 
tax charged on the dividend at the company level. "' This was a significant benefit to 
243 See Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report, Cmnd. 9474 1955, 
pp. 201 and 202. 
244 E. g. the limitations automatically excluding from credit relief provincial, cantonal and municipal 
taxes in a non-Commonwealth territory were removed (FA 1961 s. 19). 
24' Distributed profits were subject to income tax at the standard rate under Schedule F. 
246 Capital gains were also subject to double taxation: first at the company level, and as a result of the 
increase of the share value derived from the retention of profits when realised in the hands of the 
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charities and pension funds as they are, if approved, exempt from tax on aH dividend 
income. 
Companies were to deduct income tax at the basic rate from distributed profits 
and pay it over to the Revenue irrespective of their eventual corporation tax liability. " 
However, both domestically and at the corporate level, the radical features of the 
classical system were put aside and economic double taxation of inter-corporate 
dividend income completely prevented. For instance, resident corporate shareholders 
were not liable to corporation tax on the dividend received" if tax has been previously 
accounted for at the paying company level. "' The tax paid could be set off against tax 
deducted from its own distributions. Repayments of corporation tax were not granted. 
However, excessive income tax charges could be offset against the corporation tax 
liability. 250 
From the above, it can be seen that dividends transferred between domestic 
companies were excluded from the classical system of taxation and instead covered by 
a more favourable tax system which was in effect an exemption system. The overall 
structure of this system nonetheless encouraged retentions of profits, "' an aim pursued 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer: "It gives a strong incentive to all companies to 
plough back more of their profits for expansion". "' The virtue of this criteria has been 
widely challenged. For instance, research data had evidenced that fin-ns which reinvest 
most are not those with the most rapid growth rates. "' 
shareholder. The capital gains tax, introduced by the 1965 Financial Act, was necessary to 
guarantee that the principle of horizontal equity was complied with: 
"As long as it was possible for one person to convert (taxable) income into (untaxed) capital gains, Whilst 
another with a different source of income could not, two people of similar taxable capacity were being taxed 
differently. " (C. T. Sandford, Realistic Tax Reform, Chatto & Windus, London, 197 1, p. 3 3. 
247 FA 1965 ss. 47,48, Sch 12. 
248 It represented 'franked investment income', in accordance with the F. A. 1965, s. 48(l). 
249 The paying company must also be resident in the UK. 
250 Dividends paid within a group were not subject to income tax. 
251 See C. T. Sandford, Realistic Tax Reform, Chatto & Windus, London, 197 1, p. 110: 
"Me philosophy was that, as fiscal equity could not be achieved anyway in the taxation of corporate profits, 
it was more sensible to abandon the forlorn attempt to secure it and seek other objectives instead: flexibility 
to allow freedom to adjust personal income tax without at the same time changing the tax on company 
profits; differentiation in favour of undistributed profits to promote investment and a disincentive to 
overseas investment. These were some of the aims of the new corporation tax. " 
252 Hansard, April 6,1965, col. 255. 
253 See John E. Talbot and G. S. A. Wheatcrok Corporation Tax and Income Tax Upon Company 
Distributions, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1968, p. 8: 
"So much depends on whether the retentions are employed productively. There is little advantage 
in a trading company simply accumulating large liquid reserves and/or portfolio investments. 
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Dividends, interest or royalties paid by a non-resident company and derived 
from UK sources were, and in the absence of a double tax agreement, subject to 
deduction of UK income tax at the standard rate. Moreover, to the extent that interest 
or royalty income was subject to corporation tax, the income tax deducted could be 
offset against the corporation tax liability. Dividend income was not included, in line 
with the tax treatment of domestic dividend income. Generally, in accordance with a 
classical system structure, international double taxation of dividend income was 
relieved by using the 'ordinary' credit method. 
b) Partial Imputation System 
A nL 
Aner only seven years of the classical system, a new system replaced it in 1972. 
This new system, a partial imputation system, was introduced specifically in order to 
remove the discrimination against distributed profits. "' It was also introduced with a 
view to making it easier for the UK to avoid the problems of international double 
taxation of companies. Under this system, all profits, distributed or undistributed, 
would be liable to corporation tax at the same rate in line with the efficiency principle 
of taxation. Moreover, part of the tax on the distributed profits would be available to 
be set as a credit against the shareholder's tax liability. By moving away from a 
classical system that treated separately company and individual shareholders, this new 
system was supposed to reduce or eliminate double taxation of distributed profits and 
also acknowledge that undistributed corporate profits represent income belonging 
ultimately to individuals, both internally and internationally. Only the former was fully 
realised. 
To guarantee a smooth transition from one system to another and so prevent 
large revenue losses, a Select Committee of the House of Commons recommended the 
Moreover, many companies make every effort to avoid as far as possible any reduction in their 
dividends rates; this they regard as essential to preserving their financial status and their access to 
the capital market. " 
See also I. M. D. Little, "Higgledy Piggledy Growth", Bulletin of Oxford University Institute Of 
Statistics, November 1962. 
254 In Cmnd. 4955, Reform of Corporation Tax, H. M. S. O., London, 1972, the imputation system is 
described as follows: 
"The system described in this White Paper, being a system under which part of the company's liability to 
corporation tax is "imputed" to the shareholder, i. e. is treated as satisfying the basic rate income tax liability 
of the shareholder. The mechanism by which the imputation is given effect is the "tax credit" NNhich is 
conferred on each resident shareholder when a qualifying distribution is made to him. " 
'55 See Cmnd. 4630, Reform of Corporation Tax, H. M. S. O., 1971, London, p. 2. 
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introduction of an advance corporation tax (ACT) . 
25' This expedient would ensure that 
the Treasury was not put in the position of having to repay to shareholders tax which it 
had never received from the company. Subsequently, a further role would be allocated 
to the ACT mechanism. to determine the degree of imputation in the UK corporation 
tax system. The government also introduced a reduced rate of corporation tax 
applicable to small companieS, 257 following recommendations of the Select Committee 
emphasising the importance of an equitable taxation of undistributed profits. 211 
2. UK CORPORATION INCOME TAX SYSTEM 
2.1 Introduction 
UK corporation tax operates in accordance with what might be termed a 
progressive tax rate structure. "' Currently, the corporation tax is charged at a rate of 
33%. "' However, a lower rate of 25% is imposed when the profits of resident 
companies"' do not exceed BOO, 000 (FA 1994, s. 86). Marginal relief applies when 
256 See Charts IA and A at the end of this part. An account is given of the corporation tax and 
Schedule F or ACT receipts since the introduction of the classical system. 
251 Anti-avoidance provisions were also enacted to prevent the use of tax avoidance schemes (e. g. 
splitting businesses between companies to take advantage of the lower rate). 
258 It pointed out that small companies tend to retain more profits in order to finance further 
investments (e. g. cost of loan finance very high compared with that applicable to large 
companies, inability to provide collateral, etc. ). See also Cmnd. 7503, The Financing of Small 
Firms, Interim Report of the Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, 
H. M. S. O., 1979, p. 39: 
"There is no doubt that, compared to large firms, small firms are at a considerable disadvantage 'in financial 
markets. Loans are more expensive and security requirements are generally more stringent. External equity 
is more difficult to find and may only be obtainable on relatively unfavourable terms ... 
Finally, proprietors 
of small firms do not always have the same financial expertise as their large competitors, and information 
and advice about finance may not always be easily accessible. " 
259 In the EU only three countries apply a progressive tax system when taxing corporate income: UK, 
Luxembourg and Belgium. 
260 Taking into account the progressive structure of tax rates, this gives a marginal tax rate of 35%. 
See numeric example below: 
EXANTLE 
000,000 (4,25% 05,000 
fl, 200,000 (435% 090,000 
fl, 500,000 (d '33% 
L495,000 
it is worth noting the recently introduced cut in the 25% lower rate. In 1996, a 24% rate comes 
into operation. 
261 The reduced company tax rate applicable in the U. K. (which may apply to domestic branches) 
does not apply to foreign branches unless otherwise provided by a non-discrimination provision of 
a double tax convention. In the latter case, the total annual profits of the foreign branch (from UK 
and foreign sources) shall not exceed the limits established under the 'small companies' regime 
(see Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies guidance note TR500, paragraph 15). 
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the profits exceed L300,000 but not il. 500,000. "' In effect, the total profits of any 
company with total profits below the upper limit will be taxed at a rate below the 
higher rate. However, business often views this in a discrete fashion, with a lower 
amount of profits subject to the lower rate, and an upper amount charged at a higher 
rate (currently 35%). The aim pursued by this progressive tax rate structure differs 
from the vertical equity aim claimed under the personal income tax rate structure. The 
former was put in place to give a fair chance to small and medium companies and to 
increase their competitiveness in the market place. The latter is nowadays challenged 
by the results evidenced in the available data.. which raises important questions mainly 
concerned with the income distribution achievements of a progressive system of 
taxation. "' 
The UK personal income tax system is based upon a three income bracket 
structure subject to the following rates: 20%, 25% and 40%. Since 1994, dividends 
have been taxed only at the lower (20%) and higher (40%) rates of personal income 
tax . 
21' This resulted from the decision to cut the ACT amount from, in effectl 25% of 
the total amount available for distribution to 20%. 
A complete analysis of the UK partial imputation system requires not only 
coverage of both corporate and personal income tax structures but also a clear 
understanding of the mechanisms used to integrate, domestically and internationally, 
those systems. As previously mentioned, they are the ACT and the tax credit attached 
to dividend income or, if the dividend derives from foreign sources, tax credits granted 
under DTCs or unilateral relief provisions. 
This type of discriminatory treatment contradicts article 52 of the of Rome which 
expressly states that restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by 
nationals of any Member State in the territory of any Member State can no longer apply (see 
Gloria Teixeira, Business Taxation in the European Union, Wiley Chancery Law, 1995, Chapter 
1, paragraph 1.3 and ss. ). See also recent ECJ case (R v IRC, ex p Commerzbank A G, (Case C- 
330/91) [19931 STC 605, CJEC). 
262 See ICTA 1988, s. 13. This reduced rate does not apply to close investment-holding companies 
(see ICTA 1988, s. 13 (1)). Accordingly, all their profits are chargeable at the main corporation 
tax rate. 
263 See Chart 2 at the end of this part. 
264 See Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, fifth 
edition, 1989, p. 360: 
"Concem with the progressivity of the tax structure, after all, is not only with the way in which the tax 
burden is distributed but also, and perhaps primanly, with the way in which the distribution of after-tax 
income is affected. " 
265 Chart 3 at the end of this part illustrates both corporation and income tax rates trends since the 
introduction of the partial imputation system. 
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The multifunctional role of ACT raises difficulties when trying to ascertain its 
definition. Does it fall under the general concept of 'withholding tax' or is it simply an 
'imputation element' in the UK corporation tax system? Is it, in reality, advance 
corporation tax, or advance income tax? ACT is charged upon qualifying distributions 
at a rate based in a formula which uses (or, depending on definition, produces) the 
lower rate of income tax (20%) . 
2' This charge enables the UK resident shareholder to 
claim the tax credit at a flat rate of 20%. But, notwithstanding its role as a form of 
withholding of income tax, the main purpose of ACT is to mitigate the distortions 
arising from the operation of a classical corporation tax system. hence it is a partial 
imputation system. 
As mentioned in paragraph b) above, before the recent ACT cut (from 25% to 
20%), full imputation appeared to be achieved when dividend income was paid by 
small companies taxed at 25% corporation tax rate, because the corporation tax rate 
was equal to the tax credit rate. 
However, dividend income paid by companies subject to higher corporation tax 
rates were penalised by the use of the uniform 25% flat credit rate. In these 
circumstances, the system was only partially integrated and the economic double 
taxation of dividend income merely mitigated. 
The newly introduced 20% ACT rate aimed at reducing the extent of 
imputation without increasing the income tax on basic rate income taxpayers. In 
particular, its effect was to target exempt entities such as pension funds and, by this 
process, collect more tax revenue to cover public spending. This measure put under 
strain the coherence of the UK corporation/income tax system. The existing full 
imputation was overridden and small and medium companies were subject to tax as a 
result of that measure. Also, tax distortions were introduced in the general income tax 
structure in order to accommodate the new measure (e. g. the dual income tax rate 
structure applying to lower/basic rate shareholders and higher rate shareholders). 
Does this new tax measure indicate that the UK government is willing to 
abandon an ultimate goal of full imputation and complete elimination of economic 
double taxation of dividend income? Or does it indicate that it is prepared to have a 
new system based on a completely different theoretical framework? 
266 The ACT rate is expressed algebraically as follows: 
LR/(100 - LR) LR being the lower rate of income tax (see ICTA 1988, s. 14). 
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In the subsequent paragraphs the main distortionary tax features of the current 
UK partial imputation system will be critically analysed with special emphasis placed 
upon the tax distortions arising from the economic double taxation of dividend income. 
This work aims also to expose the main distortionary tax aspects affecting flows of 
dividend income paid or received by UK companies or UK resident shareholders. A 
comparative critical analysis will be undertaken, focusing on the tax treatment given to 
dividend income derived from Dutch and Portuguese sources and also to dividend 
income paid by UK companies to resident shareholders of those EU member states. 
2.2 Domestic Dimension 
a) Taxation of Corporate Shareholders 
1) The Flaws of the System 
In the UK, both distributed and undistributed profits of resident companies are 
charged at the same statutory tax rate . 
26' Furthermore, distributed profits are subject to 
advance corporation tax (ACT). 
26' ACT is payable when the company makes a 
qualifying distribution (see ICTA 1988, s. 14)2" and it can be set against corporation 
tax . 
211 In the special case of stock dividends (see ICTA 1988, s. 249(l 
)), 211 bearing in 
mind that they are not treated as distributions within ICTA 1988, s. 209(2), there is no 
charge to ACT. Nonetheless, the exposure to ACT liability may increase as a result of 
the share capital increase. 
This particular feature of the tax system gives full weight to the name attributed 
to this tax. an advance of corporation income tax. "' It is clear that one of the Treasury 
261 A different system applies in Germany. Here, a split-rate system applies. Retained and distributed 
profits are charged respectively at 45% and 30% tax rates. 
268 See FA 1993, s. 78. 
269 Distributions are not deductible from the company profits (ICTA 1988, s. 337 (2)). 
270 See ICTA 1988, s. 239 (2): 
"The amount of advance corporation tax to be set against a company's liability for any accounting period 
under subsection (1) above shall not exceed the amount of advance corporation tax that would have been 
payable (apart from section 241) in respect of a distribution made at the end of that period of an amount 
which, together with the advance corporation tax so payable in respect of it, is equal to the company's profits 
charged to corporation tax for that period. " 
271 A stock dividend is: 
"(a) share capital issued by a company resident in the UK in consequence of a shareholder exercising an 
option to take either a dividend in cash or additional share capital; or 
(b) bonus share capital issued by a company resident in the LJK in respect of shares which carry a right to 
receive bonus shares(of the same or another class), where the right was conferred by the terms of issue or by 
a later variation. Such shares are known as accumulator or cumulative shares and are often convertible to 
ordinary shares, either at fixed times or at the holder's option" (Simon's Tax Intelligence, D 1.202). 
272 See Case L23 (1979) 79 A. T. C. 110 (Board of Review). 
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aims is to prevent tax avoidance devices that could lead in practice to the reduction of 
the corporation tax on a company to nil. ACT can be seen though as the ultimate 
tribute to the past classical system which looks at companies and shareholders as 
completely separate entities, subjecting them respectively to corporation and personal 
income tax with no relief for economic double taxation. Indeed, its original aim was to 
guarantee a harmonious transition from the previous classical system to the new partial 
imputation system. 
The operation of different rates of corporation tax and ACT leads to different 
effective average corporation tax rates, depending of the distribution policy of the 
industry sector and company. For instance, despite the nominal full imputation that 
used to exist, small and medium companies are subject to higher effective corporation 
tax rates mainly due to their tendency to retain profits. Normally, all their profits are 
charged at the statutory corporation tax rates (25% to 35%). In the unusual case of full 
distribution of profits, an effective corporation tax rate of 6% is charged. "' Large 
companies are subject to effective corporation tax rates of only 16% if all their profits 
are distributed as dividends. "' 
2) 'Franked Investment income': A Temporary Solution for a Permanent 
Problem? 
Notwithstanding the withholding role of the ACT mechanism, "' its primary 
purpose is to integrate corporate and personal income tax systems and as a result 
273 Example: 
Company distributes all its profits and it is subject to a 25% corporation tax rate. 
Profits Lloo 
Profits after CT L75 
ACT Payable L19 
Gross Dividend L94 
CT Effective Tax Rate L6 (CT-ACT) 
274 Example: 
Company distributes all its profits and it is subject to a 33% corporation tax rate. 
Profits LIOO (33*/o) 
Profits after CT L67 
ACT Payable L17 
Gross Dividend L84 
CT Effective Tax Rate E16 (CT-ACT) 
275 See paragraph above. 
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mitigate the economic double taxation of dividend income. "' Accordingly, dividend 
income received by a company resident in the UK is not subject to corporation tax' 
and the ACT paid at the paying company level constitutes a tax credit in the hands of 
the receiving LJK company. Together, dividend income and tax credit qualify as 
'franked investment income' (FII). "' The tax credit may be refunded if the receiving 
company is wholly or partially exempt from corporation tax or if the distribution is one 
in relation to which express exemption (other than by operation of s. 208 ICTA 1988) 
is granted, either specifically or by virtue of a more general tax exemption. 2,9 
Otherwise, franked investment income may be used to frank company's qualifying 
distributions (called franked payments) and in this case no ACT liability arises. ACT is 
only charged if the amount of franked payments exceeds company's franked investment 
income. In the inverse situation, franked investment income surplus may be carried 
forward to frank payments in the following accounting periods. 280 
At the corporate level, the system ensures that dividend income once covered 
by the ACT charge is no longer subject to further taxes until it reaches the hands of the 
individual shareholder. Tax neutrality is achieved and economic double taxation of 
dividend income prevented. 
3) Group of Companies: The Use of a New System 
A specific tax regime applies to intra-group"' qualifying distributions. A group 
under the UK tax law consists of a parent company and its UK resident subsidiaries 
and respective sub- subsidiaries. Generally, the minimum 51% beneficial ownership"' 
holding test must be satisfied, "' by either direct or indirect holdings. 
276 It is important nonetheless to differentiate that 'withholding tax' role from the concept of 
withholding tax which applies for example, to interest income. Taking also into account UK 
DTCs, it is correct to say that no withholding tax is charged upon dividend income in the UK. 
277 See ICTA 1988, s. 208. 
278 See ICTA 1988, s. 238(l). 
279 See ICTA 1988, s. 231(3). 
280 See ICTA 1988, s. 241. 
281 For a definition of group or consortium see respectively, ICTA 1988, s. 247 (8A) and s. 247 (9) (c). 
282 See ICTA 1988, s. 838(3) and SP 3/93. 
283 See J Sainsbury ple v O'Connor [ 199 1] STC 3 18, CA. In this case it was held that the beneficial 
ownership test is satisfied even though another person has an option to buy the shares. 
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One of the main advantages of group taxation comes from the derogation to 
the general rule of applying ACT to dividend income. Dividends paid and received 
under this regime are called "group income". " If the requisites are met, distributed 
profits are neither subject to ACT at the paying company level nor to corporation tax 
at the receiving company level. An exemption system is in operation. Within the 
corporate sphere, economic double taxation of distributed profits is eliminated and 
companies' investment choices are not distorted by the tax system (in accordance with 
the efficiency principle of taxation). 
However, 'group taxation' does not extend to non-resident companies and as a 
consequence efficiency and neutrality are achieved domestically but not within the EU 
space. "' Recent developments may challenge this discriminatory treatment and lead to 
an extension of the more favourable domestic group taxation regime (e. g. elimination 
of the ACT charge) also to EU parent companies. "' 
b) Taxation of Individual Shareholders 
1) Partial Imputation System 
Main Distordonary Features 
In the UK partially integrated system, the ACT establishes the link between 
corporation and shareholders. It guarantees that a minimum corporation tax is paid and 
ties up the income tax credit to the ACT tax rate. Corporation tax rates (from 25% to 
35%) are disregarded for the purposes of applying the income tax credit. As a result, 
the underlying taxes charged on dividend income are only partially imputed to the 
individual shareholder . 
28' The ACT, and the Schedule F income tax rules explained 
below, are the cornerstones of the UK partial imputation tax system. 
284 See ICTA 1988, s. 247. 
285 In Denmark for example, 'group' covers also foreign subsidiaries, subject however to a 100% 
ownership requisite. 
286 See Simon London, "Hoechst in fight over tax levy", Financial Times, 18 April 1995. The case 
Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (CH 1995 H No. 2155) is currently 
been heard in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division. The legal claim, amounting to 
f, 25,250,000.00 of ACT paid by the German subsidiary resident in the UY, is based upon article 
20(4) of the UK/German DTC and articles 6 (discrimination on grounds of nationality) and/or 52 
and/or 58 (infringement of freedom of establishment) of the Treaty of Rome. Supported by these 
legal grounds, the company argues that each or all of sections 14,208,231 and 247 and Schedule 
13 of the ICTA 1988 cannot apply. If successful, this case may generate a flow of similar claims 
and as a result, a change of tax policy in the UK in the field of company taxation may occur in the 
near future. 
287 From 1996, a self-assessment system will also apply to individuals. Under the new system, the 
taxpayer will be required to produce his or her own tax computation, rather than supplying the 
information from which the IR may calculate the liability. 
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As explained in paragraph 2.2, a), distributed profits are subject to advance 
corporation tax at the company level . 
28' The overall effect is that retained profits are 
taxed at rates ranging from 25% to 35%, while distributed profits may be taxed at rates 
ranging from 6.25% to 16.25% and then again at the shareholder's income tax rate. 
ACT is creditable (or refundable) against income tax. "' Assuming a 33% corporation 
tax, this gives an effective tax rate on distributed profits of respectively, 16.25% for 
exempt shareholders, 33% for lower and basic rate shareholders and 49.75% for higher 
rate shareholders . 
2" The interplay of a fixed tax credit rate (20%) with a progressive 
income tax rate structure based upon a three tax bracket structure, "' does not remove 
the distortionary aspects of a partial integrated tax system. It can be extracted from the 
UK experience that the progressivity of the tax systeM292 (nowadays confined to higher 
rate shareholders) coupled with the use of a partial imputation system, conflicts with 
the aim of entirely eliminating economic double taxation of dividend income and can be 
regarded therefore as giving rise to economic and financial distortions in the economy. 
See for instance, the importance of pension funds or the use of tax avoidance devices 
such as PEPs. "' 
Those administrative changes demonstrate the growing awareness of UK treasury to the public 
compliance costs issue. Public revenue efficiency may be attained not only by the increase of tax 
revenue collected but also by the decrease of tax costs incurred with the running of treasury 
departments. 
2ý3ý3 See ICTA 1988, s. 78. 
289 See ICTA 1988, s. 231. 
290 See ICTA 1988, s. 20: dividend income paid by a company resident in the UK is taxable under 
Schedule F. The amount charged to income tax is the amount of the dividend plus the amount of 
the credit. 
291 The income tax rates applying in 1994-95 are: 
.......... .... . ......... . ............ :S Ua h .... ... ... ..... ..... ..... 
ail ........... 
. .......................... 0-3,000 20 600 
3,001 - 23,700 25 5,175 
Over 23,700 40 
Notes: 
(1) The tax brackets are linked to the retail prices index unless the Parliament determines 
otherwise (ICTA 1988, s. 1(4) and s. 83 3 (2)). 
(2) See also FA 1994, s. 75 (Charge and rates of income tax for 1994-95). 
292 For a critical view of how this principle operates in the UK, see Chart 2 at the end of this part. 
293 The role of pension funds and financial institutions within the corporation tax system is clearly 
evidenced in the Table presented below: 
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In an integrated EU, the unconditional defence of the principle of progressivity 
at the individual income tax level... and more decisively, the threat of loss of revenue, 
poses serious obstacles to the free flow of dividend income. This issue is analysed in 
the paragraphs below, focusing in the tax treatment given to dividend income derived 
from foreign sources (e. g. the Netherlands and Portugal). 
2) Taxation of Capital Gains 
To complete the analysis of the UK domestic corporation tax system, taxation 
of capital gains must be reviewed. Taxation of companies is closely linked to the 
systems of taxing personal incomes and capital gains and one cannot be considered in 
isolation from the others. Distributed and retained profits are subject, in the hands of 
the shareholder, to income or capital gains tax respectively"'. The latter tax only 
applies when the shares are disposed of 2" However, any increase in share value, as a 
consequence of the retention of profits which are taxed at the corporate level 
ultimately, will be charged again at the shareholder level by a CGT charge. As a result, 
a double charge occurs at this stage . 
29' This element of economic double taxation 
discriminates primarily against investment in small companies because they rely heavily 
on retained profits as source of finance. 298 
Share Ownership (1992) 
............................... ..................................................................... ............................................... .... ......... ........... 
::.::::: s ....... 
............. 
.......... .............. 
..... .:: Ow .................. 
.... ..... .... ... AM 
................................ 
............................................ 
.... .... .... ................... ................... 
... .... ..... ......... ....... 
Individuals 20 
Non-profit making bodies, public sector 3 
Pension funds 31 
Financial institutions 29 
Companies 3 
Overseas 13 
Source: Share Register Surveys, Economic Trends. 
294 
CIO Z- Z 
See TiWw4 at the end of this part and respective notes. 
295 See TCGA 1992, s. 4: an individual's net chargeable gains for the year of assessment are treated 
as the top slice of income in computing the CGT liability. The income tax rates are also 
applicable to chargeable capital gains. There is a annual exemption for gains accruing to 
individuals; for 1994-95 the figure is L5,800 (see CGTA 1992, s. 3(3)). 
296 The central concept of disposal is not defined. See however Turner v Follet [19731 STC 148,48 
TC 614. 
297 It is worth mentioning that certain categories of income are exempted from CGT (e. g. shares held 
in a PEP). 
298 See EFS, Setting Savings Free, Proposals For The Taxation of Savings And Profits, The Capital 
Taxes Group of the IFS, 1994. In this work, the authors propose to exempt from CGT capital 
gains on shares held by one company in another (e. g. Dutch or Luxembourg CGT regimes). 
106 
Internationally, compared with the Dutch system that exempts capital gains at 
the individual shareholder level or the Portuguese system that exempts long term 
capital gains, the system is uncompetitive and may therefore discourage UK resident 
shareholders from investing in the UK. Furthermore, there is positive discrimination 
towards non-resident shareholders as they are not subject to CGT on any UK gains. 
This may create non-neutralities in the corporation tax system and place UK resident 
shareholders at disadvantage in the worldwide market. A resident individual may avail 
himself or herself only of the annual exempt amount of gains -a sum in the order of 
16,000. 
However, notwithstanding the deficiencies of capital gains taxation, the current 
system favours retention of profits over payment of dividends. CGT only applies to 
some disposals of shares, and not at all where no disposal occurs. The use of 
opportunities for CGT deferral mechanism and efficient management of the annual tax 
exemption can be major compensatory mechanisms in the capital gains tax system. "' 
2.3 International Dimension 
a) Taxation of Companies 
1) Tackling the ACT Surplus Problem 
Recently, a new tax regime has been introduced in the LJK tax law. This is 
aimed at reducing long-term tax distortions resulting from the operation of the ACT 
mechanism on foreign profits of UK resident companies (the surplus ACT problem). "' 
Surplus ACT is ACT paid by a company that cannot be offset against mainstream 
corporation tax liabilities of the company. The general rule is that surplus ACT is not 
repayable to the company. As a result, some companies have accumulated huge 
amounts of surplus ACT. As surplus ACT represents tax paid by the company that it is 
unable to have set off in the intended way, it increases the effective tax burden of the 
company on any dividend. Generally, surplus ACT arises either when a company's 
distributions and the ACT payable in respect of them exceed its taxable profits, 101 or 
299 See Mervyn King, Tax Reform: The Next Step, Discussion Paper No. 42, LSE Financial Markets 
Group, 1988. The author points out that the simplest way to extend imputation to retained 
earnings would be to regard capital gains as having already paid the basic rate at source and 
charge gains only to the excess of the higher rate over the basic rate. 
300 Distortions created by permanent ACT surplus were noted by the Ruding Committee in the 
Ruding Report (Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, 
Commission of the European Communities, 1992, p. 54 et seq. ). 
Surplus ACT can be carried back and set off against corporation income tax relating to the 
previous six years (see ICTA 1988, s. 239 (3)). If after applying that relief the surplus persists, it 
may be carried forward indefinitely (see interpretation given by John Tiley to s. 239 (4)), 
107 
when it has a high proportion of foreign profits on which there is little or no UK tax to 
pay. "' In the latter case, after the operation of double or unilateral tax relief 
provisions, "' no mainstream tax liability is left against which ACT liability can be 
offset. In these circumstances, a structural or permanent surplus ACT occurs, and 
there may be no future prospect of recovering it in subsequent accounting periods 
unless the company in question changes its territorial focus and concentrates its 
business in the UK domestic market. 
Under the foreign income dividend (FID) regime, " a company in receipt of 
foreign income can pay foreign income dividends up to the amount of the foreign 
income dividends it receives, without accounting for ACT. 'O' This regime follows the 
same underlying rationale which operates at domestic level. In place of the domestic 
offset between FII and franked payments, we have: FIDs received offset against FIDs 
paid. However, tax credits are not attached to foreign income dividends. As a result, 
the main UK shareholders (e. g. pension funds and other exempt entities) are 
discouraged from investing in other EU member states . 
306Furthermore, administrative 
Butterworths UK Tax Guide 1994-95,13th edition, 1994, p. 1240, footnote 10). Restrictions to 
carry forward ACT surplus are mentioned in ICTA 1988, s. 245. 
Foreign income dividends may be subject to special rules introduced by the FA 1994 (see ICTA 
1988, ss. 246J, 246K, 246L and 246M). 
302 Cuffently, the UK corporation tax ranks amongst the lowest corporation income tax rates in the 
EU. 
303 See ICTA 1988, s. 797(4). See also case Procter & Gamble Ltd v Ta lerson (Inspector of Taxes) y 
[19881854, ChD, [1990] 624, CA. 
304 This special regime is optional (see ICTA 1988, s. 246 (A) (1) added by FA 1994, Sch. 16). See 
also ICTA 1988, ss. 246N and 246Q introduced by FA 1994, Sch. 16. 
This regime was introduced in the FA 1994 and it only applies to cash dividends. See also the 
position of the Institute of Taxation which has argued that this scheme should be optional and 
that the company should have freedom to decide in relation to each dividend whether it is an FID 
or not. It argued that this freedom is necessary to allow for changes in the relative importance of 
foreign income for the company and in order to meet the needs of its shareholders. 
305 See ICTA 1988, s. 246F(l). See also Malcolm Gammie, "Foreign Income Dividends - The UK 
Response to Surplus Advance Corporation Tax", Intertax, 1994/6-7, p. 255: 
"A company has considerable freedom to match the FIDs it pays with the distributable foreign profits it 
chooses. Thus, it can match FIDs with those foreign profits that have borne the highest rate of foreign tax. 
This secures the highest level of ACT repayment under these provisions. Foreign profits that have borne a 
low rate of foreign tax will continue to suffer UK corporation tax against which the ACT can be set without 
resort to the FIDs scheme. " 
306 The foreign income dividend regime prevents repayments of tax credits. By preventing refunds of 
tax credits, the Exchequer finances the cost arising from granting relief for ACT surplus or from 
the non-payment of ACT in case the IHC regime applies. 
From the point of view of the distributing company, the elimination of the tax credit will lead to 
higher dividend payments in order to compensate exempt shareholders (see for example BAT 
Industries case). Higher dividend payments will be funded by recovering ACT or by its 
elimination in case the IHC regime applies. 
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and compliance requirements... increase substantially the tax burden of UK companies 
operating abroad, reducing the impact of this regime on the UK corporation tax 
system. 
HFAMPAOTER 
2) A New Investment Vehicle: "' T46e International HoldWog Company 
This new regime was introduced with the Finance Act of 1994. A resident 
company qualifying under this regime is called an international headquarters company 
(IHC). When an 1HC distributes profits derived from foreign sources that have 
suffered foreign taxes eligible for double tax relief, " no ACT is due. "' The policy 
behind this regime aims primarily to encouraging inward investment in the UK. By 
reducing the tax burden falling upon foreign dividend income ('the ACT surplus 
problem'), "' the UK tax system will be able to retain and attract international 
businesses. A move towards a more efficient system of taxing company profits is also 
accomplished with the 1HC regime. 112 
See also special case of stock dividends (ICTA 1988, s. 249(l)) whose regime prevents repayments 
of tax credits (this type of dividend income is unattractive to pensions funds and other exempt 
entities which are prevented from claiming the tax credit attached to the dividend). 
30' E. g. FID ACT is payable quarterly and repayable on the corporation tax payment date (nine 
months after the end of the accounting period). 
308 See Consultative Document of the Inland Revenue, Corporation Tax Surplus A. C. T. Proposalsfor 
Reform, 1993, p. 3: 
"It has long been recognised that our system of corporation tax poses problems for companies which are 
based in the United Kingdom but which earn the majority of their profits overseas. A particularly acute forin 
of this problem arises when companies based abroad are considering setting up a headquarters company 
here to consolidate their European operations, and firid that the likelihood of surplus ACT prevents them 
basing that operation in the United Kingdom. "(Norman Lamont) 
309 Profits for which double tax relief is granted are called 'foreign source profits' (see 1988 ICTA, 
s. 2461(l)). 
310 See ICTA 1988, s. 246T which reads as follows: 
"(1) TI-ds section applies where- 
(a) a company pays a foreign income dividend in an accounting period, and 
(b) at the time it pays the dividend the company treats itself as an international headquarters 
company by virtue of section 246S(9). 
(2) The company shall not be liable to pay advance corporation tax in respect of the dividend. 
(3) This section shall have effect subject to section 246V. " 
See Eric G. Tomsett, "UK International Headquarter Companies and a Comparison of European 
Holding Company Centres", World Tax News, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, 5(l), 
January 1994. 
311 The Consultative Document 'Corporation Tax - Surplus A CT: Proposals for Reform' identified 
two types of surplus ACT; short term surpluses arising when companies do not reduce their 
distribution levels in response to a temporary reduction in profits and permanent surpluses arising 
when dividends derive from foreign sources. The IHC tax regime aims to solve the permanent 
ACT surplus problem. 
312 In line with the position taken by the Institute of Taxation, the concept 'headquarter companies' 
does not preclude such companies having other activities including, for example, trading. 
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In order to qualify under this regime, companies must satisfy one of the three 
tests described below. 
313 
(a) The first covers wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign held companies. A 
foreign held company is one where at least 80% of its share capital is owned by 
non-residents or is wholly owned by a company with such non-resident 
shareholders. Moreover, no more than 20% of the IHC's ordinary share capital 
may be ultimately owned by resident persons, excluding however companies. "' 
(b) The second covers wholly owned subsidiaries of non-resident companies whose 
shares must be quoted in the official list of a recognised stock exchange outside 
the UK and also those shares have been dealt in on that stock exchange within 
the previous twelve months. 
(c) The third test covers companies whose shareholders each own at least 5% of 
the company's share capital but subject to the 20% maximum UK ultimate 
ownership test. 
These tests have been criticised in the UK by bodies consulted by the Revenue 
because of what is seen as their restrictiveness (e. g. applying only to direct ownership) 
and complexity. Further, the enacted legislation is open to divergence in interpretation 
(e. g. does it apply both to trading or investment companies or merely to investment 
companies? ) and the consequent legal uncertainty weakens the success of the regime. 
The IHC tax regime follows closely the main features of other European 
Holding Company Centres. Despite the absence of a participation exemption relief 
applicable to foreign dividend income (compare with Dutch, Belgium or Portuguese 
systems) in practice, the UK regime may offer the same tax advantages as such a 
system. This is a result of the combination of two factors: the method used to relieve 
international double taxation (e. g. tax credits apply not only to foreign withholding 
taxes but also to the underlying taxes charged on the distributed profit) and the low 
corporate income tax rate. These may guarantee a similar result to an exemption 
method of relieving international double taxation. However, this result is not achieved 
with member states with lower corporation income tax rates such as Finland (25%) 
and Sweden (28%). 
315 
313 See ICTA 1988, s. 246S. 
314 Criticisms have been made by the Law Society to the ultimate ownership test. It argues that it 
may prove impossible to establish ultimate ownership in special cases (e. g. corporate trustee of a 
pension fund). 
315 See Ralph Atkins, "Corporate tax rates no longer the lowest", Financial Times, 6 Februan- 1995. 
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IHCs are subject to corporation tax and to the UK's controlled foreign 
company regime. "' Taking also into account that no withholding tax applies in the UK 
to dividend income paid to foreign parent companies (in contrast with other EU 
countries - e. g. France or Netherlands), the IHC ranks amongst the best holding 
centres within the EU. 
3) The Parent- Su bsid iary Directive"' 
a) The Easy Task of Implementation 
The Council Directive of 23 July 1990 establishing a common system of 
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different 
Member States"' has been in place in the UK since I January of 1992 . 
31' However, the 
legal implications arising from the implementation of this Directive in the UK tax 
system were attenuated by both domestic legislation and double taxation agreements 
policy. "o 
One of the aims of the Directive is the elimination of withholding taxes charged 
on company profits in order to ensure fiscal neutrality. Because ACT is not a 
withholding tax, and the UK imposes no other withholding tax on corporation tax or 
payment of dividends, no change was necessary in the UK domestic legislation. "' In 
line with the Directive's definition, ACT is excluded from the concept of 'withholding 
316 See ICTA 1988, s. 750 et seq. See also s. 13 4 introduced by the 1994 Finance Act. 
317 See also COM(93) 293 final, Brussels, 26 July 1993, Proposalfor a Council Directive amending 
Directive 9014351EEC of 23 July 1990. The Commission proposes to extend the scope of that 
Directive to cover all enterprises subject to corporation tax, irrespective of their legal form (e. g. 
co-operatives or public savings banks) and also to eliminate economic double taxation of dividend 
income where a subsidiary redistributes profits derived from its own subsidiary (see p. 18 and ss. ). 
Both aims are already achieved in the UK tax system (see list annexed to the Parent - Subsidiary 
Directive and domestic legislation (see paragraph 2.3,5), b)). 
318 Council Directive 90/435/EEC, Official Journal No. L 225/6. of 20.8.90. 
319 See article 8 paragraph I of the Directive which says: 
"Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary for them 
to comply with this Directive before I January 1992. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof 
The Directive was implemented by F(No. 2)A 1992. 
320 See David Williams, Business Taxation in the EU edited by Gloria Teixeira, Wiley Chancery 
Law, 1995, Chapter 2 ("European Union Overview"). 
3 2-1 See "EC Direct Tax Measures: A Consultative Document", Inland Revenue, December 1991. 
Moreover, and taking into account the proposal of the EC Commission for a Council Directive 
(COM(93) 293 final), the UK tax system already conforms with its proposed measure of 
extending underlying tax credits to sub-subsidiaries of the resident parent company. 
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tax"" and unless the H-ICs regime applies, ACT is charged upon the profits distributed 
by a UK subsidiary to its foreign parent company. 
b) Questions to be Answered: The Incorporation Criteria 
The definitions of both "parent company" and "subsidiary" are given in articles 
2 paragraph a) (and respective Annex) and 3 paragraph I a) and b) of the Directive. In 
conformity, it only applies to companies incorporated under the law of the United 
Kingdom. 323 In UK tax law, two tests are used to determine the residence of 
companies. The incorporation test was recently introduced in the UK tax system, in 
addition to the traditional common law test laid down by Lord Loreburn in the case De 
Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe which established that: 
11 
... a company resides, for the purpose of income tax, where its real business is carried on ... and the real business is carried on where central 
management and control actually resides" 
([19061 AC 455 at 458,5 TC 198 at 212). 
From 30th November 1993, a company that is incorporated in the LJK is 
resident here for tax purposes. "' Nonetheless, the old test is still used by the Inland 
Revenue in SP 1/90: 
"Generally, however, where doubts arise about a particular company's 
residence status, the Inland Revenue adopt the following approach: 
(i) they first try to ascertain whether the directors of the company in fact 
exercise central management and control. 
(ii) If so, they seek to determine where the directors exercise this central 
management and control (which is not necessarily where they meet). 
(iii) In cases where the directors apparently do not exercise central 
management and control of the company, the Revenue then look to 
establish where and by whom it is exercised. " 
In this context a reference to the UK company law is required. Palmer's 
Compaiýy LaW325 points out that: 
the four major categories into which the organisation of business in 
Great Britain is divided are: 
322 The International Tax Glossary of the I. B. F. D. (2nd edition) define 'withholding tax'as: 
"A tax on income imposed at source, 
i 
i. e. a third party is charged with the task of deducting the tax from 
certain kinds of payments and remitting that amount to the government ... 
Withholding tax may be 
provisional or final. If provisional, the amount withheld will be credited against the taxpayer's final tax 
liability and adjusted accordingly. If final, no subsequent adjustments will be made. " (p. 274). 
323 See Annex to the Directive. 
324 See Finance Act 1988, s. 66(l). 
325 Palmer's Company Law, 25th edition, Clive Schmitthoff, 1992. 
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single traders; 
partnerships and other unincorporated associations; 
corporations; and 
specialised t3Ws of business organisation. 
Companies incorporated under the Companies Act (or one of its 
predecessors) fall within the third of those categories, viz. corporations. 
The status of the company as a corporation, i. e. as a legal person distinct 
from its members, is the outstanding legal characteristic which 
distinguishes the company from other forms of business organisation. 026 
In the UK, the incorporation process is embodied in the registration procedure. 
There is no necessary contractual relationship in existence between the founders of a 
company. The only legal nexus arises after formation, once the registration procedure 
is complete. 
'Voting Rights Test ý- The Ends Always Jusdfy The Means? 
In accordance with the Directive, a minimum 25% share capital holding is 
required to establish a parent- subsidiary relationship"' subject to an anti-tax avoidance 
provision established in the second part of paragraph 2 of article 3. But UK legislation 
(ICTA 1988 sections 790 (6) and 800) establishes a 10% voting power test for 
dividend underlying tax credit purposes (also section 123 paragraphs (7) and (8) 
applying to foreign dividends). 
The current position in the UK is that the 10% voting rights test does not 
constitute an effective derogation of article 3 paragraph 2) of the Directive. In defence 
of this position article 7 paragraph 2) may be cited to the effect that the Directive shall 
not affect the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions... designed to 
326 See also John Foster & Sons v. I. R. C[ 189411 Q. B. 516,530. 
In accordance with paragraph 2 of article 3 of the Directive and by way of derogation from 
paragraph 1, Member States shall have the option to replace, by means of bilateral convention, 
the criterion of a holding in the capital by that of a holding of voting rights. 
An anti-tax avoidance provision is also included in this paragraph precluding the application of 
the Directive to companies which (or whose shareholders) do not maintain the respective 
holdings for an uninterrupted period of at least two years. In this respect, see recent ECJ cases 
Denkavit International v Bundesamt fur Finanzen, Case C-283/94 and VITIC Amsterdam v 
Bundesamtfur Finanzen, Case C-291/94. 
328 Most UK double tax conventions concluded with EU countries (e. g. article 21 (2), (b) of Irish/UK 
DTC, article 24 (2), (b) of Italian/UK DTC, article 23 (1), (c) of Belgian/UK DTC, article 22 (1), 
(b) of Danish/UK DTC, article 24 (a), (ii) of French/UK DTC, article 22 (1), (b) of Dutch/UK 
DTC or article 24 (1), (b) of Spanish/UK DTQ impose as the test for giving credit for underlying 
taxes charged on dividends a requirement that the parent company must control at least 10% of 
the voting power in the subsidiary. This criteria is in line with article 3 paragraph 2) of the 
Directive which establishes that Member States shall have the option of replacing, by means of 
bilateral convention, the criterion of a holding in the capital by that of a holding of voting rights. 
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eliminate or lessen economic double taxation of dividends, in particular provisions 
relating to the payment of tax credits to the recipient of dividends. However, this issue 
is open to difficulties of interpretation (e. g. can these articles be interpreted 
cumulatively or shall they be interpreted separately? ). But the voting rights criteria, and 
its benefits or costs when compared with the holding capital criteria, is ultimately 
tested by the particular situation of the shareholder. 
The primary aim pursued by the Parent- Subsidiary Directive is the elimination 
or mitigation 0 international double taxation of dividend income attributed to EU 
company groups (as defined in the paragraph above). Taking into account the tax 
policy of the UK on these matters (e. g. the UK has a full double tax convention 
network in the EU... and the recourse ultimately, to unilateral tax credit domestic 
provisions), article 4 of the Directive will not bring major changes in its tax system. "' 
4) Extending the Partial Imputation System 
A Comparison of the Dutch and Portuguese Positions 
The UK tax system does not apply any withholding tax on dividend income of 
foreign parent companies paid by LJK resident subsidiaries. However, special 
derogations apply under double taxation agreements when tax credits are granted to 
non-resident corporate shareholders. "' No tax credit is granted under the 
Portuguese/UK DTC and consequently, no withholding tax is levied on the dividend 
income. "' Differently, in the Dutch/UK DTC (article 10(3)), tax credits are given to 
companies resident in the Netherlands if the following conditions are met: 
(a) First, the beneficial ownership test shall apply. 
Other UK DTCs prescribe a higher voting power test. See for example German (article 18 (1), (b) 
of German/UK DTQ or Luxembourg (article 25 (1) of Luxembourg/UK DTQ experiences. 
329 The UK had concluded DTCs with all EU Member States and also with many overseas countries 
(see Table 4 at the end of this part). Those DTCs follow closely the OECD model convention in 
its successive updated versions. 
330 Article 4 of the Directive gives Member States the option of using a credit method or an 
exemption method of eliminating or mitigating international double taxation. The deduction 
method of eliminating or mitigating international double taxation was overridden by the EU 
legislator. 
331 Under certain UK DTCs tax credits may also be granted to individual shareholders (see for 
instance, article 8(2) of Australian/`UK DTC and article 11(2) of New Zealand/UK DTQ. See 
also Sl 1973/317 (Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (General) (Dividend) Regulations 
1973). 
332 Also, no tax credit applies under the German/UK DTC (see article 6). 
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(b) Second, and if the minimum direct or indirect 10% voting rights test is 
complied with, "' a tax credit equal to one-half of the tax credit which 
would be available to a LTK resident individual shareholder on the 
dividend... is granted, subject however to a 5% tax. "' "' 
Both the dividend and the tax credit are sub ect to UK income tax but the j 
income tax rate is reduced to 5%. The income tax is then deducted from the tax credit 
and a net refund made to the non-resident corporate shareholder. "' 
The operation of tax credits granted to Dutch corporate shareholders is 
illustrated in the numeric examples below. In examples I and 2, it is assumed that the 
UK subsidiary pays a gross dividend of 100 to its Dutch parent company and it is 
subject to the normal corporation tax rate (33%). Further, it is assumed that ACT is 
fully creditable against corporation tax. 
Example I (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Gross Distributed Profit of UK Subsidiary 100 
Corporation Tax g 33% 33 
Dividend Paid to Non-Resident Corporate Shareholder 67 
Tax Credit on Dividend (67 x 20/80: 2) 8.3 
UK Income Tax on Dividend Plus Tax Credit (75.37 x 5%) 3.7 
Net Receipt by Non-Resident Corporate Shareholder Before Foreign Tax 71.6 
Net Refund 4.6 
Effective UK Dividend Income Tax Rate 28.3 
Other requisites shall also apply namely, the Netherlands company's shares shall be quoted on a 
Netherlands stock exchange and the conditions for admission to a quotation specified in the 
Directive No. 79/279/EEC of 5 March 1979 shall be satisfied (see article 10(3)(d) of the 
Dutch/UK DTQ. 
334 Foreign income dividends do not qualffý for tMs tax credit. 
335 Some argue that this is not a tax, but an abatement or reduction of the credit. 
336 A similar provision applies in the following DTCs: 
- Italian/UK DTC (article 10(3)), 
- LuxembourgfUK DTC (article 10(3)), 
- Belgian/UK DTC (article 10(3)(c)), 
- Danish/UK DTC (article 10(3)) and 
- Spanish/UK DTC (article 10(3)). 
337 See example 1. 
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If the minimum 10% voting rights test does not apply, the tax credit granted is 
equal to the whole of the tax credit which would be available to a UK resident 
individual shareholder, subject however to a 15% tax. Both the dividend and the tax 
credit are subject to UK income tax but the income tax rate is reduced to 15%. The 
income tax is then deducted from the tax credit and a net refund made to the non- 
resident corporate shareholder 
Example 2 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Gross Distributed Profit of UK Subsidiary 100 
Corporation Tax g 33% 33 
Dividend Paid to Non-Resident Corporate Shareholder 67 
Tax Credit on Dividend (67 x 20/80) 16.7 
UK Income Tax on Dividend Plus Tax Credit (83.75 x 15%) 12.5 
Net Receipt by Non-Resident Corporate Shareholder 71.1 
Net Refund 4.1 
Effective UK Dividend Income Tax Rate 28.8 
A further limit is prescribed in Art. 10(6) of the UK/Dutch DTC, if the bona 
fide commercial test is not met. 
From the above examples it can be concluded that if the dividend income is 
paid to parent companies located in states such as Portugal or Germany, which are not 
entitled under the respective DTCs to a tax credit, a higher effective tax rate will apply 
(33%). The same may apply under the UK IHC regime. "' It is arguable whether, by 
denying the 'partial imputation relief to certain EU partners, this treatment constitutes 
a discriminatory measure which goes against the free movement of capital within the 
EU. "' If so, it is because these tax differentials (e. g. denial of imputation credits to 
338 A similar provision applies in the following DTCs: 
- Spanish/UK DTC (article 10(3)), 
- Irish[UK DTC (article 11(2)), 
- Luxembourg/UK DTC (article 10(3)), 
- Belgian/UK DTC (article 10(3)(b): the 15% is increased in this DTC to 20%) 
- Danish/UK DTC (article 10(3)) and 
- France/UK DTC (article 9(l), (b)). 
339 See example 2. 
340 See paragraph b) above and also example 5, note 4. 
341 See recent decisions of the ECJ in the field of direct taxation, Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln- 
A Istadt v Roland Schumacker and Case- 1/93, Halliburton Services B. Vv Staatssecretaris van 
Financien. 
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certain EU investors and current implemented IHC regime) contradict the principles of 
neutrality and efficiency and discourages companies from distributing profits derived 
from foreign sources. 
It can also be concluded that, notwithstanding the theoretical differences in the 
tax regimes applying to those qualifying corporate shareholders in practice, the 
effective LJK dividend income tax rates converge due mainly to the interplay of the tax 
credit rates... with the abatement rates. "' As a consequence, the holding percentage 
ends up as irrelevant to the achievement of full neutrality between substantial or minor 
shareholdings. 
Notwithstanding the lack of an EU uniform regime, by providing tax credits to 
certain non-resident corporate shareholders, the UK tax system aims to extend its 
partial imputation system beyond domestic borders, reducing at the same time the 
scope for international double taxation falling upon cross-border dividend income. 
Indeed, the UK has one of the lowest effective dividend income tax rates in the EU 
(e. g. Dutch or Portuguese effective dividend income tax rates at respectively, 
39%/45% and 47%/50%). 344 
More Distortions Created b theACTCut y 
The recent ACT rate cut also worked to the detriment of those non-resident 
shareholders entitled to the tax credits analysed in the paragraphs above. Fiscal aims 
have prevailed once again over tax neutrality and efficiency, and discrimination against 
investment in other EU member states has been increased as a result of this measure. 
This is because the recent corporation tax system reform led to a reduction of the tax 
credits granted to non-resident shareholders. Under the new system, high effective tax 
rates are now charged on those non-resident EU shareholders. The system is now less 
integrated at the international level and EU investors subject to heavier tax burdens 
than domestic investors. 
In example I the tax credit is only half of the tax credit applying to UK residents. 
Notwithstanding the reduced 5% abatement rate, this relief is off-set by this tax credit reduction. 
343 Notwithstanding the full tax credit granted to non-resident corporate shareholders covered in 
example 2, this result is off-set by increasing from 5% (see example 1) to 15% the abatement rate. 
344 See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of this part. 
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5) Tackling International Double Taxation 
a) Residence or Nationality? 
The income of companies resident in the UK is taxed on a worldwide basis. 
ICTA 1988, s. 8 establishes that, subject to any exceptions provided for by the 
Corporation Tax Acts, a company shall be chargeable to corporation tax on all its 
profits wherever arising. "' The UK tax system taxes resident companies on their 
worldwide income and provides relief for international double taxation of capital or 
income by using three methods. 
(1) The first method is the comprehensive list of double taxation agreements 
mentioned in Table 4. 
(2) The second is the unilateral tax credit regulated in ICTA 1988, s. 790 and ss. "' 
(3) The third one consists in deducting foreign taxes when computing company 
profits (the deduction method is regulated in ICTA 1988, s. 81 1). 
These methods are analysed below when describing the tax regimes applying to cross- 
border dividend income flows derived from Portugal and Netherlands. 
Towards More Integrated EU Corporation Tax Systems? 
b) How Portuguese and UK Corporation Tax Systems Interact 
The UK Position 
In the UK, foreign dividend income is taxed under Schedule D Case V (income 
from foreign possessions), in accordance with the income tax rules applicable to this 
Schedule .... 
... Foreign dividends are taxed on the basis of their gross amount, 
including the withholding tax levied in the source state and,, if the UK company 
controls more than 10% of the voting power of the Portuguese company, any 
345 Some restrictions may apply to this general principle. See for example Colquhoun v. Brooks 
(1889), 14 A. C., 493,504 where it was held that a person resident in the UK and engaged in 
trade carried on entirely abroad was liable to income tax only in respect to the profits of that trade 
which were received in the UK (limited liability). 
346 This relief is particularly valuable if the DTC in question follows closely the OECD Model Tax 
Convention which merely deals with the problem of juridical double taxation. The important 
issue of economic double taxation is not yet covered by its Article 23. 
347 See ICTA 1988, s. 9. 
348 Conflicts of qualification may occur when trying to ascertain the type of income or capital 
remitted by the foreign subsidiary. In this case, the dividend income definition used in the DTC 
can be used as guidance in order to solve the qualification conflict. This definition conforms with 
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (see article 10 paragraph 3 and 
commentaries 23,24 and 81.1). 
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underlying corporation tax. "' This domestic regime must, of course, be adjusted in line 
with the relevant DTC provisions (see paragraphs below). 
The Importance of DTC Tax Spaying Provision 
A special regime may be granted to Portuguese companies whose income is 
exempted from tax or granted tax relief In these cases, article 22 paragraph 2b) of the 
UK/Portugal DTC provides a tax sparing provision which establishes that tax forgiven 
or forgone in Portugal is to be treated as if it were paid. "' For instance, the most 
relevant example is of dividend income paid by companies incorporated in the offshore 
islands of Madeira and Azores. If not caught by the CFC legislation, this is covered by 
this tax sparing provision. For a state such as Portugal that still relies in generous tax 
exemptions and incentives mainly introduced to attract foreign investment, the 
operation of tax sparing provisions is seen as indispensable to prevent transfer of 
revenue to the state of residence. It does, however, amount to a subsidy provision. 
A Quest For a 'New Convention? 
Portuguese corporate income tax (IRC), local tax (contribuigdo autarquica), 
municipal tax (derrama) and inheritance and gift tax are excluded from the scope of the 
DTC tax credit (or from the scope of the DTC as a whole - see 5% inheritance and gift 
withholding tax applying in the Portuguese tax regime to distributed profits of 
'Sociedades Anonimas'). This covers only Portuguese withholding taxes charged upon 
the distributed profits of the subsidiary (see article 22(l) UK/Portugal DTC"'). 352 If the 
dividends derive from a company incorporated in the offshore island of Madeira, no 
withholding or corporation taxes (IRC) apply until 31 December 2011. 
In line with the Parent- Subsidiary Directive (article 5 paragraph 4), until the 
year 2000, Portugal may charge withholding taxes upon distributed profits. Those 
349 Dividends paid by Portuguese companies to UK pension funds are exempted in the UK (see ICTA 
1988, s. 590 et. seq. ). However, no tax credit is given to pension fund trustees if the dividend 
income derives from non-resident companies. 
350 See also ICTA 1988, s. 788(5) and s. 795(3). In computing the amount of dividend income for the 
purposes of applying corporation tax, the Portuguese tax forgiven or forgone it is not to be added 
to the net dividend received in the LIK. 
351 Notwithstanding the special tax regime prescribed in the UK/Portugal DTC, it is worthwhile to 
point out commentary 63 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: 
"The provisions of the Convention have been drafted to apply when the State of which the distributing 
company is a resident has a so-called "classical" system of company taxation, namely one under which 
distributed profits are not entitled to any benefit at the level either of the company or of the shareholder 
(except for the purpose of avoiding recurrent taxation of inter-company dividends). " 
"I See example 3 below. 
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withholding taxes are subject however to the maximum limits established in that article 
(15% until 1997 and 10% until the year 2000). After the year 2000, the Council 
(following a proposal from the EC Commission and the European Parliament) may 
decide to extend for a further period that derogation. 
While withholding taxes have been charged on distributed profits, the main aim 
of this DTC is accomplished. However, as soon as the Directive is fully implemented, 
that DTC becomes partially ineffective, covering only individuals or companies not 
qualifying under the holding capital or rights criteria set out in the Directive. Until then 
the limits established under article 10 (2) of the Portuguese/UK DTC, "' 10% 
withholding tax if the UK company holds directly at least 25% of the capital of the 
Portuguese company or 15% in all other cases - will not contradict the Directive's 
dispositions until the year 2000. 
These limits are not applicable if the dividend income is paid to resident UK 
entities, owning 10% or more of the share capital of the Portuguese company, and not 
bearing a tax at a rate exceeding 20% if the "bonafide commercial test" cannot be met 
(article 10(4) of the UY-JPortugal DTC). 
The Unilateral Tax Credit 
Where the DTC relief is not available, reference can be made to the UK 
unilateral relief provisions applying to companies with residence in the UK to mitigate 
the tax burden derived from unrelieved Portuguese underlying taxes. "' UK parent 
353 See limits indicated by article 10 paragraph 2 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital (respectively, 5% and 151/o) and commentary 75 where Portugal reserved its 
position on those rates of tax. 
354 See Gloria Teixeira and Prof David Williams, "The Impact of the Unilateral Tax Credit in the 
US, UK and other Tax Systems", Intertax, 1995: 
"Section 790(4) ICTA sets out the criteria under which unilateral reliefs may be given for foreign 
taxes in the absence of a Double Tax Convention: 
"Credit for tax paid under the law of the territory outside the United Kingdom and computed 
by reference to income arising or any chargeable gain accruing in that territory shall be 
allowed against any United Kingdom income tax or corporation tax computed by reference to 
that income or gain (profits from, or remuneration from, personal or professional services 
performed in that territory being deemed for this purpose to be income arising in that 
territory). " ... 
The limit applying to corporation tax is set out in section 797(l) which reads as follows: 
"The amount of the credit for foreign tax which under any arrangements is to be allowed 
against corporation tax in respect of any income or chargeable gain ("the relevant income or 
gain") shall not exceed the corporation tax attributable to the relevant income or gain, 
determined in accordance with subsections (2) and (3) below". 
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companies may elect either the unilateral tax credit regime or the deduction regime, 
depending of its level of profits or losses. "' The UK unilateral tax credit covers only 
Portuguese underlying taxes charged on distributed profits if the UK parent company 
controls directly or indirectly, or is a subsidiary of a company which controls directly 
or indirectly, not less than 10% of the voting power of the Portuguese subsidiary. 356 357 
In cases when the 10% voting power test does not apply, those underlying taxes do 
not qualify for deduction relief In these circumstances, dividend income effective tax 
rate may reach 60% - see numeric example below. 
In line with the UK legislation, "' relief for underlying tax will take into account 
not only the tax paid by the foreign company on its profits in the country of residence 
but also any tax on those profits in the UK or any other country ('indirect tax 
credit""). 360 
Determining the Effective Dividend Income Tax Burden 
Full account of the credit method, used both in the UK/Portugal DTC and UK 
domestic provisions (unilateral tax credit), is given in the numeric example presented 
below. It illustrates the effective tax rates applying to dividend income paid by 
Portuguese companies to LJK companies under the different situations described 
above. "' 
Here and departing from the source of income criteria, each item of foreign income must be 
considered separately. As a consequence, averaging of tax credits is completely prevented (e. g. 
final and interim dividends received from a foreign company cannot be added together; instead, 
they have to be regarded as separate pieces of income even if both were received in the same 
accounting year). " 
355 See ICTA 1988, section 811. Under this section, foreign taxes are treated as deductible expenses. 
This provision does not cover however income which is taxed in the UK on a 'remittance basis'. 
"A taxpayer will elect for relief by way of deduction where credit relief cannot be utilised, e. g. where the 
taxpayer has suffered a loss in the UK and so has no UK tax liability against which to set a foreign tax 
credit" (see David R. Davies, Principles of International Double Taxation Relief, London, S&M, 
1985). 
356 See ICTA 1988, s. 790(6). 
3SI For dividends declared after 26 July 1993, relief against UK corporation tax is only allowed for 
the amount of tax actually paid by the foreign company on the profits out of which the dividend 
was paid. If those profits are not taxed in the foreign country, no tax credit relief will be available 
(see Statement of Practice SP/12/93). 
151 See Sec. 902(a) and Sec. 902(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 
359 See ICTA 1988, s. 801. 
360 Tier restrictions apply for example in Ireland and Spain (restricted to first tier only). 
361 Effective tax rate in this work covers all types of taxes falling upon dividend income. It does not 
take into account other aspects of the tax system which may determine indirectly the amount of 
tax paid on dividend income (e. g. capital allowances and stock relief). 
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Example 3 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Portuguese Company UK Conýmny 
Effective Corporate Tu Rate Divitlend Income 6 w Txv Rate 
....... .... ... ....... 
25V; Zý Other Caws 
Company Profits (100) Taxed at 
Normal Corporate Income Tax 
Rate and 10% Municipal Tax 38.8%(3) 47.7% 61.0% 61.0% 
Rate 
Holding Companies (SGPS) 38.8%(4) 44.9% 59.0% 59.0% 
Holding Companies Incorporated 
in the Offshore Zones of Madeira 
or Azores 
(5) 0.0% 20.6% 20.6% 20.6% 
__j 
Notes: 
See Table 5 at the end of this part. 
(1) 10% voting rights test applies and the holding in the share capital is less than 25%. 
(2) 25% minimum share capital test (indirect holdings are excluded) applies and the 
parent company holds less than 10% of the voting rights. 
(3) It is assumed that gross profits are subject to corporation income tax (IRC), local 
tax (which is creditable against corporation income tax) and municipal tax (e. g. 
maximum tax rate of 10%). The effective corporate tax rate in 1994 was 37.4% 
(taking into account that only 40% of the assessed corporation income tax applied 
for municipal tax purposes). In 1995, a 38.8% effective corporate tax rate applies 
(here, an increased 80% proportion is taken into account). Distributed profits are 
further subject to withholding tax in accordance with the tax rates stipulated in the 
DTC and to 5% inheritance and gift tax if the profits are distributed by a Sociedade 
Anonima (SA). If the minimum share capital requirement is complied with a 10% 
withholding tax rate applies. Otherwise a rate of 15% is charged 
In 1994 and 1995 the effective tax rates falling upon distributed profits were 
respectively 46 8% and 48.2% (assuming a withholding tax rate of 10%). 
(4) Profits distributed by holding companies or companies covered by the consolidation 
tax regime are not subject to the 5% inheritance and gift tax. 
'ý and consequently, 
it is In the UK, this tax does not qualifyfor unilateral tax relie 62 
treated as a deductible expense. 
363 
(5) Not covered by the UK CFC legislation. 
Can This System be Defined as a Classical System? 
The numeric analysis exposed above shows the primary role played by the 10% 
voting rights test also required by the unilateral relief provision (under which 
362 See Double Taxation Relief - Admissible and Inadmissible Taxes, Inland Revenue, 1982. 
363 See Table 5 at the end of this part. 
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underlying taxes may be credited) and also the importance for Portugal of the tax 
sparing provision included in the DTC. In combination with the UK corporation tax 
rates, they put in operation an exemption system, overriding the DTC classical system 
which applies when the voting fights test cannot be met. 
On the other hand, the tax burden imposed by high withholding taxes (some of 
them temporary under the Parent- Subsidiary transitional regime) and other taxes such 
as municipal tax and inheritance and gift taxes in the source state (Portugal) cannot be 
underestimated. Indeed, they lead to a substantial increase in the total dividend income 
tax burden. 
c) How Dutch and UK Corporation Tax Systems Interact 
Dividend income remitted by a company resident in the Netherlands to a 
company resident in the UK is also subject to the LTK income tax rules applying to 
Schedule D Case V (income from foreign possessions). Also, the same unilateral tax 
treatment described under the Portuguese case applies to dividend income paid by 
Dutch companies. However, divergences occur as a result of a different tax regime 
established under the UK/Dutch DTC and also due to the full implementation of the 
Parent- Subsidiary Directive (90/435/EEC) in the Netherlands since Ist January of 
1992 (Official Gazette, 1992,518). 364 
Progressive or Regressive Corporation Tax Structure? 
Company profits are subject to corporation income tax in the Netherlands in 
accordance with a tax regressive structure. Accordingly, a 40% tax rate applies on the 
first 100,000 Dfl. and profits exceeding this amount are charged at a 35% tax rate. 
Whereas the UK corporation tax system provides a more favourable tax treatment to 
small and medium businesses by using a progressive tax rate structure, the regressive 
Dutch corporation tax system aims to prevent tax avoidance devices which could 
erode the corporate tax revenue base. It can be concluded that the implementation of 
different tax policy aims leads to different corporation tax rates structures. "' 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
Unless otherwise provided by a double taxation convention, the Parent- 
Subsidiary Directive regime and respective implementing provisions or domestic 
364 On 10 September 1992, article 13(g) of the Corporate Income Tax Act of 1969 (Wet op de 
vennootschapsbelasting) was enacted to implement the Directive in the Netherlands. 
36' This may constitute one of the main obstacles to full harmonisation of corporation tax rates 
within the EU. 
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legislation, dividend income paid by a Dutch company to a foreign company is subject 
to a dividend withholding tax at the rate of 25%. If the Directive's requirements are 
met, no withholding tax is charged upon dividend income. " If those requirements do 
not apply and the criteria established in article 10(2) of the UK/Dutch double taxation 
agreement are complied with, a 5% or 15% withholding tax rates are charged on the 
dividend income. 367 
Finally, domestic provisions may exempt from withholding tax specific types of 
dividend income such as stock dividends or dividends on shares to which the 
participation exemption applies. "' 
International economic double taxation of dividend income remitted by Dutch 
companies to UK resident companies is mitigated by the use of the credit method 
prescribed either in Art. 22 of the UK/Dutch DTC or in the UK unilateral tax credit 
... According to the Dividend Withholding Tax Law (Wet op de dividendbelasting), Art. 4a, 
dividends and other distributions of profit made after 31 December 1991 from Dutch subsidiaries 
to parent companies in other EU Member States are exempt from withholding tax, if: 
(1) the subsidiary operates in the legal form of a stock corporation or a limited liability company 
(see Annex to the Directive); 
(2) the parent company has a form as listed in the Annex to the Directive and is, in its Member 
State of residence, subject to corporate income tax as listed in article 2(c) of the Directive, with no 
possibility of opting for taxation or being exempt; 
(3) the parent company holds at least 25% of the capital (or 10% of the voting rights if prescribed 
by a double taxation convention) of the distributing Netherlands company for an uninterrupted 
period of at least I year prior to the distribution; 
(4) the parent company and the subsidiary are not, in their Member State of residence, regarded 
as being resident outside the European Union on the basis of a double taxation convention with a 
third country. 
In addition, the holding of at least 25% of the voting rights in a company will in principle also be 
regarded as a participation under certain conditions (see DB article 4a, paragraph 2). 
367 The 5% withholding tax rate applies if the UK company, being the beneficial owner of the 
dividend income (for the timing to determine the beneficial ownership test under article 10(2)(b) 
of the Dutch/UK DTC, see Netherlands Supreme Court case no. 28,638), controls directly or 
indirectly at least 25% of the voting power in the Dutch subsidiary. In all other cases a 15% 
withholding tax rate apply. 
If however, the UK company carries on business in Netherlands through a permanent 
establishment and the holding in respect of which the dividends are paid is effectively connected 
with such permanent establishment, the standard 25% withholding tax applies (see article 10(5) 
of the UK/Dutch double taxation convention). 
Moreover, those reduced withholding tax rates are not granted if the dividend income is paid to 
UK exempted entities (e. g. pension funds) and the bona fide commercial test cannot be 
established (see article 10(6) of the UK/Dutch DTQ. 
368 See Art. 4(2) of the Dividend Withholding Tax Act (Wet op de dividendbelasting). 
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provisions. "' Article 22 of the UK/Dutch DTC is more generous than article 22 of the 
UK/Portugal DTC. The former not only allows tax relief for withholding taxes paid in 
Netherlands but also, if the UK company owns 10% or more of the voting power in 
the Dutch company,, it provides credit for the underlying corporation income taxes 
falling upon distributed profits. However, due to the operation of the UK unilateral tax 
relief, a similar result applies to dividend income remitted by Portuguese subsidiaries. 
The numeric example set up below illustrates the effective tax rates applying to 
dividend income paid by Dutch companies to UK companies under the different 
situations described above. 
E-- - Example 4 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Distributed Profits (100) 
Taxed at Lower Corporate Income 35% 56.5% 56.5% 
Tax Rate (35%) 
Investment Organisations (0%)(3) 33% 33% 
Notes: 
* See Table 6 at the end of this part. 
(1) Assuming that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies and consequently no 
withholding tax is charged 
(2) Article 10(2), (a) of UKINetherlands DTC. 
(3) Investment organisations (fiscale beleggingsinstellingen) are subject to a 25% 
withholding tax which is reduced in accordance with article 10(2) and (6) of the 
UKIDutch DTC . 
370 
(4) The status of investment organisation cannot be acquired if the UK company holds 
an interest of 25% or more in the investment organisation. 371 
A Better Deal Under the Dutch Tax System? 
The reduction from a high 56.5% to a neutral 35% dividend income effective 
tax rate is mainly due to the operation of the 10% voting rights test, under the DTC 
See commentaries made in the Portuguese case. 
370 See also compatibility with UK CFC legislation. 
371 See Vpb., Art. 28 and the Royal Decree concerning investment organisations of 29 April 1970 as 
amended on 3 July 1990. 
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underlying tax credit provision. Also, the impact of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive in 
the Dutch corporation tax system which led to the abolition of withholding taxes on 
dividend income is reflected as well in the 35% dividend income reduced rate. The 
combination of these legal regimes with the UK corporation tax rates overrides the 
classical system (which applies when the voting rights test cannot be satisfied) in 
favour of an exemption system. 
d) The UK Corporate Investor Perspective 
Who Wins and Who Loses? 
In general, dividend income derived from Portuguese sources is subject to 
heavier taxation than that derived from Dutch sources. The regressiveness of the Dutch 
corporation income tax rate structure (whose main rate (35%) is below the Portuguese 
corporation income tax rate (36%)), the transitional regime applying under the Parent- 
Subsidiary Directive and the weight of municipal and inheritance and gift taxes in the 
Portuguese corporation tax system, all lead to a heavier tax burden to the UK investor 
in Portugal if compared with the tax burden arising in the Dutch tax regime. "' 
Moreover, a more favourable tax regime given to dividend income in the 
UK/Dutch DTC contributes to mitigate the international economic double taxation 
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which may increase significantly when dividends flow cross-borders. Taking all these 
tax factors into account, the Dutch corporation tax system is significantly more 
competitive than that of Portugal. 
e) The IHC and the EU Investor 
Dutch and Portuguese Positions 
The International Headquarters Company (IHC) may be noted as one of the 
best investment vehicles for EU investors wishing to expand their activities worldwide. 
The advantages of electing this form of company is illustrated in the numeric examples 
below. They illustrate the effective tax rates of dividend income paid by Dutch or 
Portuguese subsidiaries to UK companies and distributed again to Dutch or 
Portuguese parent companies (e. g. Portugal => UK => Netherlands and Netherlands => 
372 See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of this part. 
373 DTC or unilateral credit methods used by the UK tax system to relieve international economic 
double taxation apply here in accordance with the 'each item of income' criteria. This limit 
prevents averaging of tax credits (e. g. final and interim dividends derived from the same source 
cannot be added together), reducing the impact of DTC or unilateral credit provisions used to 
relieve the tax burden on dividend income. 
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UK =: > Portugal). The purpose of these numeric analysis is to compare the advantages 
or disadvantages, from the point of view of Dutch or Portuguese investor, of using 
either a UK company covered by the general tax regime or a IHC. 
Example 5 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Portugal =; > UK =; > Netherlands 
Notes: 
(1) See example 3, note (3). 
(2) It is assumed that the dividend income paid to the ultimate parent company in the 
Netherlands derivesfrom the Portuguese subsidiary distributed profits and it is an 
ordinary dividend (ACT is due and the UK company must account from 6 April 
1995 to 5 April 1996 an amount of 114 of the distribution - see ICTA 1988, s. 14). It 
is also assumed that ACT remains unrelieved 
(3) See example 1. 
(4) Based on s. 231 ofICTA 1988 and supported by the case Union Texas International 
Corporation v. Critchley ((1990) 63 Tax Cases 244), the IR takes the view that non- 
resident shareholders cannot recover any tax credit under convention provisions in 
respect of a FID. The matter is however contentious if s. 246D(2) of ICTA 1988 
applies to the case. 374 
374 See Malcolm Gammie, "Foreign Income Dividends - The UK Response to Surplus Advance 
Corporation Tax", Intertax, 1994/6-7, p. 254. 
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Example 6 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Netherlands =; > UK =; > Portugal 
Net Dividend Paid to the UK- 65.0 11 65.0 
ACT- 16.2 11 Nil 
Effective Tax Rate: 51.2% 11 35.0% 
Net Dividend Received by 
Portuguese Parent Company: 48.7 11 65.0 
Notes: 
(1) See example 4, note 1. 
(2) See example 5, note 2, adjusted to the this particular example. 
Conclusions 
At domestic level and based on concepts such as 'franked investment income' 
and 'franked payments', dividends are only taxed once. Consequently, economic double 
taxation is prevented at the corporate level. Nonetheless, it merely postpones the 
operation of the partial imputation system until the dividend reaches the hands of the 
individual shareholder. However, under the group taxation regime a genuine 
exemption system is in operation. An exemption system also is followed in case the 
dividend derives from foreign sources and the IHC regime is chosen by the taxpayer. "' 
Due to the interplay of the credit method to relieve international double taxation 
(combining bilateral and unilateral measures) and the low corporation tax rate used in 
the UK, "' full integration at the corporate level is also achieved when dividends flow 
cross-borders. Within the EU and if the IHC regime is elected, the UK corporation tax 
system guarantees full integration at the corporate level. 
See examples 5 and 6. 
376 See Table 7 at the end of this part illustrating worldwide corporation income tax rates. Within the 
EU, the UK has one of the lowest corporation income tax rates (lower corporation income tax 
rates are charged in Finland and Sweden). 
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On the other hand, if the EU investor operates under the general domestic 
company tax regime and notwithstanding the low corporation tax rate operating in the 
UK, the system is only partially integrated due to the ACT charge. In these 
circumstances, permanent unrelieved ACT constitutes a severe distortion in the UK 
corporation tax system, unless relief is available under the recent alternative FID 
regime. In this context, the role played by the extension of tax credits to non-resident 
corporate shareholders (e. g. the Netherlands) cannot be underestimated. They reduce 
the economic double taxation of cross-border dividend income and ýnitigate the 
discriminatory aspects of the corporation tax system. Further, they contribute to 
making the UK corporation tax system one with one of the lowest dividend income 
effective tax rates within the EU (compare for instance the 28.4% effective UK 
dividend income tax rate with the 47.7% effective Portuguese dividend income tax rate 
or the 35% Dutch dividend income tax rate). This is only granted under the terms of 
certain DTCs and, as a consequence, distortions may occur. 
For instance, when a Dutch subsidiary pays dividends to a Portuguese parent 
company via a UK RIC, the dividend income effective tax rate ends up at 51.2%. This 
is despite the comparatively low Dutch corporation income tax rate, and is mainly due 
to the absence of the tax credit. On the other hand, if the dividend income flows in the 
opposite direction (Portuguese Subsidiary => UK IHC =: > Dutch Parent) and 
notwithstanding the high effective corporation income tax rate operating in Portugal, 
the dividend income effective tax rate reaches only 56.2%. There is a clear lack of 
consistency in the UK corporation tax system on this issue. 
Consistency may also be broken under the FID regime (extensive to the 1HQ- 
This provides an answer to the ACT surplus problem but also denies tax credits to 
non-resident shareholders. Indeed, taking into account the current UK share ownership 
structure (dominated by pension funds and other exempt entities), the FED scheme 
discriminates against investment in other EU states in favour of investment in domestic 
companies. 
A general criticism may also be made to the restrictiveness of either the IHC 
regime or the 10% voting rights test (followed under DTCs and unilateral relief 
provisions) which dismisses other corporate shareholders that cannot fulfil the 
requisites demanded under those more favourable regimes. The high tax burden 
derived from the operation of a classical system (where no underlying tax relief is 
granted) works against the EU aim of encouraging small and medium businesses to 
expand their activities within the Union. 
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b) Taxation of Individual Shareholders 
1) Towards a more EU Integrated Tax System 
Foreign dividend income paid to LJK resident individual shareholders are 
chargeable under Schedule D, Case V (profits or gains arising from possessions out of 
the UK). "' Unless the FID regime is followed, "' shareholders are subject to the same 
rules applying to domestic dividend income. However, no credit for underlying taxes 
are granted to them. DTCs concluded with other EU states do not grant this type of 
relief, nor the unilateral tax relief provisions which may apply to corporate 
shareholders. As a result and at the international level, the partial imputation system is 
replaced by a classical system. But, is this system a genuine classical system? 
Dutch and Portuguese Positions 
As illustrated in examples I and 2, non-resident individual shareholders may in 
certain circumstances be entitled to the domestic tax credit granted to resident 
shareholders. "' This feature of the UK corporation tax system aims to mitigate the 
economic double taxation of dividend income paid by UK resident companies to non- 
resident individual shareholders. In these circumstances, the partial imputation system 
plays also an important role at the international level. 
In order to provide an answer to the above question, individual dividend 
income effective tax rates are analysed in the examples below. They take into account 
flows of dividends from Portuguese and Dutch companies to individual shareholders 
with residence in the UK. 
377 See ICTA 1988, s. 18. 
37ýý Exempt shareholders are not entitled to refunds of tax credits. 
379 E. g. Australia/UK DTC (article 8(2)) and New Zealand/UK DTC (article 11(2)). 
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Example 7 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Portugal =; > UK. - Dividend Income Effective Tax Rate* 
Notes: 
See Table 8 at the end of this part. 
(1) See notes 3 and 4 in example 3. In this example it is assumed, in accordance with 
article 10,2, b) of the UKIPortugal DTC, that a 15% withholding tax rate is 
charged in the shareholder dividend income in the source state (Portugal). Also, it 
is assumed that no relie is given to the underlying tax charged in the dividend 
(unilateral reliefi. 380 
ILI-- 
Example 8 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Netherlands =; > UK. - Dividend Income Effective Tax Rate* 
Notes: 
See Table 9 at the end of this part. 
(1) It is assumed that a 15% withholding tax rate applies and no underlying credit is 
given in accordance with article 10 paragraphs 2, b) and 6 of the UKIDutch DTC. 
380 Unilateral relief may also be claimed by individuals resident in the UK. However, the limit on 
credit for income tax purposes (see ICTA 1988, s. 796) is different from that applying for 
corporation tax purposes (see ICTA 1988, s. 797). 
Section 796(l) establishes that the limit for income tax purposes is the income tax at the marginal 
rate on the income in respect of which credit is to be allowed. The method used to limit the relief 
is based upon the source of income criteria (in accordance with this criteria, income is separated 
taking into account both the category of the income and its territorial source). Accordingly, where 
there are two or more sources of foreign income for which credit is claimed, the UK tax on each 
source is computed separately in accordance with the UK tax laws. Averaging of tax credits is 
only accepted if relating to income falling from the same source (e. g. final and interim 
dividends). See Gloria Teixeira, Prof. David Williams, "The Impact of the Unilateral Tax Credit 
in the US, UK and other Tax Systems", Intertax, 1995. 
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2) Main Findings 
The Distortionary Features of Source State Taxation 
The numeric analysis undertaken in the paragraph above shows that the 
effective tax rates charged upon dividend income paid by Portuguese or Dutch 
companies to UK individual shareholders are substantially higher than those applying 
to domestic dividend income under the partial imputation system. "' These tax 
differences arise mainly from the high dividend income effective tax rates charged in 
those source states (Portugal- 50% and the Netherlands: 44.7%). Tax credits cover 
only withholding taxes charged in the source states (Portugal and Netherlands), 
without any relief for the underlying taxes charged in the dividend income, either under 
DTCs or unilateral relief provisions. "' Formally, the system remains unchanged. 
However, the combined operation of current withholding tax rates with the relatively 
low income tax rates mitigates the impact of classical system and reduces the scope for 
economic double taxation (e. g. 20%/25% income tax rates against 15% DTC 
withholding tax rates leading to final effective tax rates of only 53% (Portuguese 
source) or 48% (Dutch source)). For these shareholders, the classical system moves 
almost completely to an exemption system. Higher rate shareholders are still affected 
by the tax rate differential. For them the corporation tax system moves towards a 
classical system. 
38 ' The table presented below compares the effective tax rates applying to domestic and foreign 
dividend income (e. g. Portugal and Netherlands): 
Financial Year (1994) 
......... .......... ............. .......... ........ .......... ....................... ........... ....................... m an ss': *: Disth'bd. t-'-. d: P .... -Ndividuat-SharehoWr Ywo ............. C 
:P.... 
.............. . ...... ......... ..:.: 
:,., 
.: 
: -: :::::.:,: 
-- -- ---------------- ......... ........ .................................. 
... ............... ..... ..... ... ...................... ........................ ................................. ........ ................. ......................... .............. ... ................. .. 
........................ ................ ......................................................................... ................................... ................. I ................. ...................... 40% ...... .... . ..... ......... - . 11 ............. UK Company (33%) 33.0% 49.75% 
Portuguese Company 53.5% 65.00% 
Dutch Company 48.0% 61.00% 
* See conclusions inserted into the main text. 
382 Withholding taxes are set against the UK tax chargeable and the latter is reduced by the amount 
of the credit. See Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Caro [19611 1 All ER 658,39 TC 374. 
Dividend income is treated as the top slice of the shareholder's total income thus treating the UK 
tax against which the foreign tax is to be credited as his or her top slice rate and not his or her 
average rate. See also ICTA 1988, s. 796 (1) and (2). 
The method used to limit the relief is based upon the source of income criteria. Accordingly, 
income is computed separately taking into account both the country when it arises and also its 
category within the income schedule structure. 
Where there are two or more sources of foreign income for which credit is claimed, the UK tax on 
each source is computed separately in accordance with the UK tax laws. Averaging of tax credits 
is only accepted if relating to income falling from the same source (e. g. final and interim 
dividend received from a foreign company). 
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The UK Investor Choice 
As a result, taking into account only the tax factor, source states corporation 
tax systems determine most of the shareholder's final tax liability. Faced with an 
investment decision, the UK shareholder would invest in the Dutch company due to 
the lower Dutch corporation tax rate and the absence of further taxes charged on 
dividend income (see Portuguese municipal tax and inheritance and gift tax). 
A Revenue Balance Between Convention PatWes? 
Overall, the revenue balance clearly favours source states which collect most of 
the tax revenue. "' Formally, the concept of worldwide taxation followed by residence 
states continue in place. In practice, the territorial principle prevails giving source 
states the fiscal advantage. The impact of this trend upon domestic treasuries of 
residence states should be carefully considered, "' especially bearing in mind that some 
of the states usually regarded as 'residence countries' (e. g. UK or USA) are assuming 
features of source states (see current trade patterns in the last paragraph of this part). 
3. THE TAX TREATMENT OF EQUITY AND DEBT 
Frequent criticisms have been made in the tax literature of the different tax 
treatment given to equity and debt finance. The former is penalised by being subject to 
double taxation.. and the latter treated more favourably, by allowing companies to 
deduct interest payments. This discriminatory treatment encourages debt finance, 
exposing companies to increased financial risks and distorts companies behaviour, 
contradicting the principles of neutrality and efficiency. 
To add to the complications, UK tax law distinguishes between annual and 
short interest, subjecting them to different tax regimes. 116 Annual interest is either 
383 See Tables 8 and 9 at the end of this part. 
384 See recent renegotiation of Canadian double tax conventions leading to a reduction of 
withholding tax rates (e. g. protocols to the Canada/US DTC and Canada/Hungary DTQ. 
385 Not only distributed profits are subject to economic double taxation but also retained profits suffer 
a double charge once taxed as capital gains in the hands of the shareholder. 
386 The tax allowability of interest is also subject to thin capitalisation rules (e. g. interest paid to a 
foreign subsidiary). See ICTA 1988, s. 808A and relevant provisions of DTCs. 
The latter in certain cases superseded the former by providing a more favourable tax treatment 
under the specific limitations operating in DTCs (e. g. limit the amount of a payment to be treated 
as if it were a distribution to only the part which exceeds what would have been paid between 
unconnected companies). 
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allowable as a charge on income"' or as a trading expense. "' Short interest, on the 
other hand, is allowable as a trading expense when paid by a trading company on 
money borrowed for the purposes of its trade. "' Moreover, the withholding tax regime 
prescribed to interest income clearly favours the use of debt finance. 390 
This positive discrimination towards interest income has led several 
commentators in the UK to defend a similar position towards dividend income. For 
example, the alternative ACE system proposed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies aims 
to provide equal tax treatment to equity and debt finance. "' Taking into account for 
example the German experience, 
392 it is 
clear that the trend is not to deny this beneficial 
tax treatment to debt finance but on the contrary, to extend it also to equity finance. 
393 
However, from 29th November 1994 onwards this no longer applies (see IR46 of 29th November 
1994). Generally, the new legislative measures amended the rules for identifying 'connected 
companies' and by doing so, they harmonise the domestic with the DTC regimes. 
The purpose of this new regime (which took into account the ECJ case Halliburton Services -B. V 
v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, C-1/93) is to guarantee a consistent and non-discriminatory 
treatment between companies covered by domestic legislation and companies subject to DTCs 
regime. 
On this topic see also Canadian case 'The Queen v. Meýford Developments Inc. (Supreme Court 
of Canada, September 28,1982) where the provisions of the tax convention (not unilaterally 
altered by subsequent enacted legislation) prevailed over domestic provisions. 
387 See ICTA 1988, s. 338. 
388 See ICTA 1988, s. 337. 
389 See ICTA 1988, s. 338(3)(b). 
390 Domestically, no withholding tax applies to short interest and in several situations (e. g. group 
election - ICTA 1988, s. 247(4), interest paid to recognised UK banks or recognised UK branches 
of foreign banks - ICTA 1988, s. 349(3)(a) - and the Eurobond exemption - ICTA 1988, s. 124) 
annual interest is also not subject to withholding tax. 
Internationally, the relevance of the interest provision in the UK DTCs is worth analysing (see 
Table 10 at the end of this part). See also Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 
OECD, 1994, commentary on article 11, paragraph 3: 
"A formula reserving the exclusive taxation of interest to one State, whether the State of the beneficiarys 
residence or the State of source, could not be sure of receiving general approval. Therefore a compromise 
solution was adopted. It provides that interest may be taxed in the State of residence-but leaves to the State 
of source the right to impose a tax if its laws so provide, it being implicit in this right that the State of 
source is free to give up all taxation on interest paid to non-residents. " 
Within the EU and in accordance with the respective DTCs, withholding tax is not charged on 
interest paid to the following states: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden. 
'91 See also Setting Savings Free, Proposals for the Taxation of Savings and Prof ts, The Capital 
Taxes Group of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 1994, p. 35: 
11... by giving the company a deduction for equity capital, the tax treats new equity, retained profits and 
borrowings in the same way. " 
392 See Helmut Schlesinger, Capital Ouy7ow and Taxation-The Case of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Reforming Capital Income Taxation edited by Horst Siebert, Institut fur Weltwirtschaft 
an der Universitat Kiel, Tubingen: Mohr, 1990, p. 10 1 and ss.: 
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4. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UK CORPORATION TAX SYSTEM: 
THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
1) Revenue Threats v. EU Shareholder Opportunities 
The combination of several factors, such as the intemationalisation of 
worldwide economies and the worldwide competition to attract capital, has been 
placing heavy pressure in the corporation tax systems of some developed countries. 
For instance, the UK and the US under the current trade trends may be classified 
simultaneously as capital import and capital export countries.,,, For them, the 
dichotomy between the status of capital import and capital export countries is no 
longer relevant. This mixed trend have been acknowledged by the US Treasury which 
is currently undertaking major work in the US DTC structure. 
The examples in this section demonstrate that under the current international 
tax structure, source states are collecting most of the revenue at the expense of 
residence states. For instance, the differential between dividend income effective tax 
rates operating under the UK domestic partial imputation system and those charged 
upon dividend income derived from Portuguese and Dutch sources occurs mainly 
"The introduction of a tax at source on interest income was justified largely 'in terms of the tax system: 
mainly by arguing that more tax equity could be attained in this way. However, as can be seen from the 
effects, quite clear effects, which subsequently occurred, more tax equity (and tax revenue) in this area can 
only be bought at an economic "price", and this price can be fairly high. For when taxing investment income 
and assets, one has to take into consideration that capital is a production factor with particularly high 
international mobility, and this means that national changes in tax legislation have to take into account of 
avoidance behaviour to a much greater extent than changes M other areas ... 
It was mainly foreign capital markets that profited from this change in investment behaviour after the 
announcement of the withholding tax ... Thus, domestic funds of approximately DM 70 bill. net went into foreign bonds last year (this figure includes the shares in foreign investment funds) ... 
German residents preferred this paper, even though it was providing somewhat lower interest rate than was 
obtainable for domestic bonds ... 
All these experiences show that a withholding tax on investment income, given freedom of movement for 
capital and big differences in national tax regimes, is not a procedure to be recommended if one wants to t) 
promote tax equity without mcurring macroeconomic disadvantages. rý t) 
393 See ACE proposal and recent enacted IHC and FID legislation. 
394 The table below provides figures for both inward and outward direct investment for the UK and 
the US in 1989: 
Source: OECD, Taxing Profits in a Global Economy, Domestic and International Issues, Pans, 199 1. 
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because the dividend income tax burdens are higher in those states than in the UK. 
These results pose difficult questions to domestic treasuries. 
EU Shareholders Opportunities 
In the UK, the gradual cuts in both corporation and income tax rates coupled 
with unchanged high source withholding tax rates"' have been facilitating the 
integration process and reducing the scope for economic double taxation of dividend 
income at the international level. As a consequence, the corporation tax system has 
been moving away from a classical system towards an exemption system. Currently, 
three systems are in operation. If both underlying and withholding taxes are creditable 
under DTCs or unilateral relief provisions, the UK classical system ends up to be 
equivalent to an exemption system. "' Otherwise a classical system applies, mitigated 
by the interaction of high withholding tax rates with low corporate and income tax 
rates. Finally, a partial imputation system may come into operation when dividend 
income is paid by UK resident companies to non-resident shareholders. Overall, the 
system is more integrated at the international level and as a result, the effects of 
economic double taxation are attenuated. 
Taking this trend into account, it is legitimate to ask if the classical distinction 
between exemption and credit methods has the relevance that it happened to have in 
the past. 
2) What will be the Future of ACT? 
The recent cut in the ACT rate led to important repercussions in the overall 
domestic corporation tax system namely, increase of effective corporation tax rates, "' 
reduction of tax credits granted to exempted shareholders and increase of higher rate 
shareholders tax burdens. Clearly, once again, the tax reform winner was the Treasury. 
As a consequence, the system had moved away from the full imputation (no longer 
applicable at small company level) and both exempt and higher rate shareholders ended 
up worse off. The system is now less neutral. At the international level, the impact of 
this reform is worth noticing. The FID and IHC regimes were introduced to overcome 
the structural ACT surplus problem and to introduce a holding company regime which 
395 See Table II at the end of this part. 
396 See exwnples 3 and 4. 
397 This tax change affects particularly small and medium businesses whose tendency to retain profits 
increases their exposure to heavier corporation tax burdens. It also contradicts policy aims 
emphasised in the EC Commission Mite Paper 'Growth, Competitiveness, Employment, The 
Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century, Part C, 1993. 
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could compete with other EU holding companies regimes. Those aims were achieved 
as demonstrated in the paragraphs above. 
These tax changes, however, do not provide clear guidance as to the general 
direction in which the government wishes the corporation tax system to move. 
Contradictory aims demand different tax solutions and the system cannot satisfy all of 
them. For instance, the distortionary aspects of ACT (initially introduced to guarantee 
a smooth transition from the classical system to the partial imputation system) reflect in 
the discriminatory effective corporation tax rates or unrelieved ACT surplus, satisfy 
primarily domestic larger companies and pension funds interests. The complete 
elimination of ACT would precipitate large losses especially for those exempt entities. 
This might make elimination an unrealistic proposal (see also compatibility with social 
security aims). Still, the problem must not be dismissed. 
It is important to emphasise that those conflicts arise as a result of mixing 
together ACT with tax credits granted to individual shareholders. Now that full 
imputation is no longer achieved at the small company level, it is legitimate to ask if at 
a more appropriate time in the future, the government should not look at ACT as a 
true corporation withholding tax and give an independent status to the income tax 
credit which would impute fully at the individual shareholder level the corporation tax 
paid at the company level. The system would end up simpler and tax distortions 
derived from mixing two different tax concepts together (advance corporation tax and 
tax credit) deleted. "' 
398 Uncertainty about the legal nature of ACT led to a conceptual divergence between US tax 
authorities and US courts in the Xerox case. The position defended by the IRS was that ACT is a 
prepayment of the mainstream corporate tax liability. However, the US Federal Circuit followed a 
different approach. Broadly, it held that ACT is a separate tax and should not be viewed as a 
prepayment or estimate of mainstream corporation tax. Notwithstanding the substantial authority 















Sources: Cmnd. 8456, Corporation Tax, 1982, H. M. S. O. 
InlandRevenue Statistics, H. M. S. O. 
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Chart 1 
MCT and Sch F /ACT As A Percentage of Total CT Receipts 
in The UK (1966 - 1993) 
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Table I 
Corporation Income Tax Receipts and Schedule FIA CT Receipts 
Receipts in the UK (1966-1993) 








Totd CT mcr 
v 
-CA FIA CT 
a 
1966/67 1.049 300 1.349 78 22 
1967/68 1.214 640 1.854 65 35 
1968/69 1.344 640 1.984 68 32 
1969/70 1.697 670 2.367 72 28 
1970/71 1.583 700 2.283 69 31 
1971/72 1.554 750 2.304 67 33 
1972/73 1.533 2.273 67 33 
1973/74 1.869 620 2.489 75 25 
1974/75 1.730 1.129 2.859 61 39 
1975/76 1.119 877 1.996 56 44 
1976/77 1.641 1.014 2.655 62 38 
1977/78 2.137 1.206 3.343 64 36 
1978/79 2.560 1.380 3.940 65 35 
1979/80 2.815 1.831 4.646 61 39 
1980/81 2.822 1.823 4.645 61 39 
1981/82 2.937 1.993 4.930 60 40 
1982/83 3.455 2.222 5.677 61 39 
1983/84 4.066 2.118 6.184 66 34 
1984/85 5.192 3.149 8.341 62 38 
1985/86 6.900 3.808 10.708 64 36 
1986/87 9.039 4.456 13.495 67 33 
1987/88 10.795 4.939 15.734 69 31 
1988/89 12.334 6.203 18.537 67 33 
1989/90 14.228 7.267 21.495 66 34 
1990/91 13.816 7.679 21.495 64 36 
1991/92 10.327 7.936 18.263 57 43 
1992/93 7.069 8.738 15.807 45 55 
1993/94 6.800 7.800 14.600 47 53 
Sources: Cmnd. 8456, Corporation Tax, 1982, H. M. S. O. 
. 
Inland Revenue Statistics, H. M. S. O. 
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Chart 2 
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Source: IFS, Goodman, A. & Webb, S., For Richer, For Poorer, The Changing 
Distribution ofIncome in the United Kingdom, 1961-91, Commentary No. 42, 
1994. 
Notes: 
In this example, distribution of income is analysed by looking at the share of total 
income held by equally-sized population groups at different parts of the 
distribution. Population is ranked in order of their incomes and divided into ten 
equally-sized groups known as decile groups. Income shares are presented only in 
terms of BHC (before housing costsý. 
It shows the share of total BHC income held by each decile over time. The main 
conclusions from this study are mentioned in page 13 of the above mentioned 
commentary: 
"The bottom tenth of the population held around 4.25 per cent of the total income in 
1961, whereas by 1991 this share had fallen to 3 per cent. In contrast, the share of 
the top tenth of the population rose from 22 per cent of total income in 1961 to 25 
percent in 199 1-" 
This data puts seriously in question the ability of the tax system to redistribute 
wealth. Is it feasible to achieve vertical equality within the current tax system 
structure? Isn't the social security system better positioned to perform this task? 
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Table 2 
BHC Income Shares by Decile Group /Per Cent 
Year 19t nd 
... ... .. 
rd 
.......... . .......... .. .......... ... .... .. ............. . ............ . ............. . ................. ........... . ................. ....... - .... .... . 
................ ................... ... I ............... ................... .......... ......... ................... ...... ............ ................... ................... ..... ............. 
5th 
... ... ... ... ... .... ..... 
6"' 7"' 
...... ..... ...... .......... ...... -. - ............ ........... 
8 th 9 1ý1 1wh 
1961 4,22 5,13 5,91 7,01 8,19 9,63 10,87 12,10 14,98 21,97 
1962 4,31 4,89 6,13 6,77 8,25 8,98 10,32 12,96 14,95 22,43 
1963 3,96 4,82 5,85 6,58 7,92 9,62 11,00 12,35 14,90 23,01 
1964 4,26 5,37 5,69 7,29 7,60 9,24 10,99 12,56 14,88 22,12 
1965 4,50 5,36 6,05 6,79 8,39 9,61 11,17 13,13 14,64 20,35 
1966 3,97 5,35 6,09 6,75 8,31 9,31 10,37 12,97 15,50 21,38 
1967 4,29 5,16 5,90 7,22 7,88 9,34 10,47 12,47 15,02 22,26 
1968 4,69 5,62 6,09 6,72 8,12 9,28 10,82 12,70 14,83 21,14 
1969 4,35 5,54 6,13 7,02 8,18 9,23 10,56 12,11 14,94 21,96 
1970 4,45 5,59 6,18 6,79 7,81 9,24 10,59 12,53 14,95 21,86 
1971 4,40 5,47 5,75 6,78 7,70 8,88 10,60 12,41 14,66 23,36 
1972 3,98 5,35 5,95 6,87 7,78 9,12 10,58 13,08 15,24 22,06 
1973 4,82 5,74 5,72 6,50 7,55 9,14 10,19 12,67 15,12 22,55 
1974 4,49 5,93 6,17 6,71 7,97 8,93 10,14 12,32 14,74 22,60 
1975 4,38 6,07 5,98 6,72 7,87 8,93 10,45 12,32 14,90 22,39 
1976 4,40 6,12 6,19 6,47 7,72 9,12 10,71 12,52 15,10 21,64 
1977 4,43 6,13 6,41 6,76 7,83 8,96 10,63 12,33 14,73 21,80 
1978 4,26 5,84 6,22 6,79 7,88 9,24 10,98 12,43 14,87 21,48 
1979 4,65 6,32 6,52 6,72 8,01 8,92 10,63 12,55 15,27 20,41 
1980 4,12 6,06 6,39 6,87 7,95 8,69 10,11 12,15 14,81 22,85 
1981 3,54 5,47 6,36 6,92 7,55 8,45 10,22 12,59 15,21 23,69 
1982 3,83 5,73 6,43 7,18 7,64 8,79 10,41 12,52 15,33 22,14 
1983 3,81 5,67 6,48 7,16 7,77 8,83 10,63 12,23 14,89 22,53 
1984 3,76 5,56 6,75 7,44 7,66 8,94 10,50 12,50 15,08 21,81 
1985 3,62 5,28 6,64 6,90 7,65 8,68 10,84 12,54 15,23 22,63 
1986 3,34 5,07 6,56 6,91 7,61 8,72 10,46 12,13 14,94 24,25 
1987 3,34 4,97 6,25 6,76 7,37 8,45 10,10 12,14 15,05 25,56 
1988 3,33 4,86 6,31 6,38 7,32 8,85 9,98 12,37 15,60 25,00 
1989 3,08 5,03 6,10 6,44 7,44 8,90 10,52 12,63 15,29 24,56 







7,23 8,73 10,46 12,49 15,84 25,00 
Notes: 
BHC income is the sum of income from all sources, including housing-related 
benefits. 
Source: EFS, For Richer, For Poorer, The Changing Distribution ofIncome in the 
United Kingdom, 1961-91, Commentary No. 42,1994. 
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Chart 3 
Corporation Income Tax and Personal Income Tax Rates (916) 
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Notes: 
Since the introduction of the imputation system, both corporate and personal income tax 
rates have been cut gradually (e. g. exception for personal income tax during the period 
19 74- 79). It is noteworthy to mention the drastic cut in the top personal income tax rates and 
the progressive elimination of tax brackets (e. g. in 1976177 a maximum 83% tax rate applied 
with ten brackets of taxable income. Later on, in 1980181, that maximum rate was reduced to 
60% and the income tax brackets reduced to six. In 1988, a 40% tax rate was introduced and 
the number of income tax brackets reduced to two. Recently, in 1992, a lower personal 
income tax rate of 20% was introduced and the income tax brackets increased to three). 
This trend of broadening the tax base, coupled with sharp cuts in the tax rates and a 
reduction of the number of rate brackets, may lead eventually to a flat rate of income tax 
(see, for example, in support of a proportionate or flat rate tax, Adam Smith, John Stuart 
Mill, Bradford (1986), Kesselman (1982), and Meade (1948,19 72)). 
Proposals to introduce a flat rate income tax were announced in New Zealand in late 1987. 
However, they were rejected by the Government on the grounds of its adverse distributional 
impact andpotential loss of revenue. 
The closest approach to a flat rate is found in Hong Kong, Guernsey and Mauritius (see 
Jonathan R. Kesselman, Rate Structure and Personal Taxation: Flat Rate or Dual Rate?, 
Victoria University Pressfor the Institute of Policy Studies, 1990). 
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Table 3 
Corporation Income Tax and Personal Income Tax Rates (016) 
in the UK (19 73-1994) 
.... 
. .. Tax . Yea 
....... . ............. 




. . CT Small 
Com ny Rate pa 
Inc. Tax 
Basic Rate 
1973 52 42 30 
1974 52 42 33 
1975 52 42 35 
1976 52 42 35 
1977 52 42 34 
1978 52 42 33 
1979 52 40 30 
1980 52 40 30 
1981 52 40 30 
1982 52 38 30 
1983 50 30 30 
1984 45 30 30 
1985 40 30 30 
1986 35 30 29 
1987 35 27 27 
1988 35 25 25 
1989 35 25 25 
1990 34 25 25 
1991 33 25 25 
1992 33 25 25 
1993 33 25 25 
1994 33 25 25 
Note: 
For the 1992-93 tax year and subsequent years, a lower rate of personal 
income tax applies (20916). 
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Table 4 
Current Double Tax Treaties 
........ .. ... I ... ý ... I ... ............ ....... ........... Counir ................. .. 
........... .... ...... ........... .......... rýýemepýt (4qg ýýn g .......... Antigua 1 947 No 2865 
Armenia 1968 No 1096 
Australia 1968 No 305 
1980 No 707 
Austna 1994 No 768 
Bangladesh 1980 No 708 
Barbados 1970 No 952 
1973 No 2096 
Belarus (formally Byelorussia) 1986 No 224 (Soviet Union) 
Belgium 1987 No 2053 
Belize 1947 No 2866 (British Honduras) 
1968 No 573 (British Honduras) 
1973 No 2097 
Botswana 1978 No 183 
Brunei 1950 No 1977 
1968 No 306 
1973 No 2098 
Bulgaria 1987 No 2054 
Canada 1980 No 709 
1980 No 1528 
1985 No 1996 
China 1984 No 1826 
Croatia 1981 No 1815 (Yugoslavia) 
Cyprus 1975 No 425 
1980 No 1529 
Czech Republic 1981 No 2876 (Czechoslovakia) 
Denmark 1980 No 1960 
1991 No 2877 
Egypt 1980 No 1091 
Estonia 1994 No 3207 (Takes effect m UK as from I April 1995 
(Corporation Tax) and 6 April 1995 (Income Tax) 
Falkland Islands 1984 No 363 
1992 No 3206 
Faeroe Islands 1950 No 1195 (Demnark) 
1961 No 579 
1967 No 163 (Denmark) 
1968 No 307 
1969 No 1068 (Denmark) 
1971 No 717 
1973 No 1326 (Denmark) 
1975 No 2190 
Fiji 1976 No 1342 
Finland 1970 No 153 
1973 No 1327 
1980 No 710 
1985 No 1997 
1991 No 2878 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Current Double Tax Treaties 
... ... .... . ..... .... . ..... coantry 
.......... .......... .......... .......... ......... .......... ......... A ment an d yanwn ding protowls) France 1968 No 1869 
1971 No 718 
1973 No 1328 
1987 No 466 
1987 No 2055 
Gambia 1980 No 1963 
Germany 1967 No 25 (Federal Republic of Germany) 
1971 No 874 (Federal Republic of Germany) 
Ghana 1947 No 2868 (Gold Coast) 
[1993 No 1800] 
Greece 1954 No 142 
Grenada 1949 No 361 
1968 No 1867 
Guernsey 1952 No 1215 (Amended by SI 1994 No 3209) 
Guyana 1992 No 3207 
Hungary 1978 No 1056 
Iceland 1991 No 2879 
India 1993 No 1801 
Indonesia 1994 No 769 
Ireland (Republic of) 1976 No 2151 
1976 No 2152 
Isle of Man 1955 No 1205 (New draft treaty now before Parliament 
awaitm, g ratification) 
1991 No 2880 
1994 No 3208 
Israel 1963 No 616 
1971 No 391 
Italy 1990 No 2590 
Ivory Coast (Cote D'Ivoire) 1987 No 169 
Jamaica 1973 No 1329 
Japan 1970 No 1948 
1980 No 1530 
Jersey 1952 No 1216 (Amended by SI 1994 No 32 10) 
Kenya 1977 No 1299 
Kiribati 1950 No 750 (Gilbert and Ellice Islands) 
1968 No 309 (Gilbert and Ellice Islands) 
1974 No 1271 (Gilbert and Ellice Islands) 
Korea (Republic of) 1978 No 786 
Lesotho 1949 No 2197 (Basutoland) 
1968 No 1868 
Luxembourg 1968 No 1100 
1980 No 567 
1984 No 364 
Malawi 1956 No 619 (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) 
1964 No 1401 
1968 No 1101 
1979 No 302 
Malaysia 1973 No 1330 
1987 No 2056 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Current Double Tax Treaties 
............ - ............. Country ... ... Agreement Oand anyamen ng pmtocoý4) 
Malta 1962 No 639 
1975 No 426 (New draft treaty now before Parliament 
awaiting ratification) 
Mauritius 1981 No 1121 
1987 No 467 
Mexico 1994 No 3212 
Montserrat 1947 No 2869 
1968 No 576 
Morocco 1991 No 2881 
Myanmar (formerly Burma) 1952 No 751 
Namibia 1962 No 2352 (South Africa) 
1962 No 2788 (South West Africa) 
1967 No 1489 (South Africa) 
1967 No 1490 (South West Africa) 
Netherlands 1980 No 1961 
1983 No 1902 
1990 No 2152 
New Zealand 1984 No 365 
Nigeria 1987 No 2057 
Norway 1985 No 1998 
Pakistan 1987 No 2058 
Papua New Guinea 1991 No 2882 
Philippines 1978 No 184 
Poland 1978 No 282 
Portugal 1969 No 599 
Romania 1977 No 57 
Russia (Russian Federation)' 1986 No 224 (Soviet Union) 
St. Kitts 1947 No 2872 (St. Christopher and Nevis) 
Sierra Leone 1947 No 2873 
1968 No 1104 
Singapore 1967 No 483 
1978 No 787 
Slovak Republic 1991 No 2876 (Czechoslovakia) 
Slovenia 1981 No 1815 (Yugoslavia) 
Solomon Islands 1950 No 748 (British Solomon Islands) 
1968 No 574 (British Solomon Islands) 
1974 No 1270 (British Solomon Islands) 
South Africa 1969 No 864 
Spain 1976 No 1919 (Variation now before Parliament awaiting 
ratification) 
SriLanka 1980 No 713 
Sudan 1977 No 1719 
Swaziland 1969 No 380 
Sweden 1984 No 366 
Switzerland 1978 No 1408 
1982 No 714 
1994 No 3215 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Current Double Tax Treaties 
Country A greement fandanyamendingprotocols) 
Thailand 1981 No 1546 
Trinidad and Tobago 1983 No 1903 
Tunisia 1984 No 133 
Turkey 1988 No 932 
Tuvalu 1950 No 750 (Gilbert and Ellice Islands) 
1968 No 309 (Gilbert and Ellice Islands) 
1974 No 1271 (Gilbert and Ellice Islands) 
Uganda 1993 No 1802 
Ukraine 1993 No 1803 
United States of America 1980 No 568 
Uzbekistan 1994 No 770 
Vietnam 1994 No 3216 (This takes effect in UK as from I 
April 1995 (Corporation Tax) and 6 April 1995 
(Income Tax)) 
Yugoslavia 2 1981 No 1815 
Zambia 1972 No 1721 
1981 No 1816 
Zimbabwe 1982 No 1842 
Notes: 
At present, the UK- USSR Tax Treaty remains effective with respect to: 
Armenia Kazakhstan Tajikstan 
Azerbaijan Kyrgystan Turkmeniastan 
Belarus Moldova Uzbekistan 
Georgia Russian Federation 
The UK-Yugoslavia Tax Treaty presently applies to the former Yugoslav States. 
Treaties with Croatia and Slovenia have been negotiated but are not yet in effect. 
Proposed Double Tax Treaties 
Treaties negotiations with thefollowing countries are presently being undertaken: 
Argentina Brazil Latvia 
Azerbaijan Colombia Lithuania 
Belarus Gabon Mongolia 
Treaties with the following countries have been initialled or signed: 
Bolivia Tajikstan Venezuela 
Moldovia Turlaneniastan 
Treaties with the following countries are presently before the UK Parliament for 
ratification: 
Azerbaijan Mexico 
Kazakhstan Russian Federation 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Current Double Tax Treaties 




















(*) These countries benefitfrom the continuing application of the UK-USSR Air 
Transport Treaty. 
Source: G. Teixeira, "Business Taxation in the European Union", 
Update 1, September 1995. 
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Table 5 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
Portugal 
Profit Before Taxes 100 100 100 
Tax (IRC) 38.8% 38.8 38.8% 38.8 38.8% 38.8 
Profit After Taxes 61.2 61.2 61.2 
Gross Dividend 61.2 61.2 61.2 
Withholding Tax 10% 6.12 15% 9.18 10% 6.12 
Inheritance Tax 5% 3.06 5% 3.06 0% 0 
Net Dividend Paid to UK 52.02 48.96 55.08 
United Kingdom 
Gross Dividend 61.20 61.20 61.20 
Deductible Expense 3.06 3.06 
Taxable Dividend 58.14 58.14 61.20 
Corporation Tax 33% 19.19 33% 19.19 33% 20.20 
Tax Credit 10% -6.12 15% -9.18 10% -6.12 
Total Tax 13.07 10.01 14.08 
Dividend Before Tax 52.02 48.96 55.08 
Tax Paid 13.07 10.01 14.08 
Dividend After Tax 38.95 38.95 41.00 
Total Tax Burden 61.0% 61.0% 59.0% 
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Table 6 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
........... ...... ............ .................... ...................................... . ....... ....................................................... ...................... ................................ .... ........... ........................................ ............................................................... - ........................... - ...................... ........... ...................................................... 
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Profit Before Taxes 100 100 
Corporation Income Tax 35.0% 35.0 35.0% 35.0 
Profit After Taxes 65.0 65.0 
Gross Dividend 65.0 65.0 
Withholding Tax 5% 3.25 15% 9.75 
Net Dividend Paid to UK 61.75 55.25 
United Kingdom 
Gross Dividend 65.00 65.00 
Corporation Tax 33% 21.45 33% 21.45 
Tax Credit 5% -3.25 15% -9.75 
Total Tax 18.20 11.70 
Dividend Before Tax 61.75 55.25 
Tax Paid 18.20 11.70 
Dividend After Tax 43.55 43.55 
Total Tax Burden 56.5% 56.5% 
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Table 7 
Corporation Income Tax Rates (1994) 
Argentina 30 30 
Australia 33 33 
Austria 34 34 
Belgium 39 (standard rate) 40.17 
Brazil 25 40.91 (estimated) 
Canada 28 (standard rate) 44.34 (Ontario) 
China 30 33 
Cyprus 25 25 
Denmark 34 34 
Finland 25 25 
France 33.33 33.33 
Germany 45/30 54.9/42.6 
Greece 35 35 
Hungary 36 36 
India 45 - 50/65* 51.75/65 
Indonesia 15 -35 15 -35 
Ireland 40 40 
Italy 36 52.2 
Japan 37.5 (standard rate) 51.38 (Tokyo) 
Republic of Korea 18-34 19.35 - 36.55 
Luxembourg 33 (standard rate) 39.39 
Malaysia 32 32 
Mexico 34 34 
Netherlands 35 (standard rate) 35 
New Zealand 33 33 
Norway 28 (municipal tax) 28 
Philippines 35 35 
Poland 40 40 
Portugal 36 38.8** 
Russia 13 38 (Moscow) 
Singapore 27 27 
South Aftica 40 40 
Spain 35 35.385 
Sweden 28 28 
Switzerland 3.63 -9.8 28.4 (Zurich) 
Thailand 30 30 
Turkey 25 26.75 
UK 33 (standard rate) 33 
USA 35 (standard rate) 35-43 
Foreign companies. 
1995 Corporate Tax Rate. 
Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, Corporate and Withholding Tax 
Rates, International Tax and Business Guide, 1994 edition. 
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Table 8 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
Portuguese Company =; > UK Individual Shareholder 
Portugal 
(Company) 
Profit Before Taxes 100 100 100 
Tax (IRC) 38.8% 38.8 38.8% 38.8 38.8% 38.8 
Profit After Taxes 61.2 61.2 61.2 
Gross Dividend 61.2 61.2 61.2 
Withholding Tax 15% 9.18 15% 9.18 15% 9.18 
Inheritance Tax 5% 3.06 5% 3.06 5% 3.06 
Net Dividend Paid to UK 48.96 48.96 48.96 
United Kingdom 
(Shareholder) 
Gross Dividend 61.20 61.20 61.20 
Deductible Expense 3.06 3.06 3.06 
Income Tax 20% 11.63 20% 11.63 40% 23.26 
Tax Credit 15% -9.18 15% -9.18 15% -9.18 
Total Tax 2.45 2.45 14.08 
Dividend Before Tax 48.96 48.96 48.96 
Tax Paid 2.45 2.45 14.08 
Dividend After Tax 46.51 46.51 34.88 
Total Tax Burden 53.5% 53.5% 65.1% 
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Table 9 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
Dutch Company =: > UK Individual Shareholder 
Netherlands 
(Company) 
Profit Before Taxes 100 100 100 
Corporation Income Tax 35.0% 35.0 35.0% 35.0 35.0% 35.0 
Profit After Taxes 65.0 65.0 65.0 
Gross Dividend 65.0 65.0 65.0 
Withholding Tax 15% 9.75 15% 9.75 15% 9.75 
Net Dividend Paid to UK 55.25 55.25 55.25 
United Kingdom 
(Shareholder) 
Gross Dividend 65.00 65.00 65.00 
Income Tax 20% 13.00 20% 13.00 40% 26.00 
Tax Credit 15% -9.75 15% -9.75 15% -9.75 
Total Tax 3.25 3.25 16.25 
Dividend Before Tax 55.25 55.25 55.25 
Tax Paid 3.25 3.25 16.25 
Dividend After Tax 52.00 52.00 39.00 
Total Tax Burden 48.0% 48.0% 61.0% 
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Table 10 



















Republic of Korea 10/15 
Luxembourg 0/25 (holding companies) 
Malaysia 15 
Netherlands -- 






South Affica 10 








A 25% Withholding Tax Rate applies to non-treaty countries. 
Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, Corporate and Withholding Tax 
Rates, International Tax and Business Guide, 1994 edition. 
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Table 11 
Dividend Withholding Tax Rates Under UK DTAs 
Country Major Rate (/, q) Minor Rate rlo) 
Australia 15 15 
Austria 5 15 
Belgium 5 10 
Canada 10 15 
Denmark 5 15 
Finland 5 15 
France 5 15 
Germany 15 15 
India 15 15 
Indonesia 10 15 
Italy 5 15 
Japan 10 15 
Republic of Korea 10 15 
Luxembourg 5 15 
Netherlands 5 15 
New Zealand 15 15 
Norway 5 15 
Philippines 15 25 
Poland 5 15 
Portugal 10 15 
South Africa 5 15 
Spain 10 15 
Sweden -- 5 
Switzerland 5 15 
Thailand 10 10 
Turkey 15 20 
USA 5 15 
Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, Corporate and Withholding Tax 
Rates, International Tax and Business Guide, 1994 edition. 
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PART III 
THE NETHERLANDS CORPORATION TAX SYSTEM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Historic Overview 
From the early stages of its political and economic development, the 
Netherlands government realised that to compete in the worldwide economy it should 
have an open economy. Therefore obstacles to free flow of capital should be removed 
to attract foreign investors and to allow domestic businesses to expand their operations 
into larger and more profitable markets. As a small domestic economy, a policy of 
encouraging both inward and outward investment has been pursued by both 
government and commerce. "' 
This general policy stability influenced government tax policy, major aims of 
which have been subordinated to the underlying general policy summarised in the 
paragraph above. "' As a result, a coherent, stable and well defined corporation tax 
system has been in place for many years, based upon the classical view of treating 
companies and shareholders as separate taxpayers. "' However, to encourage 
investment, measures were introduced and directed towards elimination of economic 
double taxation. Among those were the participation exemption, "' the absence of 
withholding taxes on interest and royalty income and the tax exemption granted to 
capital gains. It is worth noting that for instance, the absence of withholding taxes on 
interest and royalty income was not even questioned after the Second World War 
when the Netherlands faced huge public deficits and urgently needed extra tax 
revenue. 403 
399 See Table I at the end of this part. 
400 See for instance the 1956 constitutional reform designed to limit government expenditure. The 
Netherlands budgetary system has norms for determining the increase in public expenditure in 
accordance with the increase in national income and the yields of other taxes. 
401 Simplicity and prevention of tax evasion can be invoked as the main arguments supporting the 
classical system currently in place. 
402 The participation exemption was introduced in Dutch tax law in 1893 when the 
'Bedrijfsbelasting' (Business tax) was enacted and subsequently, it has been changed and 
gradually liberalised (e. g. distinction between participations in resident and non-resident 
companies had been progressively narrowed in line with underlying tax policy of elimination of 
economic double taxation (see Parliamentary Reports 1892-1893)). 
403 See explanatory memorandum of the Wet Belastingherziening 1950 (Session 1948/9,125 1: 
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At the international levet, since the end of the last century, ' the principle of 
world-wide taxation of residents constitutes one of the cornerstones of Dutch income 
and wealth taxation. The reconciliation of this principle with the aim of eliminating 
international economic double taxation has been achieved not only by the use of the 
participation exemption and capital gains exemption but also through the conclusion of 
double taxation conventions whose underlying rationale is to reduce as far as possible 
the tax burden falling upon dividend, interest or royalty income. " Double taxation 
conventions were not used before 1933. " Instead, unilateral measures were adopted 
to counteract international economic double taxation of capital or income. Since that 
date however, the Dutch double tax convention network has been progressively 
expanded. It currently covers almost all EU member states (with the exception of 
Portugal), "' new independent Eastern European countries, Asian countries and major 
trading partners such as USA, Canada, Australia, China, India and Brazil. " 
2. NETBERLANDS CORPORATION INCOME TAX SYSTEM 
2.1 A Genuine Classical System? 
It is commonly mentioned in the literature that Netherlands corporation income 
tax system is built upon the classical system of taxation and, as a result, distributed 
profits are subject to two levels of taxation - at the company level and again at the 
shareholder level - without any relief for economic double taxation of dividend 
income. "' However, if we take into account the tax regime granted to corporate 
"The great financing problems confronting the Netherlands economy will have to be solved by a 
combination of se? f-financing and the attraction offoreign capital. The undersigned therefore believe that 
the opportunities for setf-financing must be expanded byfiscal measures". 
'0, See Law on Wealth Tax of 1892. 
401 Dutch double taxation conventions follow, as far as allowed by convention negotiations, the 
Dutch double taxation convention model recently published by the Ministry of Finance. This 
important step towards transparency of administrative tax measures or procedures should be 
carefully analysed by tax administrations of other EU member states. Notwithstanding the fact 
that tax administrations work on the basis of their own models, these documents are not disclosed 
and are merely used for internal purposes. Taking into account the relevance of the Dutch DTC 
model within the EU, a summary of its main features are included in appendix #at the end of this 
part. 
406 The first comprehensive tax convention concluded by the Netherlands was the tax convention of 
20 February 1933 with Belgium. 
407 Recently, negotiations have been held between Portuguese and Dutch tax officials. However, and 
at the present moment, negotiations have been suspended mainly due to disagreement in the field 
of inheritance and gift taxation (see Part 1, paragraph 1.3). 
408 See Table 3 at the end of this part. 
409 See Gerrit te Spenke, Taxation in the Netherlands, Kluwer, 1995. 
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shareholders (such as participation exemption and group taxation) and the increasing 
importance of company savings schemes and similar schemes available to individual 
shareholders, we may question if the classical view of taxation has not been 
progressively abandoned in favour of an exemption system which prevents economic 
double taxation of dividend income. 410 
Companies resident in the Netherlands are subject to a regressive system of 
taxation mainly to prevent tax avoidance devices which a progressive system may 
stimulate. "' Accordingly, companies with a taxable profit not exceeding NLG 100,000 
are charged at 40%. A 35% tax rate is levied on profits in excess of that lin-ýt. 412 
Example: 
Net Income (after Indirect Taxes) 
CT (40%) on NGL 100,000 






The corporation income tax rate structure currently in place in the Netherlands 
is at a competitive disadvantage if compared with corporation income tax rate 
structures of new EU member States such as Sweden and Finland. "' However,, it must 
be stressed that no local or municipal taxes are charged upon corporate income. As a 
consequence, the effective corporation income tax prevailing in the Netherlands still 
410 See, for instance, the investment institution concept which has been developed to avoid the 
economic double taxation of dividend income under the classical system. Those entities are 
subject to a zero rate corporation income tax. 
411 See, however, UK progressive system of taxation and respective anti-avoidance legislation aimed 
at preventing tax avoidance devices. 
412 See P. J. te Boekhorst, The Taxation of Companies in the Netherlands, IBFD, 1994 and Tax News 
Service, EBFD, 15 August 1994. See also Vpb. article 22. 
413 This analysis does not cover special tax incentives granted (or to be granted in the near future) by 
the Dutch goverment, mainly to reduce company's investment costs or to encourage specific 
policies (e. g. it is expected that a bill will be introduced allowing free depreciation of certain 
assets connected with environmental protection, high grade technological standing or used for 
research and development). 
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remains competitive if compared with member states such as Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg or Portugal. "' 
The Netherlands personal income tax system is based upon a progressive rate 
structure with three income brackets taxed at respectively, 37.65%, 50% and 60%. 415 
The first bracket consists of both personal income tax (at the rate of 6.15%) and 
general social security taxes (at the rate of 31.5%), "' while the other two consist solely 
of tax. No further social security taxes are levied in the 50% and 60% tax brackets. "' 
By integrating social security taxes with personal income taxes, the system solves the 
problem of economic double taxation of individual income and reduces substantially 
both corporate and individual tax burdens. "' Also, substantial administrative and 
compliance costs are saved as a result of an integrated personal income tax system. "' 
However, by subjecting all personal income to the 31.5% social security tax, including 
dividend income, the system ends up heavily taxing the distribution of profits (by 
comparison, neither in the LJK nor in Portugal is dividend income subject to social 
security taxes). 
Currently, the Dutch Ministry of Finance is undertaking a major tax reform 
with the aim of integrating indirect and direct taxes in line with its policy of 
improvement of business competitiveness, reduction of administrative costs associated 
with the running of different departments and facilitating the exchange of information 
within the overall tax system. "' 
414 See Table 4 at the end of this part. 
415 Under the Net Wealth Tax Act resident individuals (and non-resident individuals who own 
property in the Netherlands) are also liable for net wealth tax if their net wealth exceeds a certain 
amount. 
416 This tax relates to the general social security scheme. Further compulsory employee social 
security taxes should be taken into account (covering sickness, unemployment and disability 
benefits) but it is emphasised that they are deducted from the tax base. 
417 In 1995, a 37.65% tax rate applies on the first NGL 44,349 of taxable income, 50% upon income 
not exceeding 88,696 and 60% is charged on the excess. Again, simplicity and reduction of both 
public and private compliance costs have been the main aims embodied in the Dutch progressive 
income tax rate structure. 
418 The Oort Commission proposals led to a number of simplifications in the tax system. Oort 
introduced a combined rate for income and social security taxes and reduced the number of 
income tax brackets from nine to three (see Report from the Stevens Commission, "The Choice is 
Yours", 199 1). 
41 9 For a comparative analysis of the overall income tax and general social security burdens in the 
UK, Netherlands and Portugal, see Table 5 at the end of this part. 
420 See, for instance, replacement of the previous fiscal number by a common fiscal and social 
security number and administrative integration of direct, indirect and social security taxes 
departments. 
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Individual shareholders are liable for income tax on the gross dividend they 
receive without any relief for taxes paid at the company level (classical system). 
However, an exemption applies to the first NGL 1,000 (single person) received from 
Dutch resident companies. "' A further exemption of NGL 1,000 may be granted if 
dividend income derives from company savings schemes. "' No exemption is granted 
where dividend income is derived from foreign sources. Clearly, there is a direct 
incentive to invest in domestic companies and as a consequence, investment in foreign 
companies is discouraged. It may be questionable if this discriminatory treatment does 
not contradict fundamental principles embodied in the Treaty of Rome (e. g. principle 
of free movement of capital). 
Generally, dividend income paid by resident companies is also subject to a 
dividend withholding tax ("dividendbelasting") at the rate of 25%. 423 This tax is 
creditable or refundable for residents against their personal or corporate income tax. 
The anti-avoidance policy once again is playing its role in the Netherlands corporation 
tax system. By withholding at source (company level) at least, a minimum income tax 
revenue is immediately collected from dividend income paid by resident companies. 
At the international level a classical system is also in operation, mitigated by the 
use of the participation exemption or by the use of reduced or nil rates of withholding 
taxes charged upon dividend income... under double taxation conventions. In the 
absence of those conventions, unilateral relief may be granted to certain developing 
countries, as defined by Netherlands Ministry of Finance. 425 
Noting these underlying tax policies, the main distortionary tax features of the 
Netherlands classical system are next examined, as they affect flows of dividend 
income paid or received by Dutch companies or Dutch resident shareholders. As in 
previous sections, the focus will be on the tax treatment given to dividend income 
421 See Ministry of Finance, Taxation in the Netherlands, March 1994. With respect to shares in 
qualifying venture capital companies mentioned in a list issued by the Ministry of Finance, there 
is an additional maximum exemption of NGL 1,000 (single person) available for dividends 
received. 
422 See Moret Ernst & Young, Payroll Tax and Social Security 1995, January 1995. 
423 It may be reduced or eliminated under respectively, domestic provisions, double taxation 
conventions or the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. See Wet op de Dividendbelasting 1965, Art. 5. 
424 See Table 6 at the end of this part. 
425 See 1989 Unilateral Decree on Avoidance of Double Taxation with respective 1994 amendments 
and Table 7 at the end of this part. 
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derived from Portuguese and LJK sources and also to dividend income paid by Dutch 
companies to resident shareholders of those EU member states. 
2.2 Domestic Dimension 
a) Taxation of Corporate Shareholders 
Opting for an Exemption System 
The tax regime followed at corporate shareholder level aims to eliminate 
completely economic double taxation of dividend income. As a consequence, 
investment within the corporate sphere is not discouraged and greater neutrality is 
achieved when choosing between different forms of finance (e. g. debt and equity). An 
important feature of this regime is the participation exemption which ensures that 
corporation tax is levied only once on the profit obtained within a group. "' 
Accordingly, a company receiving either domestic or foreign dividends does not have 
to pay corporation tax on these dividends if tax has already been paid by the company 
distributing them. "' 
Notwithstanding a minimum share holding requisite of 5% before entitlement 
to the participation exemption arises, the system is designed to eliminate economic 
double taxation of corporate dividend income even in case the holding goes below the 
5%. "' In paragraph. 8 of article 13 of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act, the Dutch 
Nfinistry of Finance was given the authority to treat an ownership of shares not 
qualifying for the participation exemption under the provisions of the law as if it were a 
participation. The Nfinister of Finance has used this authority with respect to 
426 The participation exemption is granted to domestic corporate shareholders if the following 
conditions are met: 
Holding at least 5% of the nominal paid-up capital of the 
company paying the dividends; or 
2 Holding less than 5%, but ownership of the shares is part 
of the normal business conducted by the taxpayer, or the 
acquisition of the shares served a general interest; or 
3 Member of a co-operative; or 
4 Holding at least 5% of the share certificates in a Dutch- 
based mutual fund. 
The participation exemption does not apply to investment organisations, which may be subject to a 
0% corporation tax rate. See Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act 1969, Art. 13 and Art. 28. 
427 See Nfinistry of Finance, Taxation in the Netherlands, 1994 and HR 23 April 1958, BNB 
1958/179, HR 27 April 1960, BNB 1960/223. 
428 If the participation exemption applies, and provided that the shares on which the dividends are 
paid do not belong to the assets of a foreign permanent establishment, dividend income is also 
exempt from the standard 25% dividend withholding tax (see DB, Art. 492). 
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ownership of shares where such ownership is consistent with the normal conduct of the 
business of the taxpayer. 
429 
However, if these conditions cannot be fulfilled, distributed profits are subject 
not only to dividend withholding tax (25%) at the paying company level but also to 
corporation tax at the receiving company level. 430 Under these circumstances, a 
classical system comes into operation and only credit for the dividend tax withheld is 
granted to the corporate shareholder. This system applies only in exceptional 
circumstances, taking into account that almost all corporate shareholders qualify under 
the wide legal framework of the participation exemption (e. g. holdings of less than 5%, 
but ownership of the shares is part of the normal business conducted by the taxpayer, 
or the acquisition of the shares served a general interest). 
Contrary to the LJK experience but similar to the Portuguese 95% participation 
exemption, the Dutch tax system guarantees full neutrality between dividend income 
derived from domestic and foreign sources. Outward investment is not penalised by the 
tax system, although its aim primarily is to satisfy the principle of capital import 
neutrality. "' 
Elimination of both domestic and international economic double taxation of 
dividend income within the corporate sphere and the simplicity of the system) both 
present in an exemption system structure, lead to lower tax burdens and lower 
compliance tax costs (public and private). Other structures (e. g. imputation systems) 
demand extensive compliance costs not only from the taxpayer but also from tax 
authorities. For instance, an efficient tax administration must be in place (with all 
associated costs), able to audit and enforce the provisions regulating those structures. 
Group Taxation" 
A so-called 'fiscal unity' regime may be granted to a group of companies by the 
Nfinister of Finance once certain conditions are met, i. e. the parent company owns 99% 
429 See Frank van Brunschot and Stef van Weeghel, "The Participation Exemption, Participation 
Versus Portfolio Investment", European Taxation, 28(6), 1988. 
430 See Vpb, Art-8. 
431 Given the high nominal corporation tax rates operating in the Netherlands, the adoption of this 
principle assumes great relevance within the international context. 
432 Between 1940 and 1982, approximately 25 entities created according to foreign law were 
permitted to take part in fiscal unities. Among these were entities from the United States, UK, 
Netherlands Antilles, Belgium, Germany and France. In 1982 the policy was changed and no 
foreign entity was allowed to take part in a fiscal unity any longer. 
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of its subsidiaries,, the other shares do not entitle their holder to more than 1% of the 
company's distributed and retained profits, and all companies involved are resident in 
the Netherlands. "' Group taxation carries several tax advantages, such as elimination 
of economic double taxation of dividend income and offset of losses between 
companies of the same group. But it is limited to domestic groups. EU companies 
cannot qualify under the terms of this regime. "' Neutrality, efficiency and non- 
discrimination "' principles are given lower priority than enabling domestic groups to 
become more competitive within respectively, the EU market and other overseas 
markets. 
Difficult questions arise when analysing current corporate tax regimes within 
the EU: 436 Will it be possible to achieve a single market with this current discriminatory 
tax framework? Can member states continue to rely on protective measures to 
safeguard their public revenue aims at the expense of impairing the free flow of capital, 
services and persons within the EU? Answers to these or similar questions require 
concerted efforts and clear guidelines when implementing both residence and 
nationality tests in the tax field and for eliminating excessive financial burdens imposed 
upon companies and individuals. 
b) Taxation of Individual Shareholders 
1) The Dutch Classical System 
The Netherlands corporation tax system is based on the classical system which 
treats companies and shareholders as separate entities without relief for economic 
double taxation of dividend income. "' But, as noted above, this is no longer an 
adequate theoretical description of the system. With the aims of simplicity and 
reduction of compliance costs, "' the Dutch tax system opted for a classical system of 
433 See Vpb., articles 15 and 15a. 
434 See decision of the Supreme Court of 16 March 1994, Vakstudie-Nieuws, 14 April 1994, No. 7, 
at 1208. Notwithstanding the particular circumstances of this case, which decided whether a 
fiscal unity could exist between resident taxpayers being one of them incorporated under foreign 
law, it raises important questions in the context of the principle of non-discrimination. For 
instance, whether restrictions on the availability of certain exemptions or special regimes relating 
to legal form and place of residence cannot be taken as discriminatory either under DTCs or 
relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome (e. g. article 6 conjugated with articles 52 or 58). See 
also Supreme Court, 27 April 1994, Nos. 28.238,28.239,28.603 and 28.674. 
435 Feteris, M. W. C., in "Franse belastingwetgeving voor de bijL En nu de Nederlandse? " Weekblad 
voor Fiscaal Recht, 1986/5741,11 September 1986, argues that current Dutch fiscal unity regime 
violates article 52 of the Treaty of Rome and Dutch tax convention provisions. 
436 See also UK and Portuguese experiences. 
437 See Gerrit te Spenke, Taxation in the Netherlands, Kluwer, 1995, p. 63. 
438 See Belastingdienst, Annual reports of 1987 and 1993. 
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taxation which looks separately at companies and shareholders without attempting to 
integrate both systems of taxation. In addition, to prevent tax avoidance or evasion, a 
withholding tax has been levied at the rate of 25%, creditable against personal income 
tax. 
439 
Other objectives such as encouragement of investment and savings and 
improvement of competitiveness of the Dutch economy, have given rise to deviations 
from the simple and linear classical system, leading to mitigation of economic double 
taxation of dividend income received by individual shareholders. ' Indeed, it may be 
questionable whether by putting into operation company savings schemes or other 
similar measures, the system is not moving gradually away from the traditional classical 
system towards an exemption system that taxes distributed profits only once and at the 
company level. 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates Under The Classical System 
Assuming a nominal corporation income tax rate of 35%, personal dividend 
income effective tax rates under the Dutch classical system start at 59.4% for 
taxpayers taxed in the first income tax bracket and increase respectively to 67.5% and 
74% for taxpayers located in higher income tax bracketS. 441 Ffigh personal income tax 
rates, combined with the absence of measures to relieve economic double taxation, 
lead to high personal dividend income tax burdens and discourages distribution of 
profits to individual shareholders. 
439 See DB 1965, s. 62 1, Art. 1. 
440 See for instance current NGL 1,000 (single persons) exemption granted to individual 
shareholders or ftirther exemptions operating under the available comPanY savings schemes. 
441 Exempt entities are subject to an effective dividend income tax rate of 35%. 
165 
Income Tax and National Insurance Tax Ratesfor 1995 
% TouxlNutional InvuraHce 
................. 
Inconte Cumulative TaxNationat 
on Tax(ible Income 
........... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 
Bracket Income Insurance 
.......... .......... ...... ..... ............ ........... ............. ............. ............ .............. .. ......... ... ................. .............. .......... 
.... .... ... ..... .... N-G ....... ........ ......... ........ ....... -L ... NG NGL 
37.65% on the first 44,349 44,349 16,697 
50.00% on the next 44,347 88,696 38,870 
60.00% on the excess 
Personal allowances are also granted which amount to respectively, NGL 6,074 
(single allowance) and NGL 12,148 (married allowance). 
442 Source: Moret Ernst & Young, Payroll Tax and Social Security 1995, January 1995 . 
2) Taxation of Capital Gains 
In general, capital gains are not taxed in the Netherlands. "' The system does 
not discriminate against retention of profits which are only subject to one level of 
taxation, i. e. corporation income tax. "' Capital gains derived by non-resident 
shareholders are also not taxed. Neutrality is achieved not only domestically but also 
internationally. Moreover, neither domestic nor foreign investment carried on through 
retained profits is discouraged by the burden of economic double taxation of retained 
profits that results when capital gains are taxed. 
Individuals may nonetheless be subject to a 20% special income tax rate"' on 
capital gains, if the gain is derived from the sale of a'substantial interest' in a company 
resident in the Netherlands. "' Both resident and non-residents are covered by this 
tax . 
44' Notwithstanding the element of economic double taxation of retained profits, 
442 Following the recommendations of the Oort Commission, the number of tax brackets were 
reduced from nine to three. Subsequently, and to simplify further the personal income tax system, 
the Stevens Commission recommended a two-bracket income tax structure: the first bracket would 
extend to NGL 57,000 and the second bracket would be for all income in excess of NGL, 57,000. 
443 Capital gains realised by an investment institution - although with the benefit of tax deferral - 
will be taxed as income in the hands of the shareholder. 
444 See, for instance, the participation exemption regime and the tax exemption granted to capital 
gains derived by corporate shareholders. 
445 Capital gains constitute a separate category of taxable income (see also Portuguese experience). 
They are not taxed under a separate capital gains tax. The gains, provided and to the extent the 
income does not fall in the first rate bracket of NGL 44,349, are taxed at a flat rate of 20%. 
No such tax is levied if the shares are part of the equity of a non-resident company. 
447 See WEB, articles 39,40,41 and 57 (4). 
166 
domestic and foreign investors are treated equally as far as domestic investment is 
concerned. Discriminatory features can be traced only in the exemption granted to 
Dutch residents investing in foreign companies and deriving capital gains from the sale 
of foreign equity. A "substantial interest" exists when the taxpayer owns, either 
directly or indirectly, at least one-third of the shares of the company (alone or together 
with her/his family members in the first and second degree) and, in addition, more than 
7% of the nominal paid-in share capital (alone or together with his/her spouse). 
From 20 March 1991, this definition has been narrowed by the imposition of 
further conditions, such as exclusion of certain categories of shares. " Again, anti- 
avoidance aims have been guiding this regime and it is expected that further measures 
will be introduced mainly to bring under the tax umbrella untaxed capital gains. "' 
2.3 International Dimension 
a) Taxation of Companies 
At the international level, a classical system is in place but largely attenuated by 
the operation of the participation exemption. The tax system is designed with the aim 
of mitigating international economic double taxation of dividend income in order to 
enhance both domestic and international competitiveness of the Dutch economy. 
1) The Participation Exemption 
The same conditions as those that apply domestically must be met for a 
participation in a UK or Portuguese company. "' There are a few additional 
requirements, mainly introduced to prevent tax avoidance devices and transfer of tax 
revenue to other countries. The exemption is only granted if the subsidiary is subject to 
tax on profits in the source state. "' However, it is not essential that the tax due under 
the relevant tax legislation has been actually imposed or collected (e. g. tax holidays). "' 
The shareholding may not be a passive investment, i. e. an investment in shares without 
further commercial links between the shareholder and the foreign company. However, 
448 See Gerrit tc Spcnke, Taxation in the Netherlands, Kluwer, 1995. 
441 Information provided by Dutch tax authorities in March 1995. 
450 See paragraph 2.2, a), 1). 
451 Local taxes do not qualify under this concept of 'tax. 
452 See, for instance, tax treatment granted by The Netherlands to subsidiaries located in the offshore 
zone of Madeira. It is highly questionable if by denying the participation exemption regime to 
income derived from subsidiaries qualifying under the transitional more favourable tax regime 
operating in the zone, the Netherlands is not contradicting both its domestic and international tax 
policy without prejudice of the eventual consequences that may arise from the violation of 
ftindamental EU principles (e. g. non-discrimination principle). 
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if those links exist between the foreign subsidiary and the ultimate foreign parent 
company, Dutch intermediate holding companies can still take advantage of the 
participation exemption regime. "' As such, the anti-avoidance regime does not impair 
the establishment in the Netherlands of companies whose main aim is to manage the 
financial and business operations of multinational groups (e. g. channelling of dividends 
from subsidiary companies to foreign parent companies or holding shares in group 
companies in the interest of a major corporate group). "' 
Aside from specific anti-avoidance provisions ý@ aimed at certain EU member 
states (e. g. Madeira offshore zone), this regime guarantees both neutrality and 
efficiency within the EU. "' Taking into account that the regime is simple and 
transparent, private compliance costs are minimal. This important factor does not 
discourage foreign investors, especially small businesses, from expanding their 
operations into other EU markets. "' 
2) Implementing the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
Tax treatment granted by Dutch tax law to inward investment was already 
largely in accordance with the Directive. "' But to conform with the Directive's 
provisions, the participation exemption regime was amended to cover portfolio 
dividends, previously excluded from the regime, and also to accept the voting rights 
criteria used in certain DTCs (e. g. UK DTC). "' 
As far as outward investment is concerned, domestic regime was amended. A 
dividend withholding tax exemption.. was introduced when dividends are paid by 
See Resolution BNB 1975/11 of 15 October 1974. 
454 See also recently introduced IHCs legislation in the UK. 
455 See however, that withholding taxes charged in the source state (e. g. 25% withholding tax 
charged in Portugal) cannot be credited against Dutch corporation income tax liability. Also, they 
cannot be deducted as a business expense. 
Nonetheless and subject to specific conditions (e. g. a double taxation convention shall be in place, 
a minimum 25% of the nominal paid-up capital is required and a minimum 5% withholding tax 
shall be charged in the source state), from I January 1995, foreign withholding tax on dividends 
can be partially credited against Dutch withholding tax on those dividends upon redistribution 
(see Tax News Service, 6/2/95). 
456 See COM (94) 352 final, Brussels, 07.09.1994, Communication from the Commission, The 
European Observatory for SMEs, comments by the Commission on the Second Annual Report 
(1994). 
457 vide participation exemption regime described above. 
458 See Vpb. Art. 13g. 
459 See DB articles 4a and 4b. 
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Dutch companies to companies resident in other EU states in accordance with the 
conditions established in the Directive. " 
Problems Posed by the Excessive Use ofAnti-avoidance Provisions" 
It is not easy to design clear boundaries between legitimate and abusive anti- 
avoidance provisions. The latter may lead to discriminatory treatment and prevent the 
enforcement of EU legislation. It is an important topic, deserving special attention at 
the European level as well as at domestic levels. For instance, it is not clear what is the 
legality of recent positions taken by the Netherlands State Secretary of Finance as far 
as companies incorporated in the offshore zone of Madeira are concerned. " These 
companies have been excluded from the scope of the Directive on the grounds that 
they are not subject to one of the taxes mentioned in article 2 of the Directive. "' This 
reasoning is open to question if one argues that the general corporation income tax 
regime is in place but a temporary derogation, that has been agreed by the EC 
Commission, applies in order to promote investment in the islands. "' 
The conciliation of Directive's provisions with domestic tax policies is not an 
easy task, against a tax framework guided by unilateral or carefully planned tax 
concessions agreed under double taxation conventions. "' Ultimately, excessive use of 
460 The implementation of the Directive in the Netherlands led to the abolition of 25% dividend 
withholding tax which was charged when dividends were paid by Dutch subsidiaries to 
Portuguese parent companies. 
Also, the benefits of the implementation of the Directive in the Netherlands for UK parent 
companies satisfying the requisites of the Directive are visible. Dividend income flows now free 
of withholding tax taking into account that the 5% withholding tax agreed in the DTC (article 10 
paragraph 2, a)) no longer is levied by Dutch tax authorities. 
See recently agreed US DTC and tighter conditions imposed upon holding companies willing to 
take advantage of the benefits of the convention. See Andrew Jack and Ronald van de Krol, 
"Convention that may spark a Dutch exodus", Financial Times, 27 October 1993. 
112 See Announcement of the State Secretary of Finance of 28 July 1994, No. IFZ 94/830. 
463 Neither the participation exemption, nor the dividend withholding tax exemption, apply to these 
type of companies. 
464 Vide Dutch position in the field of so-called 'tax holidays' granted to encourage investment in less 
developed areas and low or nil effective tax rates operating in member states such as Germany, 
Ireland, Belgium or Italy, mainly granted to attract foreign investors. 
465 See recently agreed US convention and discriminatory tax treatment applying to Portuguese 
investors which end up penalised ultimately due to the absence of a DTC between Portugal and 
the Netherlands (see US/Netherlands DTC, article 26 (8) (h): 'Limitation of Benefits Clause). 
In accordance with the wording of this article, which attempts to limit the benefits of the 
convention to companies with a bonafide presence in the Netherlands, companies resident in the 
Netherlands are required to prove that they are at least 30% owned bY five or fewer companies 
resident there or at least 70% owned by five or less companies that are residents of the United 
States or other EU member states. The term EU member state is described in the convention as: 
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anti-avoidance provisions may not reconcile with the principle of eliminating economic 
double taxation by using the exemption method, because that should apply regardless 
of the level of tax in the source state. 
3) Tackling International Double Taxation 
a) The Residence Criteria 
The income of companies resident in the Netherlands is taxed on a worldwide 
basis. Residence is determined by the operation of two alternative tests- the 
incorporation test and 'actually situated' test. " The latter test is not easily defined in 
Dutch tax legislation. The most important factor in ascertaining where a company is 
'actually situated' is the place of the company's central management. However, other 
factors may help to ascertain its limits, such as the nature or location of business 
activities. Attention is also given to the relevant provisions of double taxation 
conventions relating to company's residence which prevail over domestic legislation. "' 
The Dutch tax system taxes resident companies on their worldwide income and 
provides relief for international double taxation of capital or income by using four 
methods: 
(1) The first method is the large list of double taxation conventions mentioned 
in Table 3 at the end of this part. Although the Dutch follow the classical 
system of taxation, and the form of article 23 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention,... in several double taxation conventions the exemption system 
is also used for special categories of income. "' 
(2) The second method is the use of an exemption system which applies to 
specific categories of income, namely dividend or capital gains income 
(participation exemption regime), income derived through a permanent 
the Netherlands; and 
any other Member State of the European Communities with which both states have 
in effect a comprehensive income tax convention. " 
As a result of this definition, Portugal is excluded from the benefits of the convention. It may be 
questioned if this tax treatment does not amount to a direct violation of the principle of non- 
discrimination. 
466 See Vpb., articles 2 and 7. 
467 See Vpb., article 2 (4), Vakstudie Nieuws 1992, at 3407 and decision of the Netherlands Supreme 
Court of 27 April 1994, No. 28,500 (BNB, 1994/208c). 
468 only withholding taxes charged upon dividend, interest or royalties income are credited against 
Dutch corporate or income tax liability. 
469 E. g. Dutch/UK DTC, article 22 (2), (b). 
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establishment, income from employment in another country and income 
from immovable property located in another country. 110 
(3) The third method consists in granting an unilateral tax credit for 
withholding taxes charged upon dividend, interest and royalties income. 
This credit is only given if those types of income derive from developing 
countries, as defined by the Dutch Ministry of Finance (see Table 7 at the 
end of this part). 
(4) The fourth method consists in deducting foreign taxes when computing 
company profits. 
471 
These methods are described below with the tax regimes applying to cross- 
border dividend income flows derived from the UK and Portugal. 
Towards More Integrated EU Corporation Tax Systems? 
b) How Portuguese and Dutch Corporation Tax Systems Interact 
Unless the participation exemption regime applies, foreign dividends are taxed 
on the basis of their gross amount, i. e. including any withholding tax paid in the source 
state. There is no double taxation convention between the Netherlands and Portugal. 
As a result, the role of both the Parent- Subsidiary Directive and unilateral relief 
provisions is Of considerable relevance. Broadly, it may be said that both countries 
follow the classical system at the international level. However, and notwithstanding 
their formal adherence to this system, both member states use domestic or double 
taxation convention provisions that eliminate or highly attenuate international 
economic double taxation of income. 
472 
Why a Double Taxation Convention Should be in Place Soon 
in the absence of a double taxation convention, dividend income paid by 
Portuguese companies is subject to a 25% withholding tax rate. However, this rate 
may be reduced either under the terms of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive or under the 
Madeira offshore zone regime respectively to 15% and 0%. In the Netherlands, 
dividend income paid by Portuguese companies may qualify under the participation 
exemption regime or under the unilateral tax credit relief, which in line with the 
470 See 1989 Unilateral Decree on Avoidance of Double Taxation with respective 1994 amendments. 
471 See Vpb., article 10 (d) and Resolution of 25 May 1989 No. IFZ 89/571. 
472 E. g. Portuguese 95% or 50% dividend income exemptions and Dutch participation exemption 
regime. 
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Ministry of Finance ruling (IFZ94-1434m) can only be extended until 1996. '-' Because 
of these limits, the need for re-opening double taxation convention negotiations is 
strong. 
Determining the Effective Dividend Income Tax Burden 
Example I (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Portuguese Company Dutch Compakr 
............ ................... Eff eaive Corporata. Tax Ro Dividend Income ELective - Tar Rate 
................ ...................... ................ ..................... ................. ...................... .......... 
. ................ ..... .................... ...... ..................................... artici 
Unilateral 6-on 
............................ ................. ........ ..... ...................... ........ 
113 
..... .................... ............................ ........................... ... ................... ...... ................. . ................................. ..... ............................... ......... ...................................................... ...................................... .......... ... ........ ... ........ . ....... .......................... . .......................... ..... ...................... . ................ ........ ......................... I ........... ............ I ............. ... I .......... - .... ........ ...................... ............. ....... ........... I ........................................................ ....................................... .......... 
Relief 
........................ - ... I .... I ........ I ........ ........... Company Profits (100) 
(CT + Municipal Tax) 38.8%(') 5 1%(2) 62%(3) 
Holding Companies (SGPS) 3 8.8%(4) 48% 60% 
Holding Companies Incorporated in the 
Offshore Zones of Madeira and Azores 0% 35%(5) 35% 
Notes: See Table 8 at the end of this part. 
(1) Distributed profits are further subject to a 15016 withholding tax in accordance with 
the maximum limit allowed by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and to 5yo 
inheritance and gift tax if the profits are distributed by a Sociedade Anonima (SA). 
(2) Dividend income is exempted in the Netherlands and it is assumed that no tax 
relie (credit or expense allowance) are granted either to dividend withholding tax 
or to inheritance and gift tax charged in Portugal. 
(3) It is assumed that the standard 25Yo withholding tax is charged in Portugal and tax 
relie is granted in the Netherlands both for dividend withholding tax, which is 
creditable against Dutch corporation income tax, 474 and inheritance and eift tax 
which qualifies as a deductible expense. 475 
(4) Profits distributed by holding companies or companies covered by the consolidation 
tax regime are not subject to the 5Yo inheritance and gift tax. 
(5) It is assumed in this numeric analysis that the participation exemption regime is 
denied to dividend income derivedfrom the offshore zone ofMadeira. 
An Uncertain Future 
The Netherlands corporation tax system is currently under strain, mainly due to 
recently introduced measures attempting to counteract tax avoidance schemes in the 
field of foreign investment and to improve public revenue performance in the 
473 See Table 7 at the end of this part. 
474 See Table 7 at the end of this part. 
475 See Vpb. article 10 (d) interpreted using the 'a contrario argument'. 
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international arena. "' Conflicting aims lead to uncertainty and discourage foreign 
investment in the country. It is unclear at this stage whether investment aims will be the 
primary guide in future tax developments or if, in the opposite direction, anti- 
avoidance aims will prevail mainly to safeguard public revenue interests. If the former 
prevails, the current hybrid classical system may eventually move to an exemption 
system. If the latter is chosen, the system will move backwards towards a genuine 
classical system. But, can this system survive under actual trade and financial 
circumstances? 
c) How UK and Dutch Corporation Tax Systems Interact 
Dividend income paid by UK companies to Dutch companies benefits from the 
special tax regime stipulated in the DTC agreed between the LJK and the Netherlands. 
Economic double taxation of dividend income is mitigated not only by the operation of 
the Dutch participation exemption regime but also by granting tax credits under the 
DTC... or by the extension to Dutch shareholders of UK imputation tax creditS. 478 As 
we have already seen, no domestic changes were introduced in the UK when 
implementing the Parent- Subsidiary Directive as the UK tax system does not charge 
any withholding tax upon dividend income. 
The Effects of Extending the UK Partial Imputation System 
As just noted, dividend income is not subject to withholding tax in the UK, 
except if the imputation credit is extended to a foreign shareholder (see 
UK/Netherlands DTC, article 10 (3)). In this case, either a 5% or 15% withholding tax 
is charged, depending whether the Dutch corporate shareholder meets the 10% voting 
rights test. "' If the minimum direct or indirect 10% voting rights test is complied with 
and other requisites are met (e. g. Netherlands company's shares must be quoted on a 
Netherlands stock exchange), a tax credit equal to one-half of the tax credit which 
would be available to a UK resident individual shareholder on the dividend is granted, 
subject to the above mentioned 5% retention. If the minimum 10% voting rights test 
does not apply, the tax credit granted is equal to the whole of the tax credit which 
476 It is currently perceived that the Netherlands is not getting a fair share of the international tax 
revenue and consequently measures should be taken to improve this situation (e. g. it is under 
discussion in the Nfinistry of Finance the possibility of withdraw the capital gains exemption 
currently granted to foreign investors). 
477 See UK/Netherlands DTC, article 22 (2) (c). 
478 See UK/Netherlands DTC, article 10 (3). 
479 See part 11 paragraph 2.3, a), 4). 
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would be available to a UK resident individual shareholder subject, however, to a 15% 
retention. 
Unless the participation exemption comes into operation, dividend income as 
increased by the imputed tax credit is taxed in the Netherlands but a tax credit is given 
for withholding taxes charged in the UK. "' The tax credit limit is established in article 
22 (2) (c) of UK/Netherlands DTC- 
"[T]he amount of this deduction shall be equal to the tax paid in the United 
Kingdom on these items of income, but shall not exceed the amount of the 
reduction which would be allowed if the items of income so included were 
the sole items of income which are exempt from Netherlands tax under the 
provisions of Netherlands law for the avoidance of double taxation" [the 
so-called 'ordinary credit method7. 
Determining the Effective Dividend Income Tax Burden 
Example 2 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Company Profits (100) %(3) 
Standard CT Rate (33%)(2) 28.4% 45.7 
Notes: See Table 9 at the end of this part. 
(1) It is assumed that the 10% voting rights test is also met in line with UK tax 
provisions. 
(2) It is assumed that a tax credit equal to one-haýf of the tax credit which would be 
available to a UK resident individual shareholder on the dividend is granted and a 
5% withholding tax is charged. See also Part 11, example I (the amount of dividend 
received by the Dutch corporate shareholder after operation of the tax credit and 
5% withholding tax charge equals 71.61). 
(3) It is assumed that dividend income is charged at a nominal corporation tax rate of 
35% and a tax credit is grantedfor the 15% withholding tax charged in the UK, 
which applies when the 10% voting rights test cannot be met. See also Part II, 
example 2. 
480 Dividend income qualifying under the participation exemption regime may benefit from the 
imputation tax credit. 
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A Better Deal Under the UK Tax System? 
d) The Dutch Corporate Investor perspective 
The operation of the UK corporation tax system in interaction with double 
taxation convention provisions leads to lower dividend income effective tax rates than 
those applying when dividends derive from Portuguese sources. Both the absence of 
withholding taxes on dividend income and the partial extension of imputation credits 
under the double taxation convention plus the lower corporation income tax rate 
applying in the LJK, places the UK corporation tax system well ahead of the 
Portuguese system in competitive terms. 
The absence of a DTC between Portugal and the Netherlands, the high 
dividend withholding taxes still charged in Portugal and the burden of additional taxes 
(e. g. municipal tax and inheritance and gift tax) increases substantially the tax burden 
of the Dutch investor, discouraging investment in the Portuguese market. With regard 
to the more favourable regime operating in the offshore zone of Madeira, the anti- 
avoidance policy currently followed in the Netherlands effectively offsets the benefits 
granted under that regime. 
It is hoped that these problems - namely, the absence of a double taxation 
convention and the tax position of companies incorporated in the offshore zone of 
Madeira - will be solved in the near future. Clearly, there are several outstanding 
issues, such as elimination of inheritance and gift tax charged upon dividend income 
and extension of the Dutch participation exemption regime at least to companies 
undertaking active commercial or industrial operations in the offshore zone of 
Madeira, that will require particular attention. 
e) The EU Investor Perspective 
Portuguese and UK Positions 
This paragraph aims to compare the tax burdens of cross-border dividends 
flowing within the three jurisdictions. For this purpose, two examples are used to 
illustrate payment of dividend income by a Portuguese or LJK subsidiary, through an 
intermediate Dutch subsidiary, to its ultimate Portuguese or UK parent company. 
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Example 3 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Portugal => The Netherlands => UK 
Net Dividend- 49 
VVIHT (0% / 5% / 15%)(') 
1 
51.0% 53.4% 58.3% 
Net Dividend Received by 
UK Parent Company: 49.0 46.6 41.7 
Notes: 
(1) In this analysis it is assumed that distributed profits are further subject to a 15% 
withholding tax in accordance with the maximum limit allowed by the Parent- 
Subsidiary Directive and to 5% inheritance and gift tax if the profits are distributed 
by a Sociedade Anonima (SA). 
(2) In this example, Dutch intermediate company is subject to the participation 
exemption regime. Taking into account that no double taxation convention is still in 
place between Portugal and the Netherlands, it is assumed that dividend income is 
exempted in the Netherlands without any tax reliefs (credit or expense allowance) 
granted either to dividend withholding tax or to inheritance and gift tax charged in 
Portugal. 481 
(3) See Parent-Subsidiary Directive (0% WHT rate) and UKIDutch DTC, article 10 (2), 
(a) and (h). 
481 It may be questioned whether the credit facility (which has been in place since January 1995 and 
enables offsetting, within certain limits, of foreign withholding taxes against Dutch dividend 
withholding tax (or reduced withholding tax rates agreed under DTCs)) applies to dividends paid 
by Portuguese subsidiaries since there is no double tax convention between the Netherlands and 
Portugal and the credit facility regime does not refer to the Parent- Subsidiary Directive. 
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Example 4 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
UK --:: > The Netherlands --=; > Portugal 
Net Dividend- 71.6 
"T (0% / 25%)(3) 
1 
28.4% 46.3% 
Net Dividend Received by 
71.2 53.7 Portuguese Parent Company: 
I 
Notes: 
(1) It is assumed that the 10% voting rights test is met in line with UK tax provisions 
and that a tax credit equal to one-half of the tax credit which would be available to 
a UK resident individual shareholder on the dividend is granted In these 
circumstances, a 5% withholding tax applies. 482 
(2) The Dutch intermediate company is subject to the participation exemption regime. 
Again, it is questionable if the 5% tax withheld in the UK may be creditable against 
the 25% withholding tax charged when dividends are redistributed to the 
Portuguese parent company. In this analysis, it is assumed that this facility is 
prevented 
(3) In the absence of a DTC and assuming that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive is not 
applicable, the standard 25% WHT rate comes into operation. 
Conclusions 
At the domestic level, the wide scope of the participation exemption regime 
exempting both dividend income and capital gains and also the group taxation regime 
lead to complete elimination of economic double taxation at the corporate level. In 
effect, the classical system at the individual shareholder level is abandoned in favour of 
an exemption system of taxation. An exemption system comes also into operation by 
the extension of the participation exemption regime to dividend income remitted by 
foreign sources. This regime, combining with foreign tax reliefs, such as partial 
imputation credits granted under the UK/Dutch DTC, not only eliminates fully 
482 See Table 9 at the end of this part. 
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international economic double taxation of dividend income but also reduces the 
standard effective corporation tax burden operating in the source state (e. g. reduction 
from the standard 33% UK corporation tax rate to 28.4%). QB 
The interplay of the Dutch exemption system and the UK partial imputation 
system may give better returns to foreign investors than those obtained under a 
common international system of taxation (for example, where both member states 
adopt partial imputation systems or classical systems). Furthermore, the 
implementation of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive in the Netherlands has led to the 
abolition of dividend withholding taxes once the criteria stipulated in the Directive is 
met. 
However, for the Portuguese corporate investor, the flaws derived from the 
operation of a classical system are worth noticing. While the Netherlands has no DTC 
with Portugal, "' a transitional unilateral tax credit relief is granted which merely 
attenuates the increased international tax burden that is a consequence of unrelieved 
corporation income tax (IRC) and additional taxes (e. g. municipal tax and inheritance 
and gift tax). If the Parent- Subsidiary regime is not applicable (or even if it is 
applicable but its scope is limited by Dutch anti-avoidance provisions), a high 
withholding tax is charged, discouraging distributions of profits to Portuguese resident 
companies. 
b) Taxation of Individual Shareholders 
1) The Advantages of a more EU Integrated Tax System 
Foreign dividend income paid to Dutch resident individual shareholders is 
subject to the same regime as that applying to domestic dividend income. However, 
dividend income exemptions granted to individual shareholders either under the general 
income tax provisions or under company savings schemes are not extended to dividend 
483 The advantages offered by the Dutch tax system to intermediate holding companies (e. g. in 
general, those companies were able to freely 'cross-credit' foreign taxes without further 
restrictions such as 'per country limitation' or 'source of income limitation' (see Gloria Teixeira, 
Prof. David Williams, "The impact of the Unilateral Tax Credit in the US, UK and other tax 
systems", Intertax, 1995/11) have been recently deleted in an amendment made to the 1989 
Unilateral Decree on Avoidance of Double Taxation. From 1 January 1995, the exemption regime 
will be applied on a 'per country' basis. 
484 See Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, March 1992, p. 206. The Committee urges Member States not only to 
conclude DTCS where none exist between them, but also to complete those where their coverage 
is limited. 
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income derived from foreign sources. It may be questioned if the denial of these tax 
exemptions constitutes a discriminatory measure against other EU investors. 
At the international level, a classical system is in operation mitigated in the 
special case of the UK, by the partial extension of imputation tax credits to individual 
Dutch shareholders. Therefore, withholding taxes may be creditable against individual 
income tax liability only under the provisions of a DTC, or if applicable, under the 
unilateral tax credit relief 
Portuguese and UK Positions 
By placing side by side Portuguese and UK tax jurisdictions,, it is possible to 
select the more favourable location for investment when undertaken by a Dutch 
resident individual shareholder. Also, it is possible to evidence the main distortionary 
features of the Dutch tax system when taxing individual income derived from other EU 
sources. 
Example 5 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
Portugal =:; ý The Netherlands: Divided Income Effective Tax Rate 
Gross Distributed Profit (100) 








See Table 10 at the end of this part. 
It is assumed that a 38.8% effective corporation tax is charged and in the absence 
of a double taxation convention between Portugal and the Netherlands, dividend 
income is further subject to the standard domestic 25% WHT rate. The 5% 
inheritance and gift tax charge is also included in this numeric analysis. 
In line with the classical system and taking also into account the transitional 
unilateral tax relief granted by Dutch tax authorities, both dividend income and 
withholding tax charged in the source state are added and subject to the 
progressive individual income tax rate structure. However, a tax credit is given for 
the withholding tax charged upon dividend income in the source state. 
The inheritance and gift tax is accepted as a deductible expense. 485 
485 See article 3 of the Dutch Individual Income Tax Law. 
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Example 6 (Financial Year 1995 Tax Rates) 
UK =;: ý The Netherlands: Divided Income Effective Tax Rate 
Gross Distributed Profit (100) 37.65% 50.00% 60.00% 
Effective Tax Rate: 28.8%(') 47.8% 58.0% 66.5% 
Notes: 
See Table II at the end of this part. 
It is assumed that a tax credit is granted to the Dutch individual shareholder, equal 
to the whole of the tax credit which would be available to a UK resident individual 
shareholder subject however to a 15% withholding tax. 486 
2) Main Findings 
The Distortionary Aspects of Source and Residence State Taxation 
Both source (Portugal) and residence states (the Netherlands) have 
distortionary features which contribute to increase substantially individual shareholders 
dividend income effective tax rates. Example 5 above shows that those rates are 
substantially higher than those applying to domestic dividend income, mainly due to the 
high tax burden operating in the source state (Portugal) and the use of a classical 
system in the residence state (the Netherlands). The higher Portuguese corporation 
income tax rate and additional taxes (e. g. municipal tax and inheritance and gift tax) in 
combination with a classical system of taxation which merely grants relief for 
withholding taxes charged in the source state leads to higher tax rates and discourages 
investment in the Portuguese markets. 
Example 6 shows that the flaws of the Dutch classical system are highly 
attenuated by the source state tax regime (UK) which extends beyond domestic 
borders its partial imputation system of taxation. As a result, lower dividend income 
effective tax rates come into operation, prevailing even over domestic dividend income 
effective tax rates which stand at higher levels of respectively, 59.4% for taxpayers 
taxed in the first income tax bracket, increasing to 67.5% and 74% for taxpayers 
located in higher income tax brackets. 
486 See Part 11, example 2. 
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A Revenue Balance Between Convention PaMes? 
This shows that the interaction of the Portuguese and Dutch systems leads to 
high effective tax rates on dividend income. Both source and residence states collect 
considerable potential ratios of revenue taking into account not only the high 
withholding tax charged in the source state (Portugal) but also the high marginal 
income tax rates charged in the residence state (the Netherlands). In these 
circumstances, revenue aims win by large, discouraging the free flow of capital within 
the EU. 
A different balance is achieved by the interplay of the UK partial imputation 
system with the Dutch classical system. Here, a Dutch investor's position is 
safeguarded at the expense of the UK treasury. Indeed, the combination of a low UK 
effective tax rate with high marginal Dutch income tax rates operating under a genuine 
classical system, enables the Dutch treasury to collect most of the tax revenue. 
Dutch Investor Choice 
Taking into account only tax factors, investing in UK sources is more beneficial 
to the Dutch investor than to invest in Portuguese sources. The low LJK corporation 
income tax, the absence of withholding taxes or other additional tax charges and the 
extension of imputation tax credits to Dutch individual shareholders, places the UK 
amongst the most attractive locations for Dutch investment. 
3. THE TAX TREATMENT OF EQUITY AND DEBT 
Along with the Portuguese and UK tax systems, the Dutch tax system favours 
debt finance... and penalises equity finance by charging distributed profits twice, first at 
the company level and again at the shareholder level. Retained profits are only subject 
to taxation at the company level. "' The tax distortions ansing from treating equity and 
debt finance in this way are reduced by the tax exemption granted to capital gains. 
However, the problem of economic double taxation of distributed profits still persists 
481 According to Dutch corporation income tax law, interest payments are deductible as business 
expenses. Moreover, deductibility of interest income is not formally limited by any debt-equity 
ratio. However, a number of Dutch Supreme Court decisions have imposed limits to that 
deductibility by recharacterising loans as equity (e. g. Hoge Raad, 27 January 1988, BNB 
1988/217). 
488 The Netherlands found after a 1980 debate in Parliament that the administrative costs associated 
with the imposition of a capital gains tax would be too high in relation to the revenue yield. There 
would be too many technical complications and it would have disadvantageous economic and 
financial effects. 
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in the Dutch tax system. By exempting both domestically and internationally interest 
income from withholding taxes, and simultaneously imposing high dividend income 
withholding taxes (domestically and also under the provisions of DTCs), a clear 
incentive is given to finance investment through loans. Tax inefficiencies and inequities 
arise from granting different tax treatments to these two types of finance, namely a 
high proportion of banking and financial institutions in the overall economy and poor 
manufacturing performance. "' 
4. A VIEW INTO THE FUTURE 
The long term aim of the Dutch tax system has been a compromise between 
revenue needs and the aim of encouraging simultaneously inward and outward 
investment. Notwithstanding the use of a classical system of taxation, measures were 
introduced mainly directed towards elimination of economic double taxation. The 
expanding list of double taxation conventions or the use of unilateral tax credits 
granted to developing countries contributes to mitigate the penalising effects of a 
classical system of taxation. "' But discriminatory features are still in place, weakening 
scope for the achievement of important aims embodied in the Treaty of Rome. 
Future Developments 
The Dutch Ministry of Finance is currently considering a reduction of the 
higher corporation income tax rate (40%) in order to enable Dutch companies to 
compete within the international market . 
49' The nominal corporation income tax rate 
charged in the Netherlands remains high if compared with those operating in Finland, 
Sweden or UK. But revenue pressures have been preventing so far a reduction of the 
corporation tax rate. Following its anti-avoidance policy, the Dutch Ministry of 
Finance is currently analysing the possibility of taxing capital gains. If introduced, this 
measure may lead to some capital migration to other jurisdictions offering a better tax 
environment. The dilemma is that an excessive use of anti-avoidance provisions may 
jeopardise important aims such as encouragement of inward or outward investment. 
These aims have been implemented from early stages in Dutch fiscal history. Even 
489 This extreme position conflicts with EU aims of improvement of industry competitiveness, 
especially the need to support small and medium businesses (see EC Commission White Paper, 
Growth, Competitiveness, Employment, The Challenges and ways Forward into the 2.1st Century, 
1993). 
490 See Tables 3 and 7 at the end of this part. 
491 See current trend of reduction of corporation income tax rates not only within the EU (e. g. 
Sweden) but also in Asian countries (e. g. Thailand). 
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during recessionary times they prevailed over public revenue demands. But will this 
path continue to be followed in the Netherlands during the next century? 
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Table I 
Inward and Outward Direct Investment 
- The Netherlands 
Ouhvard Direct Investment (US$ Billion) 
.... .......... .............. . 
.......... 
....... ....... 
..... ....... ......... .... ....... - ...... 
3.91 3.47 10.08 
Inivard Direct Investment (US$ Billion) 
........... ..... .................. ......... XXX. X.: ::............... .......................... . ......................... ................ .......... 
........ ............... ................. .............. .... ..................... ..... .......... ......... ........ 
980 
........................... .......... .................. 
........ .............. ............................ ......... .............. ................ I ............. ............. ........ ... 
............. ........... ........... ............ ......... ..... .......... :. - : J. 85 '98'' 
"1 ... ... 
. ..... ........... 
............................... 
....................... .... ... ...................... .. ............. ...................... 
1.99 0.62 5.84 
Source: OECD, Taxing Profits in a Global Economy, 
Domestic and International Issues, Paris, 199 1. 
Table 2 
Investment Flows in The Netherlands 
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Table 3 
Current Double Tax Conventions 
coup try natur Entr into Y Force 
Australia 17/3/76 27/9/76 
Austria 1/9/70 21/4/71 
Bangladesh 13/7/93 8/6/94 
Belgium 19/10/70 1/10/71 
Brazil 8/3/90 20/11/91 
Bulgaria 6/7/90 11/5/94 
Canada 27/5/86 21/8/87 
China 13/5/87 5/3/88 
Czechoslovakia 4/3/74 5/11/74 
Denmark 20/2/57 29/l/58 
Finland 13/3/70 10/5/71 
France 16/3/73 29/3/74 
Germany 16/6/59 18/9/60 
Greece 16/7/81 17/7/84 
Hungary 5/6/86 25/9/87 
India 30/7/88 21/1/89 
Indonesia 5/3/73 2/12/74 
Ireland 11/2/69 12/5/70 
Israel 2/7/73 9/9/74 
Italy 8/5/90 3/10/93 
Japan 3/3/70 23/10/70 
Latvia 14/3/94 29/l/95 
Korea (Republic of) 25/10/78 17/4/81 
Luxembourg 8/5/68 20/10/69 
Malaysia 7/3/88 2/2/89 
Malta 18/5/77 9/11/77 
Mexico 27/9/93 13/10/94 
Morocco 12/8/77 10/6/87 
Netherlands Antilles 28/10/64 l/l/65 
5/12/85 l/l/86 
12/12/85 l/l/86 
New Zealand 15/10/80 18/3/81 
Nigeria 11/12/91 9/12/92 
Norway 12/1/90 31/12/90 
Pakistan 24/3/82 4/10/82 
Philippines 9/3/89 20/9/91 
Poland 20/9/79 7/11/81 
Romania 27/3/79 5/12/80 
Singapore 19/2/71 31/8/71 
South Affica 15/3/71 3/2/72 
Soviet Union 21/11/86 27/9/87 
Spain 16/6/71 20/9/72 
Sri Lanka 17/11/82 24/1/84 
Surinam 25/11/75 13/4/77 
Sweden 18/6/91 12/8/92 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Current Double Tax Conventions 
Country Date of ature Entry into orce 
_ 
Switzerland 12/11/51 9/l/52 
Thailand 11/9/75 9/6/76 
Turkey 27/3/86 30/9/88 
United Kingdom 7/11/80 6/4/81 
United States 18/12/92 31/12/93 
Venezuela 29/5/91 --- 
Yugoslavia 22/2/82 6/2/83 
Zambia 19/12/77 9/11/82 
Zimbabwe 18/5/89 21/4/91 
Source: Gloria Teixeira (ed. ), Business Taxation in the EU, chapter 13, Wiley Chancery, 1995, 
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Table 4 
EU Effective Corporation 
















Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, Corporate and Withholding Tax 
Rates, International Tax and Business Guide, 1994 edition. 
Notes: 
The effective tax rate takes into account not only the basic rate but also additional 
taxes on income, including local taxes and both national and local surtaxes. It also 
generally takes into account whether any of these taxes are deductible for corporate 
income tax purposes. 
1995 Corporate tax rate. 
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Table 5 
Income Tax and Social Security Tax Burdens 
Portugal, UK and Netherlands 
Income Tax rates 1 15 25 35 40 1 20 25 40 1 6.1 50 60 
Social Security Tax Rates 
Employer 
Employee 
Taxes as a Proportion of 
Total Cost to the Employer 
23.2 10.2** --- 
11.0 9.0 31.5 
39.9 48 56 60 1 39.2 44.2 59.2 1 37.6 50 60 
Notes: 
It is assumed that the general regime applies. 
Maximum rate is charged 
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Table 6 
DTCs Dividend Withholding Taxes 
Netherlands (1994) 
country, Taxes Clo) 
Below 2SOlo Owners*i P , Above 25% Ownership 
Aruba 15 7.5 
Australia 15 15 
Austria 15 5 
Belgium 15 5 
Brazil 15 15 
Canada 15 10 
China 10 10 
Czech Republic 10 0 
Denmark 15 0 
Finland 15 0 
France 15 5 
Germany 15 10 
Greece 15 5 
Hungary 15 5 
India 15 15 
Indonesia 20 0 
Ireland 15 0 
Israel 15 5 
Italy 15 5 
Japan 15 5 
Korea (Republic of) 15 10 
Luxembourg 15 2.5 
Malawi 25 25 
Malaysia 15 0 
Malta 15 5 
Morocco 25 10 
Netherlands Antilles 15 7.5 
New Zealand 15 15 
Nigeria 15 12.5 
Norway 15 0 
Pakistan 20 10 
Philippines 15 10 
Poland 15 0 
Romania 15 10 
Singapore 15 0 
Slovakia 10 0 
South Africa 15 5 
Soviet Union 15 15 
Spain 15 5 
SriLanka 15 10 
Surinam 20 7.5 
Sweden 15 0 
Switzerland 15 0 
Thailand 25 5 
Turkey 20 5 
United Kingdom 15 5 
United States 15 5 
Yugoslavia 15 5 
Zambia 15 5 
Zimbabwe 20 10 
Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, Corporate and Withholding I dx 




List of Developing Countyies 
(1995) 
Afghanistan Albania Algeria 
Angola Antigua and Barbuda Belau 
Belize Benin Bhutan 
Bolivia Botswana Burkma-Faso 
Burundi Cambodia Cameroon 
Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad 
Chile Colombia Comoros 
Congo Costa Rica Cuba 
Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic 
Ecuador Egypt El Salvador 
Eritrea Ethiopia Fiji 
Gabon Gambia Ghana 
Grenada Guatemala Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau Equatorial-Gumea Guyana 
Haiti Honduras Iraq 
Iran Ivory Coast Jamaica 
Jordan Kenya Kiribati 
Laos Lesotho Lebanon 
Liberia Madagascar Maldives 
Mali Marshall Islands Mauritania 
Mauritius Micronesia Mongolia 
Mozambique Myanmar Nan-tibia 
Nepal Nicaragua Niger 
Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay 
Peru Rwanda Saint Kitts-Nevis 
Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Solomon Islands 
Sdo Tom6 e Principe Senegal Sierra Leone 
Sudan Somalia Swaziland 
Syria Tanzania Togo 
Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia 
Tuvalu Uganda Uruguay 
Vanuatu Venezuela Vietnam 
Yemen Western Samoa Zaire 
Source: NEnisterie Van Financen, Directie Intemationale Fiscale Zaken, 23 December 
1994 (IFZ94-1434m). 
Note: 
Argentina, Portugal and the Seychelles still qualify as developing countries 
during 1995 and 1996 
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Table 8 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
Portuguese Company =;: ý Dutch Corporate Shareholder 
Portugal 
Profit Before Taxes 
Corporation Income Tax 













Dividend Before Tax 
Tax Paid 
Dividend After Tax 

















































Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
UK Company =; >Dutch Corporate Shareholder 
UK 
Profit Before Taxes 
Corporation Income Tax 
Profit After Taxes 
Gross Dividend 
Tax Credit on Dividend 
Abatement 
Net Dividend Paid to the 
Netherlands 
Net UK Refund 





Total Tax Burden 
Dividend Before Tax 
Tax Paid 
Dividend After Tax 






































Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
Portuguese Company =;: ý Dutch Individual Shareholder 
Portugal 
(Company) 
Profit Before Taxes 100 100 100 
Tax (IRC) 38.8% 38.8 38.8% 38.8 38.8% 38.8 
Profit After Taxes 61.2 61.2 61.2 
Gross Dividend 61.2 61.2 61.2 
Withholding Tax 25% 15.3 25% 15.3 25% 15.3 
Inheritance Tax 5% 3.06 5% 3.06 5% 3.06 
Net Dividend Paid to the 
Netherlands 42.84 42.84 42.84 
Netherlands 
(Shareholder) 
Gross Dividend 61.20 61.20 61.20 
Deductible Expense 3.06 3.06 3.06 
Taxable Dividend 58.14 58.14 58.14 
Income & Soc. Sec. Tax 37.65% 21.89 50% 29.07 60% 34.88 
Tax Credit 25% -15.3 25% -15.3 25% -15.3 
Total Tax 6.59 13.77 19.58 
Dividend Before Tax 42.84 42.84 42.84 
Tax Paid 6.59 13.77 19.58 
Dividend After Tax 36.25 29.07 23.26 
Total Tax Burden 63.7% 70.9% 76.7% 
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Table 11 
Dividend Income Effective Tax Rates 
UK Company => Dutch Individual Shareholder 
UK 
(Company) 
Profit Before Taxes 
Corporation Tax 
Profit After Taxes 
Gross Dividend 
Tax Credit on Dividend 
UK Inc. Tax + Tax Credit 
Net Dividend Paid to the 
Netherlands 











Gross DiVidend 83.75 
Income & Soc. Sec. Tax 37.65% 31.53 
Tax Credit 12.56 
Total Tax 18.97 
Dividend After Tax 






































The Netherlands Model Convention is based on the 1977 OECD Model Double 
Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital. However, some changes and additions 
have been made by the Netherlands. 
In the paragraphs below, the main divergences from the OECD Model will be 
critically analysed, within the specific taxation policy framework followed by Dutch tax 
authofities. 
2. THE NEED TO ABOLISH WITHHOLDING TAXES 
The Netherlands has an open economy guided by a policy of avoiding obstacles 
to international flows of goods and capital. To achieve this policy withholding taxes on 
dividends, interest and royalties should be as low as possible. As a result, there are no 
withholding taxes on interest and royalties in the Netherlands. 
3. ACHIEVING CAPITAL IMPORT NEUTRALITY 
Netherlands tries to implement the principle of capital import neutrality. 
income or capital shall only be subject to tax in the source state without further tax 
burdens imposed in the residence state. To implement that policy aim, a participation 
exemption regime is in place, exempting all benefits derived by a Dutch parent 
company from a foreign subsidiary. A similar approach applies to profits of a foreign 
permanent establishment of a Dutch resident company which are also exempt from tax 
in the Netherlands. 
4. THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM DEBT-CLAIMS 
There is a departure ffom the OECD definition given to this type of income and 
as a result, a different tax treatment is granted to debt-claims under the Netherlands 
Model Convention. 
In the OECD Model Convention this income is regarded as interest and 
therefore placed in article 11, paragraph 3. Differently, in the Netherlands Model 
Convention income from debt-claims is treated as dividend income and therefore 
subject (if applicable) to withholding tax (see article 10 paragraph 6). 
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5. CAPITAL GAINS EXENIPTION AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE 
POLICY 
In order to prevent tax avoidance devices, a further paragraph was included in 
the Netherlands Model Convention (article 13 paragraph 5). 
Accordingly, in case of alienation of a substantial participation in the shares of 
a company by an individual within a certain period after emigration of that shareholder 
from the state in which the company is resident, the right to tax the gains is given to 
that state. 
6. FINAL REMARKS 
Other changes have been introduced in the Netherlands Model Convention 
mainly covering employment income and income derived from pensions schemes. 
However., it is beyond the scope of this work to analyse them. For further analysis, see 
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TOWARDS A EU CORPORATION TAX SYSTEM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Historic Overview 
Throughout its four decades of existence, the European Union (and the EC 
before it) has devoted considerable attention to fiscal questions. Initial efforts and 
studies were concentrated on indirect taxation, and in particular, turnover tax. The 
harmonisation of indirect taxes and excise duties was given high priority in order to 
enable the free movement of goods within the European market. Direct taxation, in 
historical terms, was not of major importance in this context. It now is. So it was also 
inevitable that the European Commission would also begin to study the economic 
effects of direct taxation, especially taxes affecting capital movements. A brief resume 
of how this came about will help focus the European context of the issues that emerge 
from the above comparative analysis. 
The Neumark Report 
The first comprehensive tax study was undertaken as early as 1960 by a 
committee of fiscal and financial experts under the chairmanship of Professor Fritz 
Neumark. This study covered both direct and indirect taxes and made a number of far- 
reaching recommendations, giving particular weight to tax transparency and 
simplification of tax structures. "' In the field of direct taxation, it proposed a single 
general individual income tax with a common structure and a uniform definition of 
taxable income and advised harmonisation of capital gains taxation. It recommended a 
separate and more closely harmonised corporation income tax integrated with the 
individual income tax as far as distributed profits were concerned. It defended that 
corporation tax systems should be harmonised along the lines of a split-rate system 
with a lower rate of tax charged on distributed profits. Interest payments and dividends 
were to be subject to a common system of withholding tax, accompanied by a tax 
credit. Distributions to another EC company should, however, be free of withholding 
tax. Finally, it advised that double taxation conventions should be harmonised or 
replaced by a multilateral convention. 
See The EEC Reports on Tax Hannonisation, IIBFD, 1963. 
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The Segrj Report 
Following the adoption in 1960 and 1962 of Council Directives abolishing 
exchange restrictions on certain types of transactions, "' it became apparent that the 
free movement of capital raised serious issues. A group of experts headed by Professor 
Claudio Segre was then asked to study what needed to be done to establish a common 
European capital market and what its consequences would be for the Member States. 
This was a focused exercise, and its main recommendations can be briefly summarised 
as follows: 
elimination of double taxation of investments undertaken by individuals, by 
adopting multilateral arrangements or parallel national measures; 
elimination of tax barriers to investment carried on through intermediaries; 
fiscal transparency which could require the adoption of a multilateral 
double tax convention and, 
extension (or refunds) of tax credits granted to domestic shareholders to 
foreign shareholders. "' 
Again, the assumption was that achievement of free movement involved 
changes to the direct taxation methods employed in and between member states. 
The Commission Programme 
In February 1967 the Commission, accepting the same underlying approach, 
submitted to the Council a tax harmonisation programme containing measures relating 
mainly to direct taxation which were necessary for the establishment or functioning of 
the common market. "' The most urgent measures were seen as the elimination of 
obstacles to movements of capital (for instance, double taxation of dividends and 
interest) and to the restructuring or concentration of companies within the Community 
(improved tax treatment of the parent-subsidiary relationship, cross-border mergers), 
and the achievement of equal competitive conditions in relation to investments (it 
suggested a single corporate tax system, with similar rates and base). "' 
493 First Council Directive for the implementation of Art. 67 of the Treaty of Rome, OJ 1960,921; 
Second Council Directive 63/21 of 18 December 1962 adding to and amending the First 
Directive, OJ 1963,62. 
494 Vide The Development of a European Capital Market, EEC Commission, Brussels, 1966. 
495 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/1967. 
496 The Commission presented also to an internal working group a pre-draft for a 'European Double 
Taxation Convention' (Document 11.414/MV/68 of 1.7.1968). However, this draft was never 
published and after being discussed among the former 6 Member States was filed and closed. 
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In January 1969, the Commission submitted to the Council draft directives on 
cross-border mergers (COM (69) 5 final) and on taxation of parent and subsidiaries 
companies (COM (69) 6 final). Lack of political will and subsequent economic 
stagnation prevented further moves, and it was only twenty years later that these 
matters were brought again into the Community's policy agenda. 
The Van den Tempel Report 
In 1970, a study of corporation and individual income taxes in the Community 
was commissioned. This report identified three EC corporation tax systems- the 
classical system, the split-rate system and the imputation or tax-credit system. The 
committee recommended the adoption of a classical system in the Community. It 
argued that not only was a classical system simpler to administer but also it offered the 
possibility of achieving both capital export and import neutrality. "' Subsequent 
developments and the desire to find an appropriate way of avoiding economic double 
taxation of dividend income meant that this report, in effect, took matters no further 
forward. 
The Commission's VieW-" 
Following its announcement in the 1975 Action Programme, the Commission 
submitted to the Council on I August 1975 a proposal for a Directive concerning the 
harmonisation of systems of company taxation and of withholding taxes on 
dividends. "' It provided for a common partial imputation system under which 
Community shareholders would receive a (reimbursable) tax credit, and a narrow band 
of rates was set for both the tax and the credit (departing from 45 to 55%). At the 
same time, it was also proposed that all Member States should levy a 25% withholding 
tax on the dividends distributed by their resident companies, unless the identity of the 
recipient was known to the tax authorities. However, the European Parliament refused 
to give a final opinion until the Commission produced proposals to harmonise the 
corporate tax base. It argued that the harmonisation of the rates of corporation income 
tax and tax credits must take place in parallel with the gradual harmonisation of the 
systems for assessing companies 'taxable profitS. 500 Subsequently, the Commission's 
497 A. J. van den Tempel, Corporation Tax and Individual Income Tax in the European Communities, 
EC Commission (Studies, Competition - Approximation of Legislation Series no. 15) 1970. 
498 Vide Action Programmefor Taxation, Commission of the European Communities, COM (75) 391 
final of 23 July 1975. 
499 OJ 1975, C253/2. 
500 See Harmonisation of systems of company taxation and of withholding taxes on dividends, 
interim report of the EP drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetaxy Affairs 
(Doc 104 of 2.5.1979). 
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proposal was withdrawn, according to a Communication from the EC Commission 
dated 29 April 1990. At the same time, the Commission announced the establishment 
of a committee of independent experts, the Ruding committee, which would discuss 
further developments in the field of company taxation. 
The Ruding Report 
Following its 'Communication on the Guidelines of Company Taxation', "' the 
EC Commission set up a group of independent experts headed by Mr Ruding, which 
published its report in March 1992. "' The Committee's mandate, which was to 
evaluate the need for greater harmonisation of business direct taxation within the 
European Community, was legally supported by articles 52,67,58,100,101,220 and 
221, all from the Treaty of Rome. The Committee proposed to answer three main 
questions: 
Do differences in taxation among Member States cause major 
distortions, especially discriminatory distortions, in the internal 
market, particularly with respect to investment decisions and 
competition? 
Insofar as such distortions arise, are they likely to be eliminated 
simply through the interplay of market forces and tax competition 
between Member States, or is action at the Community level required? 
"at specific measures are required at the Community level to remove 
or mitigate these distortions? 
The research work itself was supported by the underlying theoretical 
considerations described below: 
Taxation should be neutral between different legal structures; different 
methods offinancing, especially between distributed and undistributed 
profits; and investments in domestic shares and investments in the 
shares of companies based in other Member States (non-discrimination 
principle). 
A strong European equity market should be created 
501 SEC 90 (601) final of 20.4.1990. 
502 Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, March 1992. 
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3. EC Member States should be guaranteed a steady flow of tax revenue 
based on fair distribution between the source country and the 
shareholder's country of residence. 
4. Administrative feasibility. 
5. simplicity. 
6 Transparency of tax rules. 
7. E cient tax collection. Iff, 
8. Combating tax evasion. 
Supported by this theoretical background, the Committee recognised a 
pragmatic need for European legislative intervention in order to eliminate or mitigate 
the distortions which the wide differences in tax regimes originate in the internal 
market. Accordingly, it concluded that the Commission should concentrate its efforts 
on the following priorities: 
a) removing the discriminatory and distortionary features of countries 'tax 
arrangements that impede cross-border business investment and 
shareholding; 
b) setting a minimum level for statutory corporation tax rates and also 
common rules for a minimum tax base; 
C) encouraging maximum transparency of any incentives granted by Member 
States. 
It concluded that, at that stage, a programme of total harmonisation was not 
justified and believed that the adoption by all Member States of a common system of 
corporation tax was a desirable long-term objective. To implement these aims, the 
committee proposed a package of legislative measures which should be put in place in 
accordance a specific timetable. Basically, they were: 
to extend the scope of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive covering all entities 
subject to corporation income tax, irrespective of their legal form (Phase 1) and 
subsequently covering all other entities subject to personal income tax (Phase 
11); 
to reduce substantially the participation threshold as prescribed in the 
Parent/Subsidiary Directive (Phase 11); 
to propose by way of directive a uniform withholding tax of 30% on dividends 
distributions by EC-resident companies subject to waiver where appropriate tax 
identification is provided (Phase 11); 
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* to press Member States not only to conclude bilateral income tax conventions 
where none exist between them, but also to complete those where coverage is 
limited (Phase 1); 
to define in concert with Member States a common policy on double taxation 
conventions with respect to each other and also with respect to third countries 
(Phase 1); 
to remove the existing discrimination in the taxation of dividends from profits 
earned in another Member State; 
Member States which apply imputation taxes on the distribution of profits 
earned in another Member State should be obliged, on a reciprocal basis, to 
allow such tax to be reduced by corporate income tax paid in another Member 
State in respect of dividends remitted by a subsidiary (Phase 1); 
Member States with various forms of tax relief for dividends received by 
domestic shareholders should be obliged, on a reciprocal basis, to provide 
equivalent relief for dividends received by domestic shareholders from 
companies in other Member States (Phase 1); 
* to examine in the course of Phase I alternatives approaches to detern-ýine the 
most appropriate common corporation tax system for the Community (Phase 
III). 
To reduce the risks of serious erosion of corporate tax revenues, the 
Committee recommended: 
that a draft directive be prepared by the Commission prescribing a minimum 
statutory corporation tax rate of 30% in Member States for all companies, 
regardless of whether the profits are retained or distributed as dividends (Phase 
I) i 
* adoption by all Member States of a maximum statutory corporation tax rate of 
40% (Phase 11); and related to this, 
* that there should be only one kind of tax on corporate income in Member 
States. If this cannot be achieved, local income taxes should be taken into 
account when fixing the statutory corporation tax rate so that the combined 
rate of tax falls within the range of 30% to 40% prescribed by the Committee 
(Phase H). 
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Notwithstanding the comprehensive research undertaken, the Ruding 
Committee asked more questions than it answered in exploring both policy and 
practical aspects of company taxation in the EU. Moreover, it also avoided close study 
of the systems of a smaller Member State such as Portugal. Further criticisms have 
been presented by the Economic and Social Conu-nittee (ESC) in their opinion issued in 
25 January 1993. "' The ESC, while supporting the aim of eliminating double taxation 
of cross border income flows, expressed reservations about a general harmonisation of 
company tax systems, rates and bases of assessment. 
The ESC was opposed to the Ruding Committee's suggestion of a 30% 
withholding tax on dividends other than those covered by the Parent/Subsidiary 
Directive and paid to shareholders not identified as EC residents. It argued that it 
could discourage non-EC investors from committing funds to the EC and lead to EC 
residents investing outside the EC. it was precisely this double risk that made the 
Member States reject the proposal for a directive seeking to introduce a Community 
withholding tax on interest; it would be contrary to the principle of tax neutrality to 
encourage financing through loans at the expense of financing from capital, which 
determined the durability of any investment-led recovery within national economies. It 
supported, however, the Commission's recommendation that the threshold for 
participation in the Directive should be reduced from 25% to 10%. Finally, it regarded 
the proposals to extend the repayment of tax credits where corporate and personal 
taxes are integrated, to shareholders in member states other than where the company is 
located as unrealistic and inadvisable and, any attempt to set a maximum corporation 
tax is regarded as inadvisable and is inseparable from discussions on harmonisation of 
the tax base. It also had reservations about entering into discussions with the Member 
States on the principle and the level of a minimum corporation tax rate. The rules 
relating to the tax base, the ESC believed, should be dealt with by member states in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. The Committee supported the 
Commission's suggestion that a debate on the choice of a common corporation-tax 
system should be initiated at Community level. 
503 See also SEC (92) 1118 final of 20.6.1992. While generally accepting the conclusions and 
recommendations of the Ruding Committee, the Commission considers that the Committee's 
recommendations on a number of elements of the tax base went too far and were not consistent 
with the principle of minimum harmonisation endorsed by the Committee itself. Furthermore, it 
reserved its position as far as a minimum rate of corporation income tax was concerned. It argued 
that such a rate may increase the tax bias in favour of loan finance given that in most cases the 
interest paid to non-residents was exempt from withholding tax. 
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1.2 The Achievements of the Nineties 
An 
After several decades of immobility, two important pieces of tax legislation 
were approved by the EU Council, " the 'Parent- Subsidiary Directive"" and the 
'Mergers Directive. "' Subsequently, another instrument has recently been ratified by 
all EU Member States, the 'Arbitration Convention'. " In 1995, Member States are still 
at early stages of their implementation. Lack of political will and economic recession 
can be pointed out as major factors preventing their implementation. Moreover, the 
abusive use of domestic (or even DTCs) anti-avoidance provisions may compromise an 
effective operation of the policies embodied in those legislative instruments. 
Despite the political stalemate, the work of the European Court of Justice in 
the field of enforcement and application of EU tax principles has become important, 
and may prove to be decisive. "' It was during the period of economic stagnation in the 
seventies in particular, that the European Court of Justice took a leading role in 
ensuring that the principles laid down in the Treaty in relation to taxation found full 
expression and validity. The unsuccessful proposals for the harmonisation of indirect 
taxation were directed in large part at tax structures which were protectionist in their 
effect, and it was the European Court of Justice that broke down many of those 
barriers through the application of article 95 of the Treaty of Rome. "' The 
reinforcement of this trend in the nineties in the field of direct taxation may prove 
critical to Community action in the direct taxes because of the principle of non- 
discrimination, as expressed in article 6 of the European Community Treaty in 
interaction with article 58 and implemented through articles 48,52,59 and 73b. "' 
504 More ambitious moves such as draft directives eliminating withholding taxes on interest and 
royalties or common treatment of losses have been blocked by Member States. 
505 Council Directive 90/435, OJ 1990 L225/6. 
506 Council Directive 90/434, OJ 1990, L225/1. 
507 Council instrument 90/436, OJ 1990 L225/10. 
508 See paragraph 2 below. 
509 E. g. EC Commission v Italian Republic, Case C-120/88, [19931 STC 136. 
51 0 The relationship between article 6, on the one hand, and articles 48,52 and 59, on the other, was 
explained in the case Commission v. Greece, Case 305/87, [1989] ECR 1461. 
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2. JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS 
2.1 Problems Posed by the Dichotomy Nationality-Residence 
Most states base their claims to tax on two sets of criteria, namely residence 
and source. They tax income received by individuals or companies resident within their 
territory and also tax income of non-residents arising from sources there. In general, 
EU member states claim the right to tax their residents on a worldwide basis. 
Exceptionally, the territorial principle is adopted as the main taxing jurisdictional 
principle. "' 
The fundamental problem is that national adherence to the residence principle 
as the guiding tax principle may conflict with the nationality test prescribed by the 
Treaty of Rome"' which also extends to the tax field. In this context, consider the US 
position. In the US, nationality provides the ground to exercise worldwide tax 
jurisdiction over the income of US citizens"' and companies. In the latter case, the 
state of nationality is taken as the state the laws of which give legal personality to the 
company. This criteria has een criticised by several scholars"' and also by the League 
of Nations EesAQauli'5-ýt =621 Committee. But can those criticisms be taken 
seriously within the current EU economic, financial and tax framework? 
Notwithstanding the standard use in EU member states of the residence 
principle as the primary basis to exercise the jurisdictional power to tax, both EU 
legislation and ECJ jurisprudence are still trying to conciliate the consequences derived 
from the operation of both residence and nationality principles within the EU. Should 
the residence principle be replaced by the nationality principle? Is the nationality 
principle better equipped to satisfy the demands of an increasing mobile European 
Union where tax avoidance and human or capital mobility walk together? 
... See French territorial tax system. 
512 E. g. Treaty of Rome, article 6. 
513 See Cook v. Tait (US Supreme Court, 1924,265 US 47,44 S. Ct. 444,68 L. Ed. 895) where it was 
held, based on the presumption that government benefits the citizen and his property wherever 
found, that (even when dealing with lex situs cases) the power to tax belongs to the country of 
nationality, and consequently it cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen or the 
situs of the property (see Richard Kaplan, Federal Taxation of International Transactions, 
Principles, Planning and Policy, American Casebook Series, West Publishing ýo., 1988, p. 5 et 
-5.6T =ATr6eA. )ATQ)AJA(_ ýOuSC(: TWA-AliOM seg., 5G6, 'PLF 
514 t2 1- 6: F W&Ff 2 timt0r: 
Ej 1,; A4VAQ, P115. 
See, for example, Mann, who defends the so-called doctrine of 'closeness of connection' arguing 
that nationality is not a sufficiently close link upon which fiscal jurisdiction can be based. 
See also Martha, The Jurisdiction to Tax in International Law, Theory and Practice of 
Legislative Fiscal Jurisdiction, Kluwer, 1989, p. 75. 
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Decisions emanating from the ECJ in this field are contradictory. This reflects 
how difficult is to achieve a fair compromise between the aims embodied in the Treaty 
of Rome and the demands coming from domestic fiscs burdened by the costs of 
government, and in particular those created by welfare state policies. 
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2.2 Removal of Discrimination: A Quest for Coherence 
When applying the principle of non-discrimination in the field of direct taxation, 
the ECJ had been confronted with the difficult task of interpreting both domestic 
(including if applicable, DTCs provisions)"' and EU tax provisions whose implications 
may go beyond well established boundaries. 
Is it Acceptable to Disctiminate on the Basis of Residence? 
Both domestic and DTCs non-discrimination provisions, as updated by the 
1994 OECD revision, point towards a positive answer to that question. However, 
would this distinction be acceptable within the EU context? 
Seeking Clarýftcafion from the European Commission 
The Commission has not yet reached a clear position in this important topic. 
On some occasions, the European Commission recognised the possibility of 
discrimination based on residence. For instance, in an answer to a parliamentary 
question of 24 January 1992 concerning a pre-levy made by Dutch banks for the 
opening and management of bank accounts for non-residents, the Commission 
accepted that such pre-levy, based on a distinction between residents and non- 
residents, was not incompatible with article 48 of the Treaty of Rome. "' On other 
occasions, however, the Commission adopted a tougher attitude in the field of tax 
515 See David G. Green, Reinventing Civil Society, The Rediscovery of Welfare Without Politics, 
Health and Welfare Unit, Choice in Welfare No. 17, FEA, London, 1993. The author argues that 
the welfare state did not only suppress the incentive system of the competitive market, it also 
suppressed those institutions which served as providing grounds for men and women of good 
character and which provided outlets for idealism, service and achievement. Further, the author 
defends the need to find new ways to 're-energise civil society' through restoration of independent 
citizenship, reinforcement of voluntary organisations and reform of the overall tax and social 
security systems. 
516 it is worth emphasising that most EU DTCs are based in the OECD Model in its successive 
updates which uses the nationality criteria when applying the non-discrimination principle (see 
article 24). However, in the 1992 version, there is a clear reference to the taxpayer's residence as 
one of the factors that is relevant in determining whether taxpayers are placed in similar 
circumstances. 
517 OJ C 162/7,29 June 1992. See also OJ C 58/12,1 March 1993. 
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discrimination. In answer to a parliamentary question of 26 October 1992, it stressed 
the discriminatory character of German legislation concerning income tax under which 
the annual adjustment of taxes on wages was granted only to German residents. "' The 
Commission took the view that the exclusion from such annual adjustment of fi7ontier 
workers who do not reside in Germany was an infiingement of article 48 of the Treaty 
of Rome and of the freedom of movement of workers within the Community. 
Notwithstanding the attention given by the Commission to this important 
principle (e. g. Recommendation of 21 December 1993 on the taxation of certain items 
of income received by non-residents in a member state other than in which they are a 
resident; Doc. C (93)3702 final, OJ L 39 of 10 February 1994, at 22), no clear and 
definitive position has yet been assumed. However, taking into account Opinion 2/92 
of the ECY' declaring the Community competence to participate in the Third Revised 
Decision of the OECD on national treatment 520 and accepting that both the Community 
and member states share joint competence to participate in that decision, it may be 
expected that some of these problems will be faced jointly by the EU and the OECD. 
ECJ. - Again, a Time to Deliver 
A crucial role is now being played by the ECJ in the process of adapting direct 
taxes to the single internal market and the European Union. Although expressly aware 
of the economic and political circumstances, the ECJ has kept alive and operative in 
this area the fundamental principles embodied in the Treaty of Rome, particularly the 
principle of non-discrimination. Strong pressure is being put upon the Court by the 
conflicting interests of businesses and of increasing mobile human capital with public 
and revenue interests. The pressures are increased by governmental invocation of the 
principle of subsidiarity as a tool to prevent what are viewed as excessive 
implementation of laws already approved by the Council. 
518 OJ C 16/2,21 Januazy 1993. 
519 Vide Proceedings of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities, 20 to 24 March 1995, No. 8-95, pp. 7-10. 
520 On June 21,1976 the OECD issued a Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises. See OECD, Declaration by the Governments of OECD Member Countries and 
Decisions of the OECD Council on Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, National 
Treatment, International Investment Incentives and Disincentives and Consultation Procedures, 
Paris, 1976. This Declaration includes a set of Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
principles concerning national treatment of foreign-owned enterprises and principles regarding 
the use of investment incentives and disincentives. As an implementation of the Declaration, the 
OECD Council has adopted three Decisions, which arc binding on the member states. In the 
Decision on National Treatment, the member states agree to notify the OECD of all existing and 
new measures which constitute exceptions to national treatment as defined in the Declaration. 
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This dilemma is well documented in the conflicting approach followed in the 
Bachmann case. "' The exception that was allowed in this case by the ECJ in the field 
of non-discrimination is strong enough to create serious doubts about the future path 
of EU jurisprudence in this important field. The case brought into fine focus the 
conflict between the national pressures for a coherent and integral tax system with 
those of taxpayers wishing to take full advantage of their freedoms of movement and 
establishment. The case re-established the principle that discrimination on grounds of 
residence may in some cases amount to an indirect form of nationality discrimination. 
But the Court also recognised that such indirect discrimination may be justified by 
national fiscal considerations of a member state. 
In the Bachmann case, the conflict was particularly important, because it 
concerned the deductibility against income tax in one member state of contributions 
paid to a scheme in another state. This principle of non-deduction is one of the most 
serious mismatches in personal income tax laws in Europe, as elsewhere. It arises 
particularly because of the immediate cost to public finances of allowing pension 
deductions, and because such allowances were originally seen as deferments of tax - 
the resultant pensions being taxed on payment. Further, national authorities often put 
close checks on the activities of pension funds, and use the privilege of tax exemption 
as a means of ensuring compliance. At present, there is no co-ordination or 
approximation of the conditions imposed by governments in this way. There are 
therefore strong reasons for limiting tax exemptions to national schemes. The Court 
accepted this argument, to the extent of recognising the importance of the link between 
exemption of contributions and taxation of the resulting pension. Discrimination on the 
basis of residence was allowed in order to safeguard the coherence of the Belgium tax 
regime. "' 
521 Case C-204/90, H. M Bachmann v. Belgium (1992) ECR 1992-1. This case involved an individual 
who, in 1971, concluded insurance contracts in Germany with a German company. In 1972 he 
settled in Belgium and from 1973 to 1976 he deducted the insurance premiums that were paid to 
the German insurance company from his Belgian taxable income. The issue was the deductibility 
of those premiums for tax purposes. The ECJ ruled that although national legislation granting 
deductibility for insurance premiums paid in the same state as that of the individual would clearly 
be an infringement of articles 48 and 52 of the Treaty of Rome, this infiringement could be 
justified by the need of guaranteeing the coherence of the applicable tax regime and that articles 
67 and 106 of the Treaty of Rome do not prohibit such legislation. 
522 In this context, it is worth emphasising the growing urgency to provide a satisfactory solution in 
the field of taxation of pensions within the EU. The increasing mobility of persons and capital is 
placing heavy pressures upon domestic treasuries whose revenues have been badly affected by the 
current system of taxation of pensions (e. g. deductibility of pension payments in the 'employment 
(source) state' and taxation in the 'retirement (residence) state'). This problem is reinforced by the 
210 
The chance for the Court to revisit the principle in the Wielockx case" is 
therefore both timely and important. In this case, again a challenge was made against 
the refusal of a government to allow deductions for contributions to a foreign scheme. 
The application was made by a self-employed individual, but the Court found that the 
application of Article 52 raised fundamentally the same points as Article 48. Following 
the guidance of the Advocate General, the Court supported the principles in the 
Bachmann case, but it did so subject to a most important exception. In Bachmann the 
Court accepted the argument that the principle of fiscal coherence could be used where 
there was exemption and no compensating taxation regarding the position of the 
applicant. In Wielockx, the Court shifted from a microeconomic analysis of fiscal 
integrity to a macroeconomic analysis. It observed that the two states involved in that 
case had concluded a double taxation convention with a provision relevant to the 
particular payment in dispute. In the view of the Court, this DTC provision was the 
appropriate way to reconcile the demands of the taxpayer with the demands of fiscal 
coherence. As the states in question had reached agreement at the macro level, they 
could not argue failure of coherence at the micro level. There, there was no national 
answer to the challenge of non-discrimination. Further, the Court found that 
discrimination did exist between residents and the applicant, because the applicant 
earned all or most of his income in the state where he claimed the deduction, not his 
state of residence. 
VVWle these cases concerned the taxation of non-resident individuals, other 
cases raise the fiscally more important issue of foreign companies. A growing number 
of cases have been referred to the Court pointing towards full enforcement of the 
principle of non-discrimination in the fields of both personal and corporate taxation. "' 
In what has been termed a consistent jurisprudence in decided cases, the Court held 
that the principle of non-discrimination prohibit not only apparent discrimination based 
on nationality, but also any form of disguised discrimination. Accordingly, 
discrimination on the basis of residence can amount to a violation of the principle of 
non-discrimination for both companies and individuals. 
progressive increase of ageing population in the EU, as demonstrated by the OECD statistics. See 
Tables 1,2 and 3 at the end of this part. 
523 Case C-80/94 of II August 1995 (G. H. E. J Wielocks v Inspecteur der directe Belastingen). 
524 See Sotgiu (Case 152/73, Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost (1974) ECR 153), Commission v. 
France (Case 270/83, (1986) ECR 273), Biehl (Case 175/88, Klaus Biehl v. Administration des 
Contrib utions (1990) ECR 1990-1), Commerzbank (Case C-3 3 0/9 1, The Queen v. Inland Revenue 
Commissioners, ex parte Commerzbank AG [1993] ECR 1-4017), Halliburton (Case C-1/93, 
Halliburton Services BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financen, [19941 ECR 1-1137) and Schumacker 
(Case C-279/93, Ffnanzamt Koln Altstodt v. Schumacker, [ 1995] S. T. C. 306) cases. 
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The full impact of this latter approach is disturbing for most EU tax systems 
which have been built upon the parallel principles of worldwide taxation of residents 
and source-based taxation of non-residents. 525 Having in mind recent amendments 
introduced in the Treaty of Rome, made by the Maastricht Treaty, 526 and arguments 
before the Court, it seems that member states want to keep that distinction alive 
although they agree not to discriminate on the basis of nationality. 
It remains to be seen whether the ECJ will continue the path initiated with 
these cases and further curb discrimination on the basis of residence. Currently'. to 
prepare for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, a major study is being undertaken 
concerning the role of the Courts in the European Union. A report has already been 
published by the ECJ emphasising the need to reduce the average length of 
proceedings, especially taking into account the increase in the volume of litigation. "' It 
concludes that, if closer integration is achieved in certain fields, it might be that, in the 
longer term, it would be desirable for the Chambers of the Court of First Instance to 
become specialised or perhaps for new specialised Community courts to be 
established. "' As regards the idea of setting up specialised courts, the Court of First 
Instance would point out that such a solution might jeopardise the unity not merely of 
that judicature but of its case-law. The same reservation would not, however, apply to 
the setting up, if necessary, of specialised chambers within the Court of First Instance. 
525 Vide pending case relating to group taxation in the EU (case presented by German parent 
company, Hoechst, against UK Inland Revenue). See also David W. Williams, "European Union 
Overview" in Business Taxation in the European Union, Wiley Chancery, 1995. The writer raises 
the important problem of interaction of EU non-discrimination provisions with double taxation 
conventions: "Of their very nature, double taxation conventions give benefits to nationals or 
residents of the two state parties. How far can a double tax convention provide a benefit to a 
national (or resident) of one state without doing so for all states? " In the writer's view, double tax 
conventions are just as subject to EU law as national tax legislation. 
526 See article 73d which allows discriminatory treatment on the basis of residence or investment 
location if it does not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
the free movement of capital and payments as defined in article 73b. The vagueness of the 
concepts 'arbitrary discrimination' or 'disguised restriction' coupled with the declaration added by 
the Maastricht Conference (according to this declaration, the right that member states have to 
make a distinction between residents and non-residents, in particular, only concerns such 
provisions as existed at the end of 1993 and only as far as transfers of capital and payments 
between member states are concerned) bring ftu-ther uncertainties in this important field already 
burdened by conflicting jurisprudence. 
521 Between 1993 and 1994, the average length of proceedings for direct actions before the Court of 
Justice changed from 22.9 months to 20.8 months; for preliminary rulings from 20.4 to 18.0 
months; and for appeals from 19.2 to 21.2 months. 
528 Vide The Proceedings of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities, No. 15/95,22 to 26 May 1995, Court's Information Service, Luxembourg. 
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3. COMPARISON OF TAX BURDENS 
3.1 Domestic Tax Burdens 
Dismantling Frontiers? 
The three tax systems researched in this work have been based on different 
historic, economic and cultural attitudes. "' These tax systems have been tailored in 
order to meet domestic or/and international aims which had been in place long before 
the introduction of the idea of European integration in 1950.530 While considerable 
progress has been made towards a single and unified system in the field of indirect 
taxation (e. g. the EU tax, VAT and the adoption of a common customs code 531), in the 
field of direct taxation only recently have initial steps been taken towards a more 
neutral and competitive corporation tax system (e. g. adoption of the Parent- Subsidiary 
and Merger DirectiveS53' and recently ratified Arbitration Convention'13). 
It may be argued that, in the process of convergence of direct taxation, 
pressures from the global international community have played the primary role, 
leading to cuts in both corporate and personal income tax rates with concomitant 
broadening of tax bases or the adoption of common models or standardised guidelines 
(e. g. OECD Model Tax Convention and recently agreed OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines). "' 
Comparing Domestic Tax Burdens 
Both the Netherlands and the UK remove completely any economic double 
taxation of dividend income at domestic corporate level by using the exemption system 
of taxation. The system is neutral and efficiency is attained within the corporate 
sphere. "' In Portugal, despite the use of a 95% participation exemption, dividend 
income continues to be subject to economic double taxation, preventing the free flow 
529 See Part I, paragraph 1.1 and 1.2, Part II, paragraph 1.1 and 1.2 and Part III, paragraph 1.1. 
530 For an historical account of the EU developments, see Stephen Weatherill & Paul Beaumont, EC 
Law, The Essential Guide to the Legal Workings of the European Community, Penguin Books, 
1993, chapter 1. 
531 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community 
Customs Code (OJ No. L 302 of 19.10.92). 
532 Council Directives of 23 July 1990 (90/435/EEC and 90/434/EEC), OJ No. L 225 of 20.8.90. 
533 Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of 
associated enterprises (90/463/EEC), OJ No. L 225 of 20.8.90. 
534 See Tables 4 and 5 at the end of this part. 
535 Vide Part II, paragraph. 2.2 a) and Part III paragraph. 2.2 a). 
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of capital and investment within the corporate sector. "' The aim of eliminating 
economic double taxation of dividend income has been pursued at the individual 
shareholder level. In all three member states, tax systems have been acknowledging this 
problem and have been trying to counteract the negative effects of the operation of 
their tax systems. "' 
When comparing effective tax rates on individual dividend income in the three 
selected EU jurisdictions, the disadvantages associated with the operation of a classical 
system are evidenced by the higher tax burdens applying to Dutch individual 
shareholders. Higher personal income tax rates (which also take into account social 
security taxes), "' combined with the absence of measures to relieve economic double 
taxation., lead to very high tax burdens which start at 59.5% for taxpayers taxed in the 
first income tax bracket and increase respectively to 67.5% and 74% for taxpayers 
located in higher income tax brackets. "' Lower effective tax rates operate in the UK 
and Portugal. In Portugal, as a result of recent increases in tax credits and exemptions 
granted at the shareholder level, effective tax rates have been progressively declining, 
currently starting at 39% with the highest rate reaching 59%. but still well below the 
top Dutch effective tax rate. 54' However, the use of the partial imputation system in the 
UK provides better results than those achieved under the other two surveyed 
jurisdictions. By partially integrating corporate and personal income tax systems, 
effective tax rates on domestic dividend income start at a very low level (16.25% for 
exempt shareholders) with the highest rate modestly reaching 49.75%. The UK system 
goes further and eliminates almost completely economic double taxation of dividend 
income at the individual shareholder level (lower and basic rate shareholders pay no tax 
in the dividend received and only higher rate shareholders are liable to income tax). 541 
3.2 International Tax Burdens 
It can therefore be concluded that international tax burdens on dividend income 
are primarily influenced by domestic tax regimes, namely level of corporation income 
tax rate or other taxes charged upon dividend income (see Portuguese municipal and 
536 See Part 1, paragraph. 2.2 a). 
S37 See, for instance, tax exemptions granted in the Netherlands to dividend income and the tax 
incentives given to the set-up of company savings schemes (vide Dutch and UK experiences). 
S38 Neither in Portugal, nor in the UK, is dividend income subject to social security taxes. 
539 Vide Part 111, paragraph. 2.2 b) 1). 
S40 Vide Part 1, paragraph. 2.2 b) 1). 
S41 Vide Part 11, paragraph. 2.2 b) 1). 
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inheritance and gift taxes). However, the important role played by either double 
taxation conventions or unilateral tax reliefs cannot be underestimated, especially if 
relief is granted for underlying taxes paid or an extension of domestic tax credits is also 
given to foreign shareholders (e. g. UK, France or Germany experiences). 
In the paragraphs below, a comparative analysis of international dividend 
income effective tax rates in the three selected jurisdictions is presented, covering not 
only corporate but also individual shareholders of those EU member states. 
Example 1542 
Portugal 47.7% / 61.0% 
34.2% / 45.0% / 57.0% 
51.0% / 62.0% 
UK 
The Netherlands 35.0% / 56.5% 36.0% / 49.6% / 58.0% 
28.4% / 45.7% 
Example 2 
Main Findings 
The comparative analysis presented above evidences the advantages granted by 
the UK tax system to both inward and outward investment. Compared either with the 
Portuguese or Dutch systems, the UK tax system by using a lower corporation income 
tax rate without further taxes falling upon corporate income (e. g. Portuguese 
municipal and inheritance or gift taxes) and by providing underlying tax credits to both 
corporate and individual shareholders, ends up more attractive from a tax point of 
view. Compare, for instance, the Portuguese or Dutch parent's dividend income 
effective tax rates when dividends derive from UK sources (respectively, 34.2%-57% 
542 See also Table 6 at the end of this part. 
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and 28.4%/45.7%) with those charged when dividend income arises from Dutch or 
Portuguese sources (36%-58% and 51%/62%). 
The same is valid to individual shareholders which end up with much lower 
dividend income effective tax rates when dividend is remitted from LJK sources: 43%- 
59.8% against Dutch rates of 58.5%-70.8% and 47.8%-66.5% against Portuguese 
rates of 63.7%-76.7%. 
Inward investment is also treated more favourably under the UK tax system. 
Notwithstanding the comparatively higher dividend income effective tax rates applying 
to UK parent companies, immediate result of the high corporation income taxes and if 
applicable, withholding taxes charged in the source states (e. g. Portugal and the 
Netherlands), the UK tax system subjects both corporate and individual shareholders 
to lower corporate or individual income tax rates than those charged either in Portugal 
or the Netherlands. For instance, taking Portugal as the source state, corporate or 
individual dividend income effective tax rates charged in the UK are lower than those 
charged in the Netherlands (e. g. 47.7%/61% against 51%/62% for corporate 
shareholders and 53.5%/65% against 63.7%-76.7% for individual shareholders). The 
same is equally valid when dividends are remitted from the Netherlands. UK corporate 
or individual tax rates remain lower than those operating in Portugal (e. g. 35%/56.5% 
against 36%-58% for corporate shareholders and 48%/61% against 58.5%-70.8%). 
4. FISCAL IWLICATIONS 
4.1 Tax Revenue Developments in the EU 
Tax revenue considerations cannot be left aside in this analysis, especially 
taking into account current economic climate and the pressures posed by economic and 
financial convergence within the EU. "' From the data published by the OECD, it can 
be concluded that corporation tax remains an important source of revenue in all EU 
member states. "' Any change, such as reduction of tax rate or adjustments in the tax 
base, would involve structural adjustments which should be carefully planned in order 
to prevent an increase of revenue deficit. "' This issue is particularly important for 
member states using imputation systems and extending domestic tax credits to other 
EU shareholders (e. g. UK and France). Indeed, a neutral and non-discriminatory tax 
543 See Table 7 at the end of this part. 
544 See Table 8 at the end of this part. 
See Table 9 at the end of this part. 
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treatment would impose upon these states the financial burden of extending to all EU 
states the benefit of domestic tax credits. "' The problems posed by the operation Of 
imputation systems within an international context has been well rehearsed"' and it 
remains to be seen whether future developments in EU jurisprudence will bring major 
changes to those corporation tax systems. 
On the other hand, classical or other tax systems (e. g. exemption, credit etc. ) 
have been based upon the traditional dichotomy source and residence. Both source and 
residence states try to extract the best revenue package either by charging high 
withholding taxes (reduced under DTCs)... or by applying the worldwide principle of 
taxation with relief for taxes paid in the source state. Strictly from the 'international' 
public revenue perspective, this structure does not provide an efficient answer to the 
problems posed by the interaction of different corporation tax systems. "' Firstly, it can 
be seen that at the corporate level an exemption system is already in place (e. g. 
participation exemption in Portugal and the Netherlands or the special features of the 
UK tax system, in combination with the absence of withholding taxes (see Parent- 
Subsidiary Directive)). "O Secondly, unless an incentive is granted to individual 
shareholders (e. g. claim a credit or deduction under an imputation system or other 
equivalent system), dividend income remains untaxed in the residence state due to the 
absence of exchange of information between the tax authorities of the states 
concerned. In practice, an exemption system is also in place mitigated if applicable, by 
the use of withholding taxes. Clearly, unless an imputation system is in place, "' source 
states end up collecting most of the tax revenue at the expense of residence states (see 
also Tables I and 2 below). 
546 Compare Tables I and 2 below. 
547 See John Chown, "International Aspects of the Imputation System", BTR, 1993, No. 2, Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
548 See that the progressive decrease of either corporate or income tax nominal rates was not 
followed by a decrease in the rates of withholding taxes. 
549 See Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?, Working Paper 
No. 3416, NBER, August 1990. 
550 See also alternative forms of corporate financing through debt or equity in order to avoid the 
economic double taxation of dividend income. 
551 See Table 2 below. 
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4.2 The Division of the International Tax Base"' 
Theoretical analysis 
Table I 
Classical System v. Classical System 
Revenue Collected (%): I Portugal: 1 57.0 
The Netherlands. 1 6.7- 19.7 
Revenue Collected (%)- I The Netherlands- 1 51.0 
Portugal: 1 7.5- 19.8 
Notes: 
** 
See Part 111, example 5. 
See Part I, example 5. 
Table 2: Classical System v. Imputation System 
Revenue Collected The Netherlands- 44.7 
UK: 3.3 -16.3 
Revenue Collected UK- 28.8 
The Netherlands: 19.0-37.7 
Notes: 
See Part II, example 7. 
See Part III, example 6 
552 This important issue cannot be separated from other important topics namely, the relationship 
between tax laws and accounting norms. As economic integration within groups of affiliated 
companies will become greater, separate accounting, as currently practised, will prove 
increasingly unsatisfactory as a means of determining the division of the income of wide groups 
of affiliated companies among the various member states in which they operate. Also, the 
opportunity to engage in creative accounting in order to manipulate the location of profits for tax 
purposes will increase as a result of lack of co-ordination in this field within the EU. 
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TBE PROBLEM OF EQUITY AND DEBT 
In general, EU member states treat debt more favourably than equity finance. 
Not only is deductibility of interest income allowed, subject to any applicable thin 
capitalisation rules, but also a more generous tax treatment is granted to capital gains5" 
and cross-flows of interest income (e. g. exemption or low rates of withholding taxes 
charged unilaterally or under DTCs). "' 
On the other hand, distributed profits remain still subject to the narrow and 
complex set of rules that give form to each specific corporation tax system (e. g. 
imputation system, classical system or other variations of this system). Despite the 
common attitude towards an exemption of dividend income at the corporate 
shareholder level within the EU and the increasing awareness of member states to the 
problems of economic double taxation of dividend income at the individual shareholder 
level (e. g. reduction of personal income tax rate in the UK, increase of dividend 
income exemption and credit in Portugal and more favourable tax treatment granted to 
company savings schemes), distribution of profits is still placed in a lower ranking if 
compared with other alternative forms of finance or investment. 
This problem interacts with another practical problem which is how feasible is 
it for member states to tax cross-border individual income in the absence of exchange 
of information between tax authorities. This problem of enforcement of revenue 
collection can also be traced at the domestic level in states with an unsophisticated tax 
administration. 
Ultimately, it may be questioned how sustainable EU corporation tax systems 
are in the light of revenue policies (e. g. incentives given to company savings schemes 
where individual shareholders can get a free tax return in their shareholdings) and 
practices. "' 
553 See Table 10 at the end of this part. 
554 See in the Netherlands (domestically and under DTCs) absence of withholding taxes on interest 
income and UK tax rules applicable to short interest (no withholding tax is charged) or absence of 
interest income withholding taxes in most of its EU DTCs. 
555 Despite living in a technological era where capital can be easily moved merely by pressing 
computer buttons, tax administrations are still not taking advantage of the technological changes 
especially in the field of exchange of information (see however national pressures to keep bank 




Aner several decades of living in a more closely integrated EU market, member 
states continue to use protective mechanisms and implement legislative measures that 
discriminate towards EU investors. With the dismantling of territorial borders and 
abolition of exchange controls, the last resource employed by states has been to create 
formal distinctions (resident or non-resident) at the tax level and as a result penallse 
EU investors wishing to expand their operations into other EU markets. 
The residence criteria has been associated in the literature with the worldwide 
principle of taxation, principle most commonly used among member states, and the 
source criteria with the territorial principle of taxation. Nowadays the boundaries 
separating this two principles have progressively been diluted, mainly due to the cuts 
made in the corporation tax rates without the necessary adjustments made with 
withholding tax rates charged by source states either under a DTC or under domestic 
provisions. This trend has been reinforced by the gradual shift of major capital 
exporting countries into capital importing countries whose prevalent attitude has been 
to exempt from withholding tax foreign income such as dividends, royalties or interest. 
As demonstrated above, source states tend to retain most of the tax revenue at the 
expense of residence states. Moreover, and taking into account that movements of 
capital can easily escape from the tax net, the enforcement of a worldwide principle of 
taxation is more an ideal than a reality. Recent ECJ jurisprudence has been 
acknowledging this fact and has been giving prevalence to the source principle of 
taxation (e. g. Schumacker or Wielockx cases). 
Notwithstanding the progress already achieved in the EU with indirect taxes, 
only recently significant progress was achieved with the approval by the Council of the 
Parent- Subsidiary and Mergers Directives and the ratification by all member states of 
the Arbitration Convention. It is important to note that those directives have been only 
partially implemented in most member states and/or when implemented, the excessive 
use of anti-avoidance provisions may override their main scope and purpose. 
The impact of the Parent- Subsidiary Directive within the field of corporation 
tax systems was limited, bearing in mind that most EU tax systems already granted a 
more favourable tax treatment to group income, namely by not applying any 
withholding tax upon dividend income or by exempting or crediting foreign taxes paid 
in source state. However, its impact has been high for states such as Portugal where 
corporate investment is not totally exempted from economic double taxation. In the 
Directive, member states were allowed to follow either the exemption or credit 
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systems to eliminate or mitigate international economic double taxation. Despite the 
attractiveness offered by an exemption system, "' no option was exercised, and 
correctly so, at this stage of tax integration. This important topic which directly 
interacts with the DTCs policy is indeed closely linked with the choice of a specific 
corporation tax system and one cannot be viewed in isolation from the other. 
In all three tax systems surveyed, domestic corporation tax systems tend to 
extend their influence over foreign shareholders, for instance through the adoption of 
the same credit or exemption mechanisms granted to domestic shareholders. 
Deviations may occur either towards a more favourable tax treatment (e. g. tax 
treatment given to interest income or capital gains of non-residents) or in the opposite 
direction leading to discriminatory features visible for example in the tax regime 
applying to domestic groups, where an exemption system is in place in all three 
member states. 
All member states covered, follow domestically an exemption system at the 
corporate shareholder level. Within the corporate sphere, economic double taxation of 
dividend income is therefore prevented. At the international level, the participation 
exemption regimes operating in Portugal and in the Netherlands or the use of the IFIC 
in the UK reaches the same aim, subject however to high compliance tax costs. If the 
conditions required by those regimes are not fulfilled, the system moves towards a 
classical system of taxation. As a result, even at EU corporate level, dividend income is 
prevented from flowing freely due to unrelieved economic double taxation. When relief 
is extended cross-borders (e. g. UK partial imputation system and the extension of tax 
credits to foreign shareholders), usually it is dependent upon specific conditions 
incorporated in double taxation conventions. Therefore, different systems become 
activated depending of the specific agreement applied between member states (e. g. 
classical system in DTC Portugal-UK and partial imputation system in the DTC 
Netherlands-UK). These discrepancies were emphasised by the Ruding Report which 
expressly pointed out the distortions and discriminatory effects created by DTCs. "' 
At the individual shareholder level, different tax systems apply. A classical 
system is followed in the Netherlands, a partial imputation system in the UK and a 
hybrid system in Portugal (exemption-credit system). However, the use of special 
incentives and exemptions (PEPs, company savings schemes, etc. ) n-ýitigate to a large 
556 See Ruding RepoM p. 377. 
See Ruding Report, p. 378 and ss. 
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extent the distortionary aspects of the operation of a classical system. The same 
regimes apply internationally either under DTCs or under the domestic unilateral tax 
relief regimes. Here, different circumstances lead, in practice, to an exemption system 
of dividend taxation. Due to the absence of exchange of information between member 
states and unless a specific incentive is given to the taxpayer (e. g. underlying tax 
credit), dividend income remains untaxed except if a withholding tax is charged in the 
source state. 
The overall analysis of these systems poses difficult questions to government 
policy makers and revenue authorities of the states concerned. Can a partial imputation 
system survive in case full enforcement of the principle of non-discrimination is 
pursued by the ECP More generally, can imputation systems effectively work in an 
international context? But, is the classical system the way forward under current 
economic or even revenue circumstances? It is also questionable if what is commonly 
called the "classical system" really constitutes a true and genuine system. These 
problems, if interacted with the dilemma of residence or worldwide taxation and the 
increasing share of revenue taken by source states through high withholding tax rates, 
point towards simplification of the tax systems and efficient taxation at a single stage, 
i. e. territorial basis of taxation. 
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Table I 
Population Over 65 as a Percentage of Total Population 
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Belgium 11.04 14.37 14.70 17.74 21.89 
Denmark 9.13 14.41 14.87 20.11 24.70 
France 11.38 13.96 15.28 19.45 22.72 
Germany 9.35 15.51 17.12 21.74 27.60 
Greece 6.76 13.14 14.97 17.80 20.99 
Ireland 10.67 10.72 11.12 12.57 16.92 
Italy 8.02 13.45 15.31 19.37 24.15 
Netherlands 7.74 11.51 13.46 18.89 24.77 
Portugal 6.99 10.17 13.54 15.63 20.40 
Spain 7.30 10.85 14.36 17.00 22.68 
Sweden 10.25 16.29 16.58 20.81 22.47 
UK 10.73 14.87 14.48 16.27 20.43 
Source: OECD (1988) 
Note: 
Austria, Finland and Luxembourg are not included in this analysis. 
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Table 2 
Estimates of Social Security Spending 
as a Percentage of National Income 
Member State 
..................................... ......................... ............ ............... ............. .................... ..... ... ...... .................. ............ ............................................. ...... - ...... ........................... ...... ...... .......... .... .... .............................................................. ........ .......... ..................................................... . ......... .... I ...... .... I. ý .......... ........................... .............. ..... .......... ........... ................................................................ ... ....... .................... I ............................................ ..... ........ .......................... ............ ............ ............ .... ............ ............. ..................................................... ý .... ýI.......... ... ..................................... ............................. ................ .-.................... ...... ....... ........................ . ........ ....................................................... ..................................................... I .... ........... ............. - ... .... ..... ............... ................................ ............ ....... .......................................................... Year ........ ...... ........ I .............................. ................................... - ........ ............................ ..................... . ....................... -. - ................. ..... . ........... ........ - .......... ........ ............................................ .................. ..................... - .... ........... 
............ ........ ..... I .................. .. ........ ........... ............ ........ .............. ....... ...................... 
.... ............... . ........... ............ 19 84 ... ........ . 20,00 21020 2640 
Belgium 14.0 13.8 17.0 22.7 
Denmark 10.1 9.5 13.5 18.7 
France 14.3 16.5 21.6 27.0 
Germany 13.7 16.4 21.6 31.1 
Greece 10.8 13.0 15.7 19.5 
Ireland 6.7 6.2 6.8 9.9 
Italy 16.9 19.7 25.6 35.7 
Netherlands 12.1 13.4 19.6 28.5 
Portugal 8.2 10.6 12.1 16.9 
Spain 10.0 11.7 13.6 20.4 
Sweden 12.9 12.1 15.9 18.0 
UK 7.7 7.5 8.6 11.2 
Source: OECD (1988) 
Note: 
Austria, Finland and Sweden are not included in this analysis. 
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Table 3 
Unfunded Pension Liabilities 1990 
MentherState* In E-cu 
....... 
% 




Belgium 184 112 128 
Denmark 108 97 67 
France 1078 106 47 
Germany (West) 2290 179 44 
Greece 112 196 96 
Ireland 38 103 102 
Italy 1723 184 98 
Luxembourg 19 238 7 
Netherlands 510 210 79 
Portugal 85 167 68 
Spain 770 183 43 
UK 582 70 40 
TOTAL 7499 145 60 
Source: ABP, European Economy 
Note: 
Austria, Finland and Sweden are not included in this analysis. 
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Table 4 
Corporation and Top Individual Tax Rates (1994) 
Argentina 30 30 
Australia 33 47 
Austria 34 50 
Belgium 39 (standard rate) 45.5 
Brazil 25 25 
Canada 28 (standard rate) 29 
China 30 45 
Cyprus 25 40 
Denmark 34 66 
Finland 25 39 
France 33.33 56.8 
Germany 45/30 53 
Greece 35 40 
Hungary 36 44 
India 45 - 50/65 (foreign companies) 40 
Indonesia 15 -35 35 
Ireland 40 48 
Italy 36 51 
Japan 37.5 (standard rate) 50 
Korea (Republic of) 18-34 50 
Luxembourg 33 (standard rate) 51.25 
Malaysia 32 34 
Mexico 34 35 
Netherlands 35 (standard rate) 60 
New Zealand 33 33 
Norway 28 (municipal tax) 28 
Philippines 35 35 
Poland 40 40 
Portugal 36 40 
Russia 13 30 
Singapore 27 30 
South Africa 40 43 
Spain 35 56 
Sweden 28 51 
Switzerland 3.63-9.8 11.5 
Thailand 30 37 
Turkey 25 50 
United Kingdom 33 (standard rate) 40 
United States 35 (standard rate) 39.6 
Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, Corporate and Withholding Tax 
Rates, International Tax and Business Guide, 1994 edition. 
Coopers & Lybrand International Tax Network, 1994 International Tax 




Personal Income Tax Changes and Proposals 
Between 1986 and 1992 Relating to Base and Rate Schedule 
(FederallCentral Government Only) 
Source: Ken Messere, Tax Policy in OECD Countries, Choices and Conflicts, IBFD 
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Table 7 
Progress Towards Maastricht Fiscal Targets 
General government financial balances and general 
government gross debt (Maastricht basis). 
Shown as a percentage of nominal GDP. 
............. ...................... ...... iwarial Bidan FF 
........ ........ .... ............ .... 
...... .... - .................. ...... : Grms Debt 
Countg 1-993. ý: 
.... ... 
1994. 





1993 1994 1995 1996 
Austria -4.1 -4.0 -4.5 -3.9 62.8 64.5 65.9 66.9 
Belgium -6.6 -5.3 -4.3 -4.0 137.2 136.2 134.5 132.6 
Denmark -4.5 -3.9 -2.1 -1.6 80.3 75.6 75.8 75.4 
Finland -7.9 -5.5 -5.0 -3.3 57.1 60.1 66.5 70.8 
France -6.1 -6.0 -5.0 4.1 45.8 48.5 51.2 52.6 
Germany -3.3 -2.5 -2.3 -2.2 48.2 50.1 58.0 58.1 
Greece -13.2 -12.5 -11.4 -10.0 115.1 113.6 114.0 114.0 
Ireland -2.3 -2.2 -2.5 -2.4 96.9 90.9 86.3 82.1 
Italy -9.6 -9.0 -7.8 -6.9 119.4 125.4 124.9 123.3 
Luxembourg 1.1 1.2 --- --- 6.8 7.0 --- --- 
Netherlands -3.2 -3.0 -3.3 -2.7 81.4 78.3 78.6 78.7 
Portugal -7.1 -5.7 -5.4 -5.0 66.5 69.5 69.9 69.9 
Spain -7.5 -6.6 -6.2 -5.5 59.9 62.2 65.3 67.4 
Sweden -13.4 -10.4 -9.2 -6.4 74.7 79.1 84.2 86.0 
UK -7.9 -6.5 4.2 -2.6 48.3 52.5 54.3 53.7 
Source OECD June 1995, Economic Outlook. 
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Table 8 




... .. . ...... .. . ... . 
. ......... ........ . .................... . ..................... . .................. ...... ........................ ................ ........ .............. I ......... . ...................... ........... - .... - .. . ...................... .............. ....... ...... ........... I ......... ........... ........... ............... - ..... 
....... .............. .. ........................ ......................... ......................... .... ....... I ............ ........................ .............. ...... ...... I .................. ............. - ......... ................ I ........ .... ............... ..................... - ......................... - ....... I ........ 
: 1.9 .0 ........ . .......... .................. ..... ........ .... .................. ....... ........... -1- ....... . .......... .... ....... - ..... I ......... .................. ......................... ...... .... -. - .......... ...... -. - ............. ............. ...... 
1985 
...... ............ ............. ...... ... -- . ... ...... ........ ......... ---- ................. ........... 1.1- .... .. ................. ...... ............. .................... 
19910 1992 
Austria 34.7 35.7 38.6 41.2 43.1 41.3 43.5 
Belgium 31.2 35.7 41.8 44.4 47.9 44.9 45.4 
Denmark 29.9 40.4 41.4 45.5 49.0 48.7 49.3 
Finland 30.3 32.5 37.7 36.9 40.8 45.4 47.0 
France 34.5 35.1 36.9 41.7 44.5 43.7 43.6 
Germany 31.6 32.9 36.0 38.2 38.1 36.8 39.6 
Greece 22.0 25.3 25.5 29.4 35.1 37.2 40.5 
Ireland 25.9 31.0 31.3 33.8 36.4 35.5 36.6 
Italy 25.5 26.1 26.2 30.2 34.5 39.1 42.4 
Luxembourg 30.6 30.9 42.8 46.0 50.1 48.8 48.4 
Netherlands 32.5 36.7 42.6 44.7 44.1 44.6 46.9 
Portugal 18.4 23.1 24.7 28.7 31.6 30.7 33.0 
Spain 14.7 16.9 19.5 24.1 28.8 34.4 35.8 
Sweden 35.0 39.8 43.4 48.8 50.0 55.6 50.0 
UK 30.4 36.9 35.5 35.3 37.9 36.9 35.2 
Source OECD, Revenue Statistics, 1965-1993. 
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Table 9 
Taxes on Corporate Income (1200) 
as a Percentage of Total Taxation 
. 
1965 
. . . .. .. .. 
....................... ............ ., .......... I ... I ... ............... . ... I .............. ............... . ............. ................. .................. I .................... . ............. ............ ...... ... 0 
............. ............. ............. ............ ... ......... ... .......... . ............. ......... . . .......... ......... .......... 
........................ ... .................... . ......................... .... ................... . .... I .............. .... ................... . .... .............. .... ................... . . ................... ................ ....... . - ...................... ........................ . 1,975, 
...... ........ ........ ........ ........ ...... 
. . 
. . . 1 80 1985 19910 1992 
Austria 5.4 4.4 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 4.1 
Belgium 6.2 6.8 7.2 5.7 5.4 5.6 4.5 
Denmark 4.5 2.6 3.1 3.2 4.9 3.2 3.3 
Finland 7.9 5.2 3.9 3.9 3.5 4.6 2.6 
France 5.3 6.3 5.2 5.1 4.5 5.3 3.5 
Gen-nany 7.8 5.7 4.4 5.5 6.1 4.8 4.0 
Greece 1.8 1.6 3.4 3.8 2.7 5.5 4.6 
Ireland 9.1 8.8 4.8 4.5 3.2 5.0 6.8 
Italy 6.9 6.5 6.3 7.8 9.2 10.0 11.6 
Luxembourg 11.0 19.3 15.7 16.5 18.3 16.2 13.1 
Netherlands 8.1 6.7 7.7 6.6 7.0 7.5 6.6 
Portugal -- -- -- -- -- 8.0 8.1 
Spain 9.2 8.2 6.9 5.1 5.2 8.8 6.4 
Sweden 6.1 4.4 4.3 2.5 3.5 3.1 2.4 
UK 7.1 9.1 6.7 8.3 12.5 10.9 7.6 
Source OECD, Revenue Statistics, 1965-1993. 
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Table 10 
Taxation of Capital Gains 
From Disposals of Substantial Participations* 
Belgium Exempt 
Denmark Exempt 











See also Table 6, Notes 8 and 9. 
(1) If transferred to a Special Reserve Account 
(2) Short-term gains are taxable. 
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